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Abdelmadjid Charfi, the author of this book (published in the English translation under the auspices of the Aga Khan University, Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations in London), is one of the most 
outstanding researchers in the field of religious studies and Islamic thought. 
He is one of a few thinkers distinguished for their deep insight, their rigorous 
methodology and their sound analysis. His accurate interpretation is grounded 
in detailed knowledge of the original sources and careful reading of contempo-
rary insights in the humanities and sociology. Charfi has closely followed devel-
opments in this wide and complex field with its multiple perspectives – and 
many potential pitfalls.
Abdelmadjid Charfi was born in the Tunisian city of Sfax in 1942 and initially 
attended a Qur’anic school before going to the Sadikia secondary school in 
Tunis, where a programme of modern education was inaugurated in both French 
and Arabic. Tunisian reformist and modernising thought developed within this 
school, which also nurtured the elite who led the new, independent Tunisia 
and founded its educational, legislative and cultural institutions. Abdelmadjid 
Charfi belonged to the first generation of students at the Higher Institute for 
Teacher Training in Tunis, one of the most important institutes of higher educa-
tion, founded along the lines of the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. This 
rigorous intellectual training enabled Charfi to pursue his studies in France. 
After graduating with distinction from the Sorbonne he taught at the Univer-
sity of Tunis.
During the 1970s, the domain of “Civilisation Studies” was a nebulous one, 
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with the exception of the sterling efforts of a few outstanding scholars such as 
Ahmed Abdessalam, Mohamed Talbi, Farhat Dachraoui and Hichem Djaït. 
Charfi was a contemporary of this group and followed the development of their 
thought. It was inevitable that he, on the basis of his learning and research, should 
propel Arabic studies toward the development of a specialised field of study still 
known today as “Civilisation Studies”. In this area Charfi was a pioneer and a 
founder in the full sense of the term, establishing a discipline whose premises 
and results were coherent, and which drew in a critical manner on the approach 
of the human and social sciences in their various branches. Civilisation Studies 
was thus able to occupy a distinct position among other established scholarly 
disciplines. Civilisation Studies drew on religious anthropology, as well as 
Muslim disciplines, history and human geography, the wide spectrum of human 
science, sociology, philosophy and linguistics, as well as knowledge of the Arabic 
language.
Abdelmadjid Charfi’s varied scholarship has been based on a comparative 
examination of, on the one hand, the meaning of the message of Muhammad 
in its original setting of seventh-century Arabia, and the subsequent reception 
of this message by generations of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Questions 
that he has studied include, for example, Muslim views of Christianity, as well 
as the structure of the arguments that Muslims developed following the revela-
tion of the Qur’anic texts, the Bible, Qur’anic exegesis and dogma. This compar-
ison between original meaning and subsequent reception is also evident in his 
work on the theme of Islam and modernity, whether it be current trends within 
Islam or Charfi’s call for the necessary nurturing of an enlightened conscience, 
integrating the tenets of religion, universal humanity and the values of moder-
nity. Charfi’s approach goes beyond Islam, encompassing the phenomenon of 
religion from its beginnings, its subsequent development and evolving meaning, 
giving as examples both adherents and opponents of religion.
It is noteworthy that Charfi considers religion as a phenomenon that can 
be examined and studied, one that has meanings and functions for its adher-
ents, throughout its history. The only way to study these is in the light of laws 
governing the history of civilisation. Religious scholarship shakes off the grip 
of repetition and marginal glosses and opens up to renewal based on novel and 
creative thought. Charfi’s enquiry covers the whole of the Islamic tradition, 
promoting deeper understanding and attitudes conducive to personal lucidity 
and responsibility, in harmony with contemporary values. 
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On the basis of this view of Islam, Charfi has published a number of books and 
essays, and edited a series of publications about the renewal of Islamic thought, 
including Muslim Thought and Its Response to Christians Until the End of the 
Fourth/Tenth Century (Tunis/Algiers, 1986), Islam and Modernity (Tunis: Dār 
al tunisiyya lil nashr, 1990), A Renewal of Islamic Thought (Casablanca: Fennec 
Editions, 1998), Islam: Between Message and History (Beirut: Dār et Talī‘a, 2001) 
and Islamic Thought: Rupture and Continuity (Tunis: Dār el Janoub/Paris: Albin 
Michel, 2008).
 This series of publications edited by Charfi represents a personal project of 
research and study. It was also a way of associating younger scholars with his work 
and reflection, while also becoming a testing ground for research methods which 
he has applied to various subjects. Sixteen titles have appeared in a series called 
“Islam Singular and Plural”, studying cultural pluralism within a contextualised 
view of Islam. He has prepared the ground for a programme of research that will 
doubtless be enriched in the future. Charfi, despite his continuing creativity, had 
to retire from teaching when he was sixty. However, he has not withdrawn from 
university life or lost contact with students; he is still committed to directing 
and evaluating their work.
It is important to mention that Charfi has supervised numerous theses whose 
authors have followed in his footsteps and drawn inspiration from his capacity to 
identify the specificity of a particular question, his rigorous analytical approach 
as well as his personal commitment to learning and its advancement. The 
research of these younger scholars represents more than the title of an academic 
certificate: they have become part of Charfi’s research project and the scholarly 
view he has evolved, one that developed from the work of innovative thinkers ill 
at ease amid the crisis of religious thought, the decline of religious learning in the 
Arab and Muslim worlds and the plagues of violent extremism and self-interest. 
There has been a corresponding loss of freedom and an undermining of the basic 
rights that guarantee intellectual creativity, individual responsibility, integrity 
and social vitality. Abdelmadjid Charfi has, therefore, sown a seed which will 
burgeon in the minds of a new generation of researchers, a sign of his belief in 
the universality of learning and his response to the contribution he received from 
the proponents of renewal, among his contemporaries and his predecessors.
Islam
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In the Company of the Innovators
“Innovators” is a term with numerous meanings, some of which may be a source 
of confusion, a point that should be mentioned before proceeding further. One 
of the meanings handed down from the past is derived from a hadīth attributed 
to the Prophet, the so-called “hadīth of renewal” according to which God sends 
every hundred years a person who will renew the community’s religion. This 
hadīth has been employed by plagiarists and falsifiers with two aims: to counter 
the concept of the Mahdi in Imami Shī‘ism in particular, and as a subterfuge to 
dilute the negative associations of the term bid‘a, associated with innovation and 
deviance, also mentioned in the hadīths attributed to the Prophet. It is certain 
that Charfi and his fellow innovative thinkers are not “hundred-year” emissaries 
or supporters of the Mahdi. They are creative thinkers who have developed a 
new way of looking at religion, one that sustains them in the face of tradition. 
Through their writings they have freed themselves and evolved a coherent system 
of thought pertinent to their world.
Renewal can also mean the revival and purification of religion, as used by 
Wahīd Khān in his book written in Urdu in 1978, entitled The Renewal of the 
Religious Sciences, although we do not consider that Charfi and his associates 
adhere to this view.
Charfi’s viewpoint, on the contrary, is closer to that emerging from an 
article by Amīn al Khūli published in the review Risāla in 1933 with the title 
of “Renewal in Religion”. Khūli embarks on a reexamination of the text of the 
Qur’an and narrative material associated with the Prophet, seen in the light of 
recently discovered data and today’s needs. Built around sound logical analysis 
and discernment, renewal entails reconstructing, for today’s world, an intellec-
tual framework that is meaningful and functional, insofar as modernity models 
its basic constituents. Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) understood the term 
“renewal” as a rebuilding, the development of a new theory.
The position which Charfi has chosen is precisely that of the second Reform 
movement as mentioned by Abdou Filai-Ansari in his book Réformer l’Islam.1 
This reformism is not preoccupied with following the righteous ancestors; nor 
does it consider its mission as one of purifying religion and belief from “innova-
tion” and plagues that have affected its unblemished spirit. From an intellectual 
point of view its task is clear: revising in a critical and rigorous way the structures 
of thought that preceding generations of scholars had put in place. The path that 
Introduction
5
this reformism has chosen is not a secure and smooth road. It is a road that leads 
to the discovery of the values of the message of the Prophet in its Qur’anic form, 
translated by the Prophet into a form that took account of questions of history 
and actuality. This road also opens up the universal dimension of the Proph-
et’s message. Thus, the principles of religion are a source of moral inspiration 
in the context of real history and the Muslim conscience is no longer divided. 
The reformers’ project of revision is carried out in an intellectually rigorous way, 
pertinent to the time in which we live. This is a project different from that of the 
preceding generation, one that draws on the Islamic principle of legal capacity 
founded on freedom, maintaining a sense of responsibility which is an individual 
duty, not a collective one.
The basic change in the approach of the second Reform movement is one that 
goes beyond the question of identity, which Charfi considered a false question. 
The change consists in substituting a legalistic and insular religious structure 
with a moral pattern for living which realises the highest human creative capaci-
ties for the attainment of goodness and happiness.
A point of view such as that of Muhammad Iqbal concerning the perfection 
of prophecy should be situated against this kind of intellectual and theoretical 
background. Charfi drew on Iqbal’s theory for inspiration when he declared 
to his interviewer in the review Contemporary Islamic Questions “the sealing of 
prophecy means that people become fully responsible without seeking outside 
advice, whatever justifications outside parties may present”.2 This is also the 
position of another contemporary Tunisian thinker, Mohamed Talbi (1923– ) 
who, in his noteworthy defence of an “oriented reading” of the Qur’an, stated 
time and again that personal integrity, adoption of freedom as the basis of 
religion and the following of the moral and human aims of the Qur’an are all 
worthier and more important for the Muslim than following the ancestors and 
legislating according to their legal schools. Talbi called for fiqh (jurisprudence) 
to be set aside in favour of a new historical and spiritual approach in the light of 
the original aims of the Qur’an. This viewpoint is grounded in the insistence of 
the Pakistani thinker, Fazlur Rahman (1919–88) in Islam and Modernity on the 
necessity for the text of the Qur’an to be announced on the basis of a movement 
in two directions: the text is situated in the social and intellectual setting of 
seventh-century Arabia, so as to uncover the original meaning of the message 
and its general moral values. Moving on to today’s realities, these values are trans-
lated into a form appropriate to the integration of believers in modern societies. 
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One may note that Fazlur Rahman likewise insists on the need to dispense with 
institutionalised legal scholarship and constraints imposed by theologians on 
the original aims of religion.
We do not subscribe to the generalisation that only Arab regions or scholars 
influenced by Orientalists are concerned by the radical reexamination of 
religion through the creation of a new interpretative method. The reality is very 
different. In Iran scholars such as Shaikh Muhammad Mujtahid Shabastari and 
Abdel Karim Sorush, though they may have differed in the application of their 
ideas and in their conclusions, do not deny the need to search for the moral 
aims of religion. Tradition can obscure the living text of the Qur’an, which is 
meaningful when situated in today’s reality. By the standard of Iranian culture, 
Shabastari’s book, The Hermeneutics of the Qur’an and the Sunna, is a highly 
significant text.
There are certain Indonesian thinkers who belong to the reformist school. 
They have been described, perhaps inaccurately, as the thinkers of “Liberal 
Islam”. Among them are Nour Khalis Majīd and Abderrahman Wahid, and the 
current coordinator of the Liberal Islam Network, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, against 
whom Attia Ali, head of the Association of Indonesian ‘Ulamā’, issued a fatwa 
calling for him to be put to death following the publication of his article in the 
Indonesian newspaper, Kompas Daily, on 18 November 2002. 
This small group of scholars base their reflection on the belief that there is 
no text which is somehow above interpretation when it is exposed to the condi-
tions of modern life. Every text, including the Qur’an, has to be subjected to new 
interpretations and considered afresh. The same group of scholars lays down a 
second principle: the crucial point in a religious text is an understanding of its 
aim and its spirit, not the particular means through which this spirit was commu-
nicated in periods of history when prevailing mentality required such means. 
These thinkers have undertaken to safeguard the universal human principles of 
the text and create contemporary means of realising them. Some examples can 
illustrate the originality of their point of view. Nour Khalis Majīd, for example, 
holds that Islam is plural by necessity since it accepts variety as a social reality, 
beneficial for all. On this basis, Nour Khalis Majīd gives a novel interpretation of 
Sūra 3:19 which says, “God’s religion is Islam”, arguing that religion, any religion, 
is devotion to God and all religions are the same in this respect: Judaism, Chris-
tianity and Islam. He goes on to assert that: “Every believer who does good 
and is upright in heart and character is a spiritual Muslim. Along with Jews, 
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Christians and Magians, idol worshippers in India and China and Japan are 
also peoples of the Book and Muslims can marry their daughters.” Ulil Abshar 
Abdalla shared this opinion, believing that positive values, wherever they are 
found, such as obedience and piety, are in fact Muslim values. All religions are 
equal in this respect. Ulil Abshar Abdalla adds that all forms of discrimina-
tion on grounds of religion and belief should disappear. Prevention of Muslims 
marrying non-Muslims is an interdiction that should disappear since the Qur’an 
considers people as equals, a single family whose members and inclinations vary 
and who seek and carry out the good in varying ways.
These thinkers, regardless of their origins in various parts of the Muslim 
world, share basic elements of this historical-critical approach that seeks libera-
tion from traditional authority. This shows that the question of reform and 
the horizon of renewal are rooted in a modernity that is a limitless journey of 
discovery. This is the opposite to the traditional theological understanding of 
belief in Islam, as stated in the hadīth attributed to the Prophet: “The believer 
is like a camel: when he is curbed, he is led.” The most important results of this 
research are particularly evident in the audacious practical applications carried 
out by some of these scholars.
Mohamed Talbi opposed the prevailing understanding of the Qur’anic text 
stipulating that women should be punished by beating, distancing himself from 
the ways in which jurists, when legislating, have considered women as inferior, 
to the point that discrimination against women has become an obstacle to 
development in the Muslim world. Fazlur Rahman, for his part, courageously 
opposed slavery although the Qur’an accepted it and legal scholars entrenched 
it on the basis of unjust (and disgraceful) judgments. His position on female 
inheritance has remained open to revision as a defence against the rancorous 
criticism directed against him, although he has not been entirely protected 
against it. Tunisian scholar Hichem Djaït was criticised for his refusal to accept 
that the story of the Cave had any significance; in his view it was a storytell-
er’s invention.3 Charfi has not hesitated to state clearly that fasting is not an 
obligation for Muslims as it is easy for them to substitute it with feeding the 
poor. This goes against the opinion of all the schools of jurisprudence and is 
contrary to popular belief, which is the basis for the authority of legal scholars, 
muftis (expounders of Muslim law), and, often, political rulers. This is the intel-
lectual, theoretical and scholarly context of Abdelmadjid Charfi’s book. It is a 
“building block” among many others similar to it, distinguished by its basis in 
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the philosophy of human sciences as an instrument of examination and study. 
The premises of the book are governed by reason and fact. What has been the 
contribution of the human sciences, apart from the creation of a new approach 
among the members of the reformist group we have mentioned? Two essen-
tial elements can be identified: truth (of any kind) cannot be dissociated from 
the cultural context that nurtured it and from the structure of thought in the 
language that has fashioned the truth. Secondly, religion is one of the (many) 
phenomena through which culture communicates a possible way of under-
standing and structuring the place of human beings within existence (as it 
unfolds). As a consequence of the first important element, religious truth, tradi-
tionally thought to be far removed from people, though they might disagree 
about its nature, is seen as a truth in the course of elaboration through the 
efforts of those interpreting it. It is far from being the absolute truth formerly 
imagined. This is pertinent to the question that numerous scholars have endeav-
oured to examine, namely, the variety (and the pluralism) of Muslim cultures. 
The same quest structures the series of publications coordinated by Abdel-
madjid Charfi, eloquently entitled Islam: Singular and Plural. The inevitable 
result is that religious knowledge founded by stories and accounts which have 
stabilised in the form of a seemingly fixed and eternal law have become the 
object of questioning and inquiry from outside the logical system sustaining it. 
Truth in the field of religion moved away from being a truth grounded in belief 
to a search for the way in which truth itself took form.
Such a search necessarily requires the questioning of articles of faith firmly 
established by a series of factors: the passage of time; an exaggerated attention 
to intellectual credibility; the sacrifice of the core moral values of religion; and a 
quest for legitimacy among the religious and political establishment.
How the humanities evaluate religion is a question with numerous ramifi-
cations. The central question concerns the way in which a religion takes on a 
specific form with meaningful structure in a society that adheres to this religion. 
There are three main elements in this system: the modes of belief; the character-
istics of religious law; and the scale of moral values. This system is meaningful 
only if it explains the enigmas of human existence that perplex men and women. 
It is reasonable to maintain that the explanatory function is not created by the 
religion itself; rather, it is the religious person in an historical setting with the 
intellectual equipment furnished by his or her culture. The humanities illustrate 
how societies are capable, in a practical sense, of reinventing the interiorised or 
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culturally defined explanatory approaches. These latter may appear venerable 
through the passing of the years and their retelling. In this setting Abdelmadjid 
Charfi presents Islam: Between Message and History.
A Title and a Vision 
The title that Abdelmadjid Charfi has chosen for his book is one that opens up 
a question. The term “Islam” shifts from its stable position in culture, heritage 
and tradition (a position of power controlling belief and education) to become 
a phenomenon, thereby susceptible to historical examination and study. The 
proof of this change can be found in the author’s move away from narrative 
knowledge to knowledge in the form of investigation and careful study. Knowl-
edge as narration remains as the ancestors saw it: correct and valid knowledge, 
truth accepted in the name of belief, imitating the preexisting code of practice. 
Knowledge as questioning is a quest for understanding, to employ Hichem 
Djaït’s term in Revelation and the Qur’an and Prophecy published in 2000. The 
usages of the past are the object of radical reexamination, and the validity of its 
results depends on the conclusions of the source criticism and the examination 
of these usages in the light of the laws of history and civilisation. For this to 
happen, the use of the human sciences has to be accepted as legitimate.
The title sets face to face two visions of Islam which are not similar, contrary 
to what Muslims thought for many decades. The first is a vision fashioned by 
the aims of the message, a living and growing discourse, in Muhammad’s social 
context. The second is a vision of Islam current in history, among the succes-
sors to the first Muslim communities in cities and in successive eras of history, 
in a variety of societies with their cultures and questions. The title is eloquent 
through its use of the separation or bridge-word “between” to indicate the inter-
pretative effort to which the message has been subjected in order to regulate 
the life of Muslims and promote religion with its explanatory role in different 
societies. Interestingly, the title also alludes to the way in which the interpreter 
approaches or distances himself from the aims of the message, claiming never-
theless that religion is being safeguarded. Charfi concentrates on the wide gulf 
or even contradiction between the original aim and the ways in which Muslims 
have interpreted it. 
An example of this would be the Qur’anic call for liberty and the way that 
legal scholars entrenched slavery and gave details of judgments on the subject, 
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the laying down of the principle of equality between the sexes and the persist-
ently negative view of women to which legal scholars gave their seal of approval 
through a series of unfair practical provisions. Charfi intended that his readers 
should revise the essentialist view of Islam anchored in popular consciousness, 
and, through many examples, to study the Qur’an in its original social and intel-
lectual setting. 
He also examines the ways in which immediate challenges were handled, 
although the message transcends these, attaining a wider human dimension. 
Subsequent generations of Muslims imagined that through their religious 
heritage they were applying the teachings of Islam as they were revealed to 
Muhammad. Charfi’s invitation (eloquently summarised in the title) to revisit all 
these questions is a quest for a reliable intellectual approach which can identify 
the moral core within the message of Islam, and which answers the dilemma of 
human conscience consumed by despair, without a moral element of restraint.
The title thus goes beyond the content of the book, enunciating an approach 
valid to questions beyond those concerning Islam. The title delineates the main 
sections of the book and its main points: the message of Islam in its original 
setting, its characteristics and organisation and the message in history, as well 
as a variety of questions which have been subject to interpretation by Muslims 
over time.
The Message of Islam: Closure of Prophecy “From the Outside”
Charfi examines the message of Islam through two phenomena: the Qur’an 
and the Prophet Muhammad. Charfi is aware of the intellectual difficul-
ties associated with the historico-critical method in analysing religious texts, 
which have been assumed by a community, celebrated and revised, assembled 
and codified after a period of oral transmission. They have become a possession 
of the community through which God is worshipped. The phenomenon of 
Muhammad has also been enveloped in a mass of stories, legends and tales of the 
Prophet’s military campaigns. These subsequent ways of imagining the Prophet 
were honest by the standards of their authors and their ways of expressing 
themselves. Their accounts of the Prophet’s miracles furnish ample proof of this. 
The Qur’an clearly rejected that any miracle other than the eloquence of the 
Qur’an be associated with the Prophet. The Qur’an’s origins were divine and the 
Prophet was not its source.
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Charfi presents the research on the specificities of the message by highlighting 
the function of religion as a means of explaining the enigmas of human existence. 
This is an important dimension of the way in which people organise themselves 
in society and interact with its culture. It is striking that humans create institu-
tions and subsequently confer religious sanctity upon them. The origins of these 
institutions are forgotten and they become religious absolutes (Islam: Between 
Message and History, page 29). The choice of ‘Arafāt as the place where pilgrims 
spend the ninth day of the pilgrimage is a departure from the practice during 
the pilgrimage of Quraysh known as the pilgrimage of al Hums. This was for a 
political aim, that of weakening the power of Muhammad’s Qurayshi opponents 
and also uniting followers, who would subsequently be termed the Umma or 
Muslim community.
For specialists of jurisprudence the question had been formalised and they 
argued unhesitatingly that the “Hajj is ‘Arafāt”. The same happened with regard 
to circumcision and the veil, which regrettably has become a major subject of 
debate between Muslims themselves and among non-Muslims. The fact of the 
matter is that Assyrian laws and Christian religious literature linked the veil to 
the social status of women.4 Charfi examines the explanatory function of the 
two phenomena, Muhammad and the Qur’an, within the socio-cultural setting 
where the message was revealed. Making Muhammad precede the Qur’an is 
significant: the messenger comes before the message: were it not for the former, 
the latter would not exist. We shall subsequently see that the Prophet is not, in 
Charfi’s eyes, a passive instrument, he is active in revelation and in its shaping. 
The Qur’an and the message flow from the phenomenon of the Prophet and his 
personality. In spite of the paucity of sources in the chronicles about the status 
of Muhammad before his prophetic mission and even afterwards in Mecca, 
Abdelmajid Charfi deduces that he was not an important personality in Meccan 
society or among his own people, despite the claims of biographical literature. 
He was an ordinary man integrated into the culture of his milieu, sharing in 
its mentality and belonging to his milieu in the usual ways. Abdelmajid Charfi 
does not deny that Muhammad practised the religion of his people before the 
beginning of his mission. It seems to us that this observation is correct in the 
light of marginal reports that Muhammad was fervent in his religious practice, 
otherwise the question of the ritual assembly on ‘Arafāt would not have been 
significant. Traditional accounts also mention his piety, a spiritual and devout 
attitude which could be linked to the pious figures of the pre-Islamic period 
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and to the pious persons living in proximity to the Kaaba; thereby discarding 
subsequent Islamic interpretations in order to recover the meaning of the term 
“piety” in pre-Islamic Arabia. The same is true of accounts of the Prophet eating 
according to pagan liturgical usages, according to the names of the idols he 
pronounced. Ibn al Kalbi mentions in the Book of Idols the question of ‘Uzza: 
“I sacrificed to ‘Uzza a dust-coloured ewe while I was a follower of the religion 
of my people.”5 There is nothing here to cast shame on Muhammad as he had 
not yet assumed his prophetic mission. On the contrary these are credible links 
between Muhammad and his milieu and culture.
The Prophecy of Muhammad: a Composite Prophecy
Biographers stressed that Muhammad was chosen for his mission on grounds 
of merit. A contrary point of view would sometimes emerge between schools 
of Muslim thought in subsequent theological debates about the question of 
prophecy: was he chosen on grounds of merit or, rather, preferment? Charfi 
has reoriented the question toward an examination of the historical and social 
context, to uncover the question of preparedness for prophecy and the truthful-
ness of Muhammad in what he contemplated and subsequently expressed initially 
to a small group of friends, before proclaiming his message to the crowd in the 
sacred precinct. Charfi’s opinion is that Muhammad was aware of other religions 
because of his journeys and his contact, either by chance or on purpose, with men 
of religion and others. This was not unconventional for his time. Muhammad 
was seeking piety. He was devoted to his spiritual quest. He was also in contact 
with spiritual figures. As a result of his meditation he was certain that God had 
chosen him to proclaim the message (Islam: Between Message and History, p. 40). 
Charfi does not exclude the possibility that the prophecy of Muhammad may 
have been a composite prophecy joining together previous prophecies among 
the people of Israel and in the Arabian peninsula (Islam: Between Message and 
History, p.  45), embracing preceding prophecies save elements which had been 
abrogated (Islam: Between Message and History, p. 43).
This reliance on preceding prophets was important in order to “steady” the 
Prophet, as in Sūra 20:99 of the Qur’an: “And We relate to you all the accounts 
of Noble Messengers, in order to steady your heart with it.” The significance 
of Muhammad emerges in this compilation of previous prophecies and their 
arrangement in a manner suited to the people of his time, their mentality and 
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their preoccupations without, however, blending with their own points of view 
or their religious or moral opinions. Had he done this he would not have been 
a prophet nor would he have faced violent opposition (Islam: Between Message 
and History, p. 46). Muhammad was genuine in his prophecy and in his sharing 
with the people of his time, his experience of God in a profound and moving 
way. He had perceived the absolute and contemplated infinity and the invisible.
He was deeply convinced of the authenticity of these experiences (Islam: 
Between Message and History, p. 42). He communicated this experience in a 
cultural form expressing a new way of perceiving the world while dispelling some 
of the existential anxiety people experienced. Muhammad was not, therefore, a 
passive prophet (Islam: Between Message and History, p. 44); he was determined 
and able to influence others. He did not, however, perform miracles, contrary to 
prevailing Muslim belief and scholarly evidence. The claim that the Qur’an was 
a miracle of Muhammad’s was a claim invented by scholars in the same way that 
they invented miracles and attributed them to him. They interiorised all these 
inventions which then became the object of veneration.
Muhammad as the Seal of Prophecy 
It has become a widespread belief among Muslims that the question of the seal 
of prophecy is a clear and unambiguous matter: Muhammad is the last of the 
prophets and there is none after him. Many thinkers considered that Islam repre-
sented the highest form of maturity and evolution among the messages of the 
three monotheist religions. 
Two other opinions developed which helped to open up a new horizon of 
meaning: the Baha’i interpretation is the first of these. The Baha’i understanding 
was that the Prophet Muhammad did not close the door of revelation necessary 
to sustain religion, nor was he the last of the prophets; but rather that religion 
is completed and enhanced by him. This means that Muhammad is among the 
prophets the one who confers upon them honour and distinction, while the 
messages of God to his servants are continuous and eternal.6 The second opinion 
is that of Muhammad Iqbal, who thought that prophecy when it was completed 
carried within itself the element leading to its disappearance. This means that 
human responsibility begins when prophecy is interrupted and ended.
Abdelmadjid Charfi was aware of the opinion common among Muslims and 
of these other two points of view. He introduced an original way of looking at 
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the question of the seal of prophecy. The seal of prophecy, according to Charfi, 
can be likened to someone closing the door of his house from the interior, 
remaining a prisoner of the house. It can also be compared with someone closing 
the door from the outside and who benefits from the contents of the house and 
what is outside. The opinion deeply rooted among Muslim scholars and many 
hadīth scholars is that Muhammad closed the preceding prophetic messages 
from the interior of the house; he is the last of the Prophets and there is no life 
for the believer save within this enclosed environment. This view of prophecy 
is a constricting one, contradicting the historical law of alternation and change. 
For that reason Charfi believes that the closure was a closure from the outside, 
putting an end definitively to the need for people to rely on resources other than 
their own. The task of the Prophet of Islam is, therefore, to guide people to a 
new sense of responsibility and to accept the results of their own choices (Islam: 
Between Message and History, p. 80).
Many of these insights seem far removed from the logic of the stories in 
traditional sources which have influenced the orientations of religious and 
cultural practice. In terms of contemporary Islamic thought they are original 
interpretations of the heritage of the past, including perceptions of the person 
of Muhammad. The Muhammad present in the writings of Charfi is different 
from the magical representation of Muhammad inherited from the past. He 
has managed to connect Muhammad, prophet and person, with the prevailing 
mentality in his society and culture. Prophecy, therefore, was a visible phenom-
enon, and in the conscience of the Prophet, an appropriate source of knowledge 
to which all previous prophecies contributed. Muhammad was confirmed in his 
mission by this knowledge, and genuine in his proclamation of it. Charfi’s point 
of view is important in that it reconsidered attitudes interiorised by Muslims and 
written down by scholars; on grounds of their venerable history these attitudes 
have become part of cultural and religious practice, considered by the majority of 
Muslims to be the gauge of their piety, even if they were contrary to the Qur’an.
The Phenomenon of the Qur’an
Discussions of the phenomenon of the Qur’an entail research about the kind of 
culture amid which the Qur’an appeared, within which it interacted and from 
which it derived its linguistic means of expression and its instruments of discourse. 
It also supposes an examination of the mission of the Prophet as a whole, its 
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social origins, the horizons of its thought, its existential preoccupations and the 
ways of receiving the revelation communicated by the Prophet. This leads in turn 
to the history of the Qur’an and how it took form. Abdelmadjid Charfi, with his 
keen anthropological sense, was aware of all these questions in his examination 
of the culture and the mentality which the discourse of the Qur’an penetrated 
and which the message shaped, thus acquiring its basic characteristics. 
The first of these characteristics is that the culture in which Qur’anic discourse 
took form was an oral culture. This is essential when deciding on the meaning 
of a verse sent down as revelation to the Prophet as the person being addressed 
does not know who is addressing him. Understanding the original meaning of 
a verse is, therefore, difficult. If one adds the question of the growth of revela-
tory discourse over twenty-two years, one may realise the difficulty confronting 
those who claim that they possess the original meaning of the Qur’an. Further 
complications arise when the researcher realises that it is impossible to recover 
the oral context of revelation and the situation of those hearing the revelation. 
In order to get round this difficulty, Muslims, scholars and simple believers alike 
have believed that the book composed between two covers is the Qur’an. This is 
a mere hypothesis grounded in popular devotion. 
The second characteristic of the message of the Qur’an is that the people 
to whom it was addressed had a mentality heavily influenced by a sense of the 
sacred and by myth (Islam: Between Message and History, p. 46). It is, there-
fore, natural that Qur’anic discourse should reflect this way of thinking, with 
its  miscellaneous images, examples, parables and stories, to say nothing of the 
rhythm of the discourse and the mysterious letters which scholars did not under-
stand despite their voluminous writings on the subject. All these elements form 
a mythical horizon for the discourse of the Qur’an, one that is appropriate to the 
mentality of the Arabs of the peninsula who received the text. Yet behind these 
stylistic features, the person receiving the revelation is the one concerned by the 
message. For the message to have a meaning among its followers and in human 
history, the content of the message has to change with the mentalities of the 
times. Otherwise the text remains silent and inanimate. The solution that Charfi 
approves is to disregard the circumstantial commands and interdictions neces-
sary at the time of the revelation (even if it was of fundamental importance) and 
to present the latent aims and intentions. 
This second characteristic (the influence of myth) had a decisive effect on 
legislation. Charfi has voiced audacious opinions on legislation connected with 
Islam
16
liturgy and social relations. He states that the revelation never alludes to Sharī‘a 
in terms of divine law, but uses it to mean a way, one of the meanings of the term 
“Sharī‘a” (Islam: Between Message and History, p. 59). This is the general meaning 
and the profound vision delimitated by the aims of the message. The judgments 
in the Qur’an are few in number and varied in content, so it is more accurate to 
consider them as general pedagogical and moral orientations (Islam: Between 
Message and History, p. 60). The few details of judgments that Muslims may find 
in the Qur’an are circumstantial in character and cannot be set down definitively 
for all time. A literal approach to the text and the few judgments therein is a 
sort of veneration of the letter of the text, removed from its historical context 
and from the mentality of the person receiving the text. Those who treat the 
text in this arbitrary way, neglect the higher aims of the text and cling instead 
to a particular set of transient historical circumstances whose protagonists have 
passed away.
The Qur’an did not give detailed instructions about liturgy and prayer, but 
merely gave impressionistic suggestions of a type suitable to a mentality influ-
enced by myth and legend. It is strange that scholars invented artifices and 
stories to support the putting in place of detailed instructions about religious 
observances. Prayer, alms-giving, the pilgrimage, fasting, even jihād, sometimes 
included in the pillars of Islam; their aim is the service of God or social solidarity 
or an expression of faith in the one God, as in the pilgrimage for example. Ritual 
and ceremony are mere forms; the decisive point is the spiritual aim behind 
them, or the reforming, moral or educational intention. These can be validly 
achieved without the outward cultic forms.
The Sunna’s insistence on word-for-word details of religious usage and 
practice did not take into account the mentality of the society in which the 
revelation took place. Such an approach is concerned with the form, not the 
aims, of the message. The same is true of relations between people as the Qur’an 
did not give detailed judgments in a number of important matters such as 
apostasy, the system of government, family organisation and economic questions 
in general. There are general succinct allusions to stealing and adultery, although 
these are general allusions taking account of prevailing mentalities with regard 
to social relations. These stipulations are determined by their historical circum-
stances and the prevailing mentality of society. They are not decisive; the educa-
tional and moral aim of the message expressed through such stipulations is of 
primary importance. The aim of the message is pedagogical and moral; it is not 
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an  instrument of legislation by means of a few summary provisions. The message 
of the Qur’an aims at attaining religious freedom, preventing slavery, securing 
equality between men and women and the elimination of abuse in all its forms. 
Attention should be given to these values when endeavouring to understand 
the discourse of the Qur’an as well as popular piety. The Prophet’s life needs 
to be considered in the same way; deeds of his which are considered exemplary 
and binding are only expressions of the mission he assumed with his Compan-
ions: one that entailed changing mentalities and behaviour inconsistent with 
the message of the Qur’an (see Islam: Between Message and History, p. 68). 
The reader may be surprised by examples of killing, violence and slavery perpe-
trated by followers of the Prophet or with his knowledge, although these were 
prevailing practices that necessarily disappeared with the passage of time. 
These opinions seem striking and audacious. Charfi’s far-reaching conclusions 
are based on the theory of the aims and the intentions of the Qur’an. He did not 
invent this theory, although those who developed it did not go as far as Charfi 
in his elaboration of it, neither Shatibi, nor al-Shawkani nor Allal al Fasi or Ben 
Achour, for example. Charfi has applied a point of view which is seen today as 
his most important and original contribution to the renewal of Islamic thought; 
that is, his understanding of the notion of the seal of prophecy as a description of 
the message of the Prophet. The aims of the message of Muhammad can, there-
fore, be seen as a seal of prophecy applied from the outside, contrary to the repre-
sentations produced by scholars in Islamic history.
Islam in History: Closure from the Interior?
Charfi states unhesitatingly that successive generations of Muslims were not 
faithful to the intentions of the Qur’an and that they sometimes deviated 
from it due to attitudes lacking in refinement. He seeks a justification for this 
point of view through the study of three phases which saw the development of 
attitudes which departed from the intentions of the Qur’an: the succession to 
the Prophet; the formation of the religious establishment; and the theoretical 
reflection accompanying it. Regarding the succession, were the Muslim commu-
nity faithful to spiritual and religious values when choosing Abu Bakr? Charfi’s 
reply is clearly negative.
It was the favoured solution, one that imposed itself due to the weakness of 
other solutions. The succession could have taken place on a tribal basis, as was 
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the case before the time of Muhammad, although the changes introduced by the 
message of the Prophet made this impossible. A second solution was for wealthy 
members of the Quraysh tribe to take control: this also proved impossible. It was 
thought that a third solution was possible: succession according to the Sahīfa or 
“Constitution of Medina”, a procedure that had not yet finally taken  established, 
institutional form. Harbingers of a fourth “solution” appeared: a civil war over 
the succession, although prospects of such a turn of events quickly receded. At the 
Saqīfa (the term used for negotiations preceding the designation of Abū Bakr), 
signs of possible conflict emerged again. A fifth possibility would have been for 
power to have been entrusted to the people of the House, the close relatives of the 
prophet such as ‘Alī or al ‘Abbās. Opposition, notably to ‘Alī, and the weakness 
of his supporters at that time eliminated this possibility. Finally, Abū Bakr was 
designated as successor: he was the oldest, most experienced and had personal 
charisma. He was also, according to traditional accounts, a genealogist. Religious 
considerations did not come into consideration in Abū Bakr’s designation. The 
question seems not to have concerned the Muslim community as much as it did 
those wielding power and influence. This is contrary to the spirit of equality 
between Muslims (Islam: Between Message and History, p. 92). The same can be 
said of the enslavement of captives during the conquest, and is even clearer with 
regard to excessive tax collection and the treatment of women, all accepted by 
the collective Muslim conscience and firmly rooted in culture and law. Perceived 
today as part of a Muslim golden age, they are contrary to the higher aims of the 
message: a call to freedom, social concord, helping the weak, equality between the 
sexes and protection of human dignity. The entrenchment of these attitudes and 
practices contrary to the spirit of the higher aims of the message was due to their 
taking on an institutional form: this is what Charfi terms “institutionalisation”. In 
his view there were three phases in this process: distinguishing between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in complete contradiction to the message of the Prophet which 
called for mutual knowledge and cooperation in order to develop understanding 
between peoples. A study of the edicts relating to the Dhimmis reveal a series of 
punitive measures which marginalise minorities, in contradiction to the message 
of Islam and the most basic human values. 
The second process involved the codification of prayer and religious practices 
without any real reflection; religious practice became form and ritual, whereas 
previously meditation on the message was intended to attain the moral and 
pedagogical aim of the message. 
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The third process turned religion into an institution by codifying the way 
(whereas in reality there is more than one way) to believe, contrary to the 
message of Muhammad, with its broad acceptance of various ways of believing 
and its aim of bringing people together around common spiritual values in the 
cause of peace and progress. The theoretical basis of the institution was laid 
down by scholars in the following areas: jurisprudence and its origins; exegesis; 
hadīth; theology; and Sufism. The most important deduction by Abdelmadjid 
Charfi in the field of jurisprudence ( fiqh) is that rites and prayer were laid down 
in detail on a non-Qur’anic basis, so disconnecting ritual from its spiritual aims. 
Conduct unconnected with Islam was sanctified by scholars on the grounds 
that it was an imitation of the ancestors. Charfi also deduces that scholars 
progressively created a barrier preventing Muslims from directly encountering 
the Qur’an, a tendency that manifested itself in the way that culturally influ-
enced sunna isolated believers from the sacred text (Islam: Between Message and 
History, p.  126).
The same was true of the study of the origins of jurisprudence; the theory 
created by Shāfi‘ī detailed the ways of dealing with Prophetic discourse, 
preventing even the basic freedom that Muslims would have enjoyed, were it 
not for the decision of Shāfi‘ī, author of the Risāla, that no judgment was to 
be made without proof in the Book of God. Thus, the interpretative effort to 
ascertain the aims of the message of the Prophet and the responsibility of the 
individual were reduced to making analogical judgments based on a preceding 
case. In every case legal scholars wanted to surround judgments with a dense 
hedge of definitive prescriptions taking no account of changing circumstances 
which modified systems and the content of legislation.
Qur’anic commentary was not exempt from this tendency to hedge the text 
with prescriptive commentary. It is clear in this field of Muslim erudition that 
scholars prescribed in detail the ways of dealing with the Qur’anic text. They 
rarely examined the real difficulties arising from the language of the Qur’an, 
the link between verses and the question of abrogation; or speculation about 
the circumstances of revelation. Culture and traditional practice prevented any 
personal effort outside the limits laid down. As pointed out in Islam: Between 
Message and History the interpretation defended by a particular school of 
thought was even more rigid.
Hadīth is another example of how scholars deviated from the aims of the 
Qur’an. Contrary to the Prophet’s wishes, hadīth were codified. Hadīth were 
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surrounded with an aura of sanctity and Shāfi‘ī went so far as to say that the 
wisdom mentioned in Sūra 4:138 “God has sent down to you the scripture and 
wisdom” is the Sunna. Falsification of hadīth, as each sect sought to legitimise its 
authority and marginalise its rivals, use of hadīth as a commentary on religious 
practice and ever more detailed judgments and directives for prayer and worship: 
these are the real dilemmas for the freedom and conscience of Muslims. Hadīth 
collections must be subjected to rigorous critical examination. The Turkish 
Department of Religious affairs announced in February 2008 a plan to revise 
the hadīth collections and remove elements contrary to the original intentions 
of the message and its humanistic values.
Charfi’s revision of how theology and Sufism are understood is similarly 
radical. Theologians and compilers of manuals of belief all belonged to a partic-
ular sect and stipulated in detail what belief entailed, in their opinion. They 
prevented free speculation and deviation (considered as unbelief ) from their 
views. As a result they legitimised the division of the community, while claiming 
to speak for a religion whose original aspiration was to create a single, united 
entity, bound together by resilient solidarity, equality and creativity derived 
from the diversity of its origins and resources. 
From this historico-critical analysis and a close reading of various sources 
representative of Islamic disciplines Charfi deduces that Muslim scholars were 
not faithful to the aims of the message of Muhammad, which was intended as an 
“open” conclusion to previous prophetic messages. It drew inspiration from the 
accumulated messages of the past, and gave Muslims their due part of respon-
sible freedom in order that they might create according to their desires, on the 
condition that they accept the consequences of their creativity. 
Charfi has “unpacked” the religious establishment, exposing its functioning. 
He has exposed in detail how Muslim scholars have sacrificed the aims of the 
message and practice of the Prophet, and its humanistic values. In so doing 
Charfi calls for a departure from the confines of codified institutionalisation 
and a move toward freedom and creativity, in keeping with the aims of the 
message of the Prophet. The true Muslim in his eyes is one who is innovative and 
creative, not one who follows in the footsteps of the ancestors, valid though their 
 experience may have been. Charfi sees true religion as giving meaning to human 
life in the context of the cosmos, its origins and ultimate destiny. Humankind 
thus rises above the animal level to that of the free, responsible, thinking person. 
In Charfi’s words: “the human person worthy of the name is not intellectually 
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lazy, but confronts his existential and relational difficulties in a responsible 
manner.”7
A Call for a Free and Responsible Muslim Conscience
The solution that Charfi proposes is for today’s Muslims to understand and 
reflect upon the aims and exigencies of the message of Muhammad. They should 
also shake off the authority of the religious establishment and of culturally deter-
mined religious practice. This means in practice that Muslims should embrace 
secularism, an important consequence of modernity in contemporary society. 
Secular Muslims are aware of historico-critical practices and realise that religion 
is not synonymous with the religious establishment. They are also aware that 
subservience to ancestral practice restricts individual freedom and destroys 
moral responsibility. They realise that the domination of minor details constricts 
believers with codes and rules and narrows down the spiritual horizon of the 
message, a horizon that believers shape for themselves. 
One of the least attractive images of Muslims today is that of people somehow 
split down the middle, who belong neither to the past (in terms of its preoccu-
pations and ways of thinking), nor to the present with its challenges and rapid 
changes in the field of technology and learning. Charfi sees the only solution 
as being a resolute choice in favour of the present instead of the past and the 
exercise of free personal judgment rather than deferring to others. Free thought 
and assumption of the consequences of one’s decisions are the basis for the moral 
dimension of the Muslim conscience. Muslims today can interiorise Qur’anic 
morality not according to the schemas of past luminaries, but by concentrating 
on the universal values toward which the message of the Prophet was directed, 
going beyond solutions linked to particular circumstances, values that define the 
characteristics of fully human individuals worthy of the position their Creator 
has entrusted to them.
This informed conscience understands the wide-ranging nature of the call 
for the application of the Sharī‘a today and realises that the inheritance of men 
and women must be equal, applying the principle of authority between sexes. 
Such a conscience also understands that legislating for civil institutions on the 
basis of religion and dogma is an incorrect way of proceeding which undermines 
the organisation of society, setting people against one another on account of 
illusory symbols. This accompanies an awareness that morality among Muslims 
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today is not defined in terms of rites and liturgies and Qur’anic commands 
and inter dictions; rather morality defines the values of freedom, responsibility, 
equality and solidarity, justice and mutual respect which together realise human 
 happiness. These are the aims of the message of Muhammad, as well as the forms 
and means which guarantee the application of these values today. Thus, the 
modern Muslim conscience is faithful to the aims of the Prophet’s message and 
the values of modernity. The Muslim is not a stranger to the period in which he 
or she is living.
This invitation issued by Abdelmadjid Charfi is based on serious research and 
a significant intellectual venture embarked upon by a scholar from a Muslim 
society. It is serious because it runs counter to the current which seeks to entrench 
the power of culturally determined religious practice, an adventure because its 
outcome cannot be guaranteed among Muslims themselves. Rigorous research, 
adherence to the principle of unfettered thought, moral responsibility and intel-
lectual integrity: in the case of Abdelmadjid Charfi these mean a putting into 
practice the aims of the message of Islam and the exercise of individual discern-
ment (ijitihād) in a non-fundamentalist way.
The reader may wonder how to categorise this book and its author: is it a 
piece of academic research carried out by a university teacher competent in his 
domain and able to organise the methods and basis for his work in a Tunisian 
university setting? Or is it an intellectual enterprise where an author has endeav-
oured to follow a particular theory and provoke the curiosity of Muslims, 
traditionally protected against uncertainty and questioning by a parrot-like 
repetition of tradition, without finding therein anything of help to them today, 
or any spiritual sustenance capable of responding to their present aspirations? 
Or is it a literary work in the traditional sense of the term, rebelling against false 
values and revealing authentic values which enable the life of the mind to redis-
cover its mission of enlightenment? Do the book and its author thus represent 
a new voice of reform? Let the reader make what he or she wills of the book. 
It is indisputably a book which challenges and unsettles its readers, preventing 
them from following obediently where others lead them. In this book resonates 
an echo, one hitherto hidden by a mere illusion of truth which has enveloped 
readers from a Muslim background, no longer able to make up their own minds. 
Readers from other backgrounds will find in this book elements that they do 
not hear amid the prevailing false and vacuous hubbub of voices. They will be 
surprised that the book does not conform to the usual patterns. They will find 
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precise analysis, truth, audacious interpretation, examples quoted from cultures 
and learning of varied origins, as well as from a variety of philosophical schools. 
They will wonder how these various elements are forged into a captivating whole.
The book had an impact in the Arab world as well as in Iran, while scholars 
and commentators in France appreciated the book prior to its translation 
into English. There was general agreement that the book’s publication was an 
“event”. They perhaps meant by that that they found a novel type of intellectual 
rigour from within the Muslim community. In the case of Charfi the human 
sciences have enriched an original point of view, one where concepts are clear, 
where opinions are not forced or manipulated and whose structure is sound. 
Here, then, is a book which may enrich what readers already possess in the way 








Defining a prophetic message in a general sense is relatively easy; it can be described as the discourse that a prophet communicates to his contemporaries, his community and to people in general. However, 
the interpretations of prophecy and its content are many and varied. Prophecy 
and inspiration are among the most difficult terms to deal with, as their meaning 
changes over time, along with religions and cultures. These terms are also 
connected with the term “God”, “that mystery which divides us even as it reveals 
itself and binds us together when it inhabits us”.1 
The task of defining the term “prophetic message” is rendered more difficult 
by the fact that it evokes unique historical experiences which cannot be relived 
at second-hand. The protagonists involved were human, although they were 
invested with qualities uncommon among ordinary people; qualities which 
attracted followers and disciples who believed in their message and strove to 
spread it. They believed in a spontaneous way, and they did not theorise the 
content of their belief until some time after the proclamation of the prophetic 
message. As far as the history of Islamic thought is concerned, this theorising 
took place only in the context of ‘ilm al kalām (theology); it was not an initial 
concern of the community, more occupied with the political situation than with 
the rational organisation of the tenets of belief and their content.
For the moment, therefore, the contribution of the theologians has been 
left aside, in order to re-examine what the history of religions has to say about 
prophecy and inspiration. Thereafter, close reading of the text of the Qur’an will 





reveal) to uncover the historical reality behind the text. This means reexam-
ining the tales of the Sīra (biography of the Prophet), although we know that 
they were compiled only after the events that they narrate and that they are a 
“reading” of history which reflects the writer’s own situation (Ibn Sa‘ad, Ibn 
Ishāq, Ibn Hishām, Tabari), as well as the events that befell the Muslim commu-
nity after the death of the Prophet, notably during the period between the death 
of the Prophet and the compilation of his biography. In other words, they are 
a particular representation of the events of the Prophet’s life, a representation 
influenced by external circumstances, ambiguous to some extent, and so to be 
treated with caution. It is clear that a communal folk-memory does not record 
exactly the events of a hero’s life, but transforms him into a kind of archetype 
invested with the qualities required by his mission. It does not soberly record 
historical events but presents them in a way that reflects the ideal qualities of the 
heroic founder figure.
Manifestations of the sacred and forms of religious practice and profession 
have varied widely throughout history, as excavations and successive archaeo-
logical discoveries have shown. Traditional religions, mysticism and prophetic 
revelations provide further examples of this diversity. Not all the characteristics 
of traditional beliefs will be examined at this point, since their variety makes 
it difficult to present them in a summary fashion without the risk of deforma-
tion: these include, among many other examples, ritual celebrations of the yearly 
cycle of seasons organised in agricultural societies at the beginning and end of 
the planting season, rites connected with death and significant events in the life 
cycle such as birth, puberty, marriage and illness, the conferral of a sacred status 
to trees and places, the sanctification of natural phenomena such as the sun and 
certain planets, the veneration of idols, the deification of rulers and the myths 
which narrate the lives of heroes and gods. We are essentially concerned with 
the stages through which humankind passed in its search for the meaning of 
existence, explaining the origin and destiny of human life and creating a belief 
system as a bulwark against the apparent disorder of creation. 
Human existence requires a structured environment of some kind, which 
entails giving a specific order and coherence to events and phenomena, be 
they part of the natural world or arising within human society. Understanding 
and accounting for such phenomena provides a defence against the vagaries 
of blind chance or hazard. Once such a Weltanschauung has been elaborated, 
it undergoes continual refinement, thus creating culture, with its material and 
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spiritual dimensions. Culture is one of humankind’s particular attributes, which 
distinguishes it from animals. The instruments, institutions and values which 
together create culture acquire, with the passage of time, a certain autonomy 
and cohesion. These are then considered part of the very nature of things, and 
once “interiorised”, to use the sociological term, humans obey these institutions 
and values automatically, forgetting that they are, in reality, human creations.2 
Human creativity, in any field, engenders a subsequent series of creations 
which acquire autonomy and objectivity, and are continually “interiorised” in 
a dialectic fashion. In other words, in early history humankind languished in a 
state of alienation, unaware of the meaning of its actions and of what constituted 
authentically human behaviour at a personal or collective level.
Simply as an example, one can observe that societies lay down rules and 
constraints to govern sexual relations. Such rules vary from one society to 
another, but they are nonetheless present, defining what is permissible and 
licit, or forbidden and illicit. These rules are integrated into the structure of 
the individual’s personality. Self-knowledge is thus acquired by interiorising 
the ways in which society considers the individual. A successful education and 
upbringing means that social rules will seem evident to the individual and he or 
she will not transgress them, or imagine that he or she might transgress them, 
without feeling guilt and remorse. If a person does not follow these rules and is 
sanctioned for that, he or she  will consider him or herself guilty and deserving of 
punishment. Other forms of relations within society function in the same way. 
Through a comprehensive observance of the laws prevailing within society, the 
individual is brought to accept the status quo, without any inclination to rebel 
against the established order of things or to transgress it. No alternative to what 
is already familiar and allows the group to function can be contemplated by the 
individual. People will even willingly sacrifice themselves so that these values 
may be respected when their tribe, people, or nation is engaged in conflict. 
Religion has historically played a fundamental part in conferring absolute 
legitimacy on options taken at a particular time. Social institutions thus receive a 
validity which goes beyond their historical reality, anchoring them in a common 
origin surrounded by a halo of sanctity. These institutions thus appear as though 
they are a reflection of the cosmos itself. This latter is a continuous circular 
movement manifesting itself in successive natural phenomena which triumph 
over chaos, a movement which humans reenact symbolically through liturgy and 
its concomitant expressions and gestures. The most ancient forms of  religiosity 
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are characterised, inter alia, by the belief that transient human actions are 
inscribed in an order of continuity and permanence, invested with quasi-divine 
attributes. Individuals and societies can thus face up to their own mortality as it 
is believed to be part of a sacred temporal continuum. 
Religion’s role of legitimisation, an integral part of all religions, took on an 
animist form in primitive religions which imagined a world in which human-
kind was not distinct from other elements of the created order. These religions 
were based on a number of founding myths which explain the nature of existence 
in general and were characterised by a belief in magic, particularly with regard to 
words pronounced by individuals considered capable of directing the course of 
events. Ritual played a highly important role in maintaining the equilibrium of 
existence and in integrating the individual into society.3
It is in this context that the phenomenon of offering sacrifices to remote, 
mysterious deities can be observed. Sacrifices, sometimes entailing human 
offerings (the eldest son, an unmarried daughter), or more generally involving 
specific animals, are not intended only to placate the gods or ask for fertility, but 
also to restore an equilibrium that has been lost. This was necessary in cases of 
drought, floods, tornadoes and earthquakes, or when a society’s laws and usages 
had been transgressed. Those officiating in these rites, which included sacrifices, 
were aware of their magical and religious significance and hoped that through 
these rites the continued stability of existence would be guaranteed. The healthy 
development of animals, abundant prey for hunters, as well as harvests and 
fruitful trees, the birth of children without any defects, the regular succession 
of the hours and the seasons, all of this depended on carrying out certain rituals. 
If this order of things was disturbed in any way, humans considered themselves 
responsible for this and the prescribed rites had to be carried out in order to 
return events to their normal course. 
This form of religious practice continued in various forms throughout the 
prehistoric era, in particular before the invention of writing and the growth 
of more developed and complex forms of religious practice. Indian and Asian 
religions will not be examined in any detail, as their influence on the monotheist 
religions of the Near East was a limited one. It is worth observing, however, that 
traditional religions left a residual deposit, as it were, in the monotheist belief 
systems. This is particularly clear in the Judaeo-Christian Bible. Among these 
are, for example, the magic effect of words pronounced in particular circum-
stances, and the ancient belief that plants and animals attained full existence 
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only when they received a name. Another example is the notion that human-
kind was created from clay; traces of this exist in Sumerian beliefs. The story 
of Creation in the Old Testament contains a number of elements belonging to 
ancient religions: the existence of an imaginary land between two rivers is clearly 
of Babylonian origin; the episode in which Adam eats the fruit of the tree and 
loses his immortality echoes the story of Gilgamesh who also loses his immor-
tality. As for the sacrifices mentioned in the Bible, it is one of the elements of 
Canaanite ritual in which offerings are considered food for the gods, although 
it is also present in ancient religions and among many peoples and cultures. A 
standing stone could also be a symbol of divine presence and this belief was 
current among the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula even before Biblical 
times. Sacrifices were offered in proximity to the stone, particularly at the begin-
ning of spring. Other symbols and rites which existed in the region were also 
retained in Biblical times, although they were invested with new significance.
Belief in the one God may well represent a new element introduced by 
Judaism, although the Torah does not so much deny the existence of other gods 
as insist that the God of Moses does not brook the acceptance of other rival 
gods. Baal was the god of the Canaanites and among the Hebrews his cult was 
associated with that of “El” and “Yahweh”, finally becoming one single deity. The 
final separation, and rejection of the cult of Baal, took place only in the seventh 
or eighth century bce. It is also noteworthy that the Torah presents a God who 
is human in his qualities and weaknesses: he is capable of love and hate, happi-
ness and sadness, he pardons, he exacts revenge, and so on. However, he does not 
have the failings of the Greek gods; in particular, he does not tolerate mockery. 
The survival of certain elements of traditional belief systems should not, 
however, lead the observer to neglect the radical novelty of monotheist religion 
and the rupture it provoked with traditional systems. Even the resemblance 
between God and man is only one of God’s attributes: the other is that of a 
radical otherness, a sole Being, surrounded by heavenly creatures. He is the 
absolute judge, representing a desire for perfection and purity in an absolute 
form. It is not surprising that monotheist religions do not contain traces of 
the conflict between heavenly forces present in many other religions, and that 
monotheism’s proponents across the centuries contain a proportion of fanatics, 
in the light of their desire to assume divine qualities. At the same time, they 
attach importance (in a way that Hindu deities do not) to the principles and the 
practice of morality, and historical events possess a religious significance insofar 
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as they are manifestations of the divinity. Another example of this would be the 
interdiction to consume the fruit of the tree in the Garden of Paradise: a new 
idea took form here, unrelated to the symbolism traditionally associated with 
the tree, namely the significance of knowledge as something possessing existen-
tial value, together with the fact that science has the power to transform the 
foundations of human existence.4
At the heart of the radical novelty of monotheism was its advocacy of human 
responsibility for all actions, especially those considered evil. God, on the other 
hand, was held to be innocent of all involvement. God addresses man for the first 
time in the Old Testament when he addresses Abraham, asking him to do certain 
things and promising others. God, however, is not affected by the nature of the 
subsequent actions of Abraham, nor does he “need” them in any way. Human 
refractoriness does not lead, as was the case before, to some kind of instability 
in the natural order. The bond between Abraham and his God is one of faith. 
Those who offered sacrifices were aware of their value, as we noted earlier, 
whereas Abraham did not understand the meaning of the sacrifice of his son 
when this was requested of him. He responds to the call of faith alone when he 
is on the point of sacrificing his son. It is this faith which sustains Abraham and 
sustains humankind as a whole in the face of difficulties, trials and experiences 
throughout life. The figure of Job, together with that of Abraham, embodies this 
deep faith which does not waver despite the severe trials of the believer. 
Even if the historians of religion are inclined for the most part to deny the 
notion of a linear evolution from polytheism to monotheism, insisting, on the 
contrary, on the permanence of certain common elements in religious experi-
ences of different kinds, that does not deny the quantitative leap represented by 
monotheism within the history of religions. It reduced the role of magic within 
religion and considered events within their historical context. It gave importance 
to a system of belief in which reason played a part. The notion of prophecy, too, 
underwent notable changes. Making prophecies while in a state of trance was 
a phenomenon which existed in Canaanite religion, and around 1000 bce the 
Hebrews encountered prophets in Palestine while at the same time having their 
own seers during their period as nomads. Subsequently, the term of prophet and 
that of seer came to be synonymous. The prophets were of two kinds: those who 
were affiliated to cultic institutions, joining the priests in the celebration of their 
liturgies. Certain of these prophets were accused of being charlatans. A second 
category uttered prophecies not in their capacity as functionaries of the temple 
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cult, but because God had chosen them as prophets. This gave them the power to 
foretell the future and transcend the laws of nature. When they prophesied, they 
fell prey to strange afflictions including paralysis, fainting, stupors and rolling on 
the ground. They were convinced, in particular, that they were not speaking of 
their own accord, but were communicating the word of God, together with his 
orders and prescriptions. The Old Testament has immortalised the prophecies of 
Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Amos, who lived between the eighth and the fifth 
centuries bce. Abraham, Lot, Isaac and Jacob were considered patriarchs rather 
than prophets. Prophecy, in the sense of the communication of a divine message, 
was a Jewish phenomenon, which explains the opposition to the prophecies 
of Muhammad when he appeared among the Ummiyin (a term which means 
“non-Jewish”, rather than “illiterate” as many commentators have imagined).5
When Jesus initiated his preaching in Palestine, his contemporaries, whether 
they had adhered to his teaching or not, interpreted his message in the light 
of contemporary Jewish representations of prophecy. The occupation that a 
Messiah would save his people from the yoke of foreign expectation also influ-
enced popular reactions to Jesus’ teaching, together with what were taken to be 
signs of the imminent end of the world and the coming of an age of harmony 
when the wolf would go out to pasture with the lamb without doing it any harm. 
Doctrines concerning such subjects as the relationship between Jesus and God, 
the incarnation in the person of Jesus, the Word or “Logos” and the under-
standing of sacrifice were all developed by the first generations of Christians 
after the Church seceded from the Jewish community, due to the influence of 
Paul in particular. The spread of Christianity among Gentile nations influenced 
by Hellenic and various Gnostic currents of thought also contributed to this 
process of doctrinal elaboration.6
The Arabian Peninsula, and in particular the region of Hejaz, was not isolated 
from the various religious and cultural currents existing throughout the Near 
East, whether in Syria, Palestine, Egypt, or Mesopotamia, and the neighbouring 
Persian empire. Geopolitical boundaries, in the modern sense of the word, did 
not exist between the various centres of population separating them from one 
another. Various forms of commercial contact, together with conflict and crises 
such as famines, meant that cross-cultural exchanges took place in an ongoing 
and reciprocal fashion. The pilgrimage to Mecca and markets were occasions 
during which different currents of thought and belief converged. The birth of 
Islam in the early seventh century ce should be seen not only as a natural prolon-
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gation of the Judaeo-Christian monotheism present in the region, but also as 
part of the religious evolution of humankind across the centuries. This does not 
mean that the prevailing conditions in Mecca and the surrounding region should 
be neglected, but they should not, on the other hand, be considered as the sole 
determining influence on the message of Muhammad, as though this were simply 
a reaction to these conditions or a reworking of the pre-Islamic heritage. Much 
of Western scholarship concerning the early development of Islam is marked by 
this approach, which, despite appearances, is influenced by ideas which circu-
lated in medieval Europe about Islam.7 The message of Muhammad presented 
itself as a continuation of previous religious teaching, and there is no reason 
why it should not be accepted in this light, especially as this interpretation is 
confirmed by objective historical analysis. 
While monotheism may have initially developed in a Jewish environment, it 
was permeated by anthropomorphism as well as by residual traces of the religions 
that had preceded it.8 For example, the notion that God had spoken on occasion 
under the collective name “Elohim”, and that he was the God of a particular 
people rather than a kind of cosmic God. Rituals and prohibitions occupied an 
important place in the Old Testament, and early Judaism had no conception of 
the resurrection and everlasting life after death.9 Christianity, with the doctrines 
of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the special status of Mary and the saints and 
their relics, led to a drift away from a pure form of monotheism to a greater or 
lesser extent. It is certain that the Jewish and Christian communities existing in 
the regions of Hejaz or the north and south of the Arabian Peninsula were not, 
religiously speaking, of a high level of refinement, nor did they participate (with 
the exception of the community of Hira) in any meaningful way in the theolog-
ical development which Egypt and Syria experienced. A Bedouin, oral character 
marked popular culture in the Jewish and Christian communities and led to a 
blend between their respective cultures and local elements of popular belief. A 
distance opened up between these forms of religious faith and official doctrine as 
elaborated by rabbis and theologians, who had attained a high level in theological 
reflection and the study of the textual sources on which doctrine was based. 
The Hejaz, cradle of Islam, was ready at the beginning of the seventh century 
ce to receive the new religion. The foundations of tribal society had begun to 
weaken due to the rise of Mecca as a position of power and influence and organi-
sation, which made it a hub of religious and economic activity throughout the 
whole Arabian Peninsula. The ongoing wars between the Persian and Byzantine 
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empires, together with the weakness of Yemen in the face of their competition, 
played an important role in modifying the existing trade routes between Asia, 
Europe and Africa, placing them under the control of the Quraysh. Qurayshi 
merchants, moreover, had succeeded through a system of alliances in guaran-
teeing the security of caravans. They were able to ensure that a share of the profits 
went to tribes through whose territory the caravans passed.10 This situation gave 
rise to a kind of tacit recognition of the Quraysh’s preeminence, as revenue gener-
ated by trade was added to the symbolic authority derived from the pilgrimage 
to the Kaaba, in addition to the Quraysh’s control of the system of protection 
and assistance granted to pilgrims. They also organised Meccan life through an 
incipient institutional structure consisting of an assembly of notables from each 
clan (batnun) which met in the Dar en Nadwa to discuss community affairs and 
determine norms for individual conduct. 
These changes affecting social organisation in the Arabian Peninsula as a 
whole, and especially Hejaz from the sixth century ce onward, were destined to 
have a profound effect on the way in which religion was lived out. The dominance 
of the Quraysh created the conditions necessary for a certain standardisation 
of local dialects and the growth of a common language of literary expression 
as manifested particularly in the Mu‘allaqāt and the poetry of the sixth century 
ce. Rites and beliefs also tended to become more similar, while certain individ-
uals found these circumstances conducive to their quest for forms of religious 
expression which were more relevant to the new situation with all its defects and 
negative aspects. Traditional forms of religion, linked to the tribal system (which 
was showing initial signs of breaking up), did not provide adequate spiritual 
sustenance.11 A number of inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula embraced Chris-
tianity, a proselytising religion, whereas Judaism considered itself the exclusive 
religion of the people of Israel and did not actively seek conversions. Its adherents 
were mainly in Yemen and in the region of Yathrib. Another group, known as 
the Ahnāf (plural of hanif: follower of the original, true monotheism), chose to 
abandon traditional polytheistic idol worship in favour of one sole God, the God 
of Abraham and Ishmael his son, the ancestors of the Arabs. 
In other words, the period during which Islam initially developed was a period 
of change at many levels, and such periods by their very nature need figures to 
come forward bearing a message of great hope, opening up new horizons. Such 
was the mission of Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah.
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Compared with the founders of other religions, such as Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, Moses and Jesus Christ, Muhammad’s life is relatively well documented, although the oldest existing historical 
elements have been in large part mingled with mythology, a dominant influ-
ence on traditional Arab and Islamic thought. Representations of the Prophet’s 
personality and life draw on pre-Islamic examples of hagiography as well as 
examples from other civilisations, and introduce numerous mythical elements 
far removed from historical reality.1 The only corrective to this tendency is what 
the Qur’an says of the Prophet. The Qur’an is constantly present in the lives of 
Muslims, and presents a rich human portrait, far removed from the idealised 
portrait to which Muslim sensibility inclined in subsequent eras, seeking a kind 
of union with the spiritual ideal which took on human form in the person of the 
Prophet. 
However, historical details about Muhammad’s childhood and youth are 
scarce and fragmentary, once one has stripped away the mythical elements 
added by subsequent generations. What is known about him can be summed 
up as follows: he belonged to Beni Hashim, one of the factions of the Quraysh, 
who played a significant symbolic role since some of their leaders from Qusayy 
onwards (in the sixth century ce) played an important role in the promotion 
of the pilgrimage to the Kaaba, escorting and accommodating pilgrims to 
the sanctuary. They did not have the same disposable material wealth as Beni 
Umayya, who had become wealthy through trade and thus played an influential 
role in Mecca and its environs.2
2
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Muhammad was born in Mecca about 569 ce. He grew up an orphan, his 
father having died before Muhammad’s birth. He spent a period of his child-
hood, as did other children of Qurayshi aristocratic families, with the Bedouin 
of Beni Huzan near Taef, acquiring a mastery of a pure form of Arabic, visiting 
his mother periodically with his nurse and accompanying her tribe in its 
nomadic existence and sedentary interludes. It seems that he went with her to 
the market of Ukkāz in the same period. For the period after the death of his 
mother while they were returning from Yathrib, there are only uneven fragments 
of information: his grandfather, ‘Abd al Muttalib, adopted him for two years 
before he died, a responsibility that then passed to his son, Abu Tālib despite his 
straitened circumstances, Muhammad travelled frequently to Syria, once with 
his uncle, Abu Tālib, when he was ten years old, and once on one of Khadīja’s 
trading missions when he was about twenty-four. He may also have travelled to 
Yemen, to the east of the Arabian Peninsula and perhaps Abyssinia.3
Although Muslim sensitivities have generally led them to shy away from recog-
nising that Muhammad followed the religion of his tribe, the laws governing 
society impose this as the usual course for a child before he is able to choose and 
differentiate, imitating and following what he sees others doing, including the 
practice of their religion. Religion is an “all-embracing and coherent explanation 
of the universe, sustaining and propelling the lives of society and individuals”.4 
It is not unlikely that Muhammad resembled his contemporaries by following 
existing forms of devotion, as attested by the following anecdote of Ibn Kalbi 
concerning ‘Uzza, the goddess of the Quraysh mentioned in the Qur’an along 
with Lāt: “we have learnt that the Prophet mentioned her one day saying ‘I 
sacrificed to ‘Uzza a dust-coloured ewe and I follow the religion of my people’”.5 
The offering of sacrifices to the gods was one of the manifestations of religious 
practice among the tribe of the Quraysh. 
There are a number of first-hand accounts which, taken together, indicate 
that he was known for his piety, virtue and mild character. Perhaps he was intro-
verted, like most orphans, without being cut off from normal social life.6 His 
competence, qualities and, very possibly, his handsome bearing, were among 
the traits that endeared him to Khadīja bint Khawailad, the mature woman of 
strong personality whose graciousness Muhammad evoked until the end of his 
days despite the presence of other women. Khadīja, therefore, made an offer of 
marriage. The marriage produced a number of children; the male offspring died 
while the girls survived. The marriage was a decisive factor in determining the 
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course of Muhammad’s life, providing him with emotional and psychological 
stability and preserving him from poverty and hardship, and enabling him to 
dedicate himself to his mission when the divine call came. Khadīja gave him the 
moral support he needed in times of trial, and was the first to believe in him and 
adhere to his teaching, urging him to continue on the path of his destiny. On 
a personal and a social level, circumstances moulded Muhammad’s personality, 
developing within him the confidence, the persuasiveness and charisma that set 
him apart from the very beginning of his preaching, and played a decisive role in 
the success of his mission despite all the obstacles in his path. 
The point of view of the simple and trusting believer oscillates between, 
on the one hand, praising the ideal qualities of Muhammad, and, on the other 
hand, emphasising that he assumed the mantle of prophecy because of divine 
election and not because of his preparedness in human terms. Divine election 
does not necessarily preclude human predisposition, the difference being that 
the principle of divine election is accepted in faith without being able to prove 
it through rational arguments alone whereas propensity or readiness can be 
examined and tested empirically. It is doubtless for this reason that Muhammad 
Abduh gave the customary definition of revelation as being “the instruction 
that God communicates to his prophets by a rightful decree”, then adopted 
another definition which met with his approval: “knowledge that the person 
discovers himself with the certainty that it is from God, through an interme-
diary or without an intermediary”.8 If such is the case, this knowledge does not 
take form overnight but develops progressively, and is influenced by personal, 
psychological and social elements. Prophetic inspiration can encompass all of 
these, blending and bonding them in such a way so that its components may be 
perceptible at certain moments, imperceptible at others. 
The information that Muhammad gathered from his surrounding environ-
ment and on his journeys, from the Ahnāf, as well as from Christians and Jews, 
was familiar to his contemporaries, although of little interest to them as they 
considered such matters to be beyond their intellectual horizons and far removed 
from their concerns. Muhammad also spent much time in meditation in the cave 
of Hīra. All these elements matured within him, giving him the certainty that 
God had chosen him to communicate his message, first, to his own people and 
then, through them, to all others. Without a conscious effort, he made his own 




For that reason he was not immediately certain that God had chosen him to 
be the bearer of a momentous message, one that would bring upon him vexation 
and opposition. It may well be the case, as the Sīra relates, that he suffered 
from doubts when he was ordered to read, and needed the support of his wife 
Khadīja and her nephew, Waraqa ibn Nawfel.9 Doubts haunted him again when 
the revelation was interrupted and tailed off, without his knowing whether or 
not the call addressed to him came from God or from one of the devils which 
populated the collective imagination. Society at that time recognised that what 
came over diviners, poets, magicians and “holy fools” (meaning those who were 
in constant contact with spirits, rather than those who were incapable of discern-
ment) originated from contact with unseen forces which made them speak in 
a strange language. Muhammad, however, was not a diviner, or a poet, or a 
magician, or in contact with the world of the junūn (imperceptible, intelligent 
beings), nor was he a sage, rich in experience and reflection. He did not seek 
to bring about superficial changes in the way in which people related to one 
another in society or seek a position of leadership in his tribe or people. He was 
a Prophet, similar to the prophets of Israel, even if he was not afflicted by a loss of 
consciousness or fainting or fits or other symptoms of inner turmoil or unusual 
behaviour. Inspiration came upon him while he was awake and asleep, he did not 
speak of his own accord but by divine command, God addressed him through 
one of the angels: “truly this is the word of a noble Messenger having power, 
with the Lord of the Throne secure” (Sūra 81: 19–20), whom the Qur’an will 
subsequently identify as Gabriel (Sūra 2: 97), meaning the “strength of God”.10
Therefore, the discourse that he heard and which weighed heavily upon him 
when it “came down upon his heart”, according to the Qur’anic expression,11 is 
the word of God which he conveys in human language, his word and word of 
God at the same time.12 The word of God from the point of view of its source, 
human by its belonging to a particular language and its taking form in phrases 
and constructions according to the lexicon and grammar of the language and 
in the conceptual framework derived from the Prophet’s culture and that of 
his milieu. It is noteworthy that Muslim scholars in the past were not averse to 
recording inspired declarations on the part of ‘ Umar or other Companions,13 
and took pains to prove the divine origin of such declarations. For we should not 
look at the minute particularities of what Muhammad could know or what was 
going through his or his Companions’ minds, as what matters is the blending of 
his thoughts and aspirations to serve the aims that Divine Providence sought to 
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realise through him. Historical and human influences and contingencies would 
have only documentary importance were they not, in their invisible dimension, 
an expression of something that transcends history. Is not the essence of belief a 
trust in this interior wisdom, a seeking of sustenance in its blinding illumination 
in the same way that one longs for the rays of the sun? The scientist, on the other 
hand, merely analyses the sun’s rays dispassionately. 
The mutakallimūn (theologians) were not generally concerned with the way 
in which the revelation was communicated, emphasising taklīf (obligation to 
observe religious precepts) and ‘ibāda (adoration). They concentrated instead 
on proving that the prophets could work miracles. The interpretation that 
acquired widespread currency in Islamic writings, for which Muslims cannot 
imagine an alternative, was that the revelation that descended on the Prophet 
consisted of words bearing a certain meaning. Most Muslims cannot imagine it 
otherwise. One of the sayings included by the prolific Egyptian scholar, al-Suyūti 
(849/1445–910/1505) in the Itqān is that Gabriel brought down to the Prophet 
the sense of the message; he learned these meanings and expressed them in the 
language of the Arabs.14 He did not see this as somehow heretical or deviant. 
This point of view is perhaps the closest position to modern rationality and may 
serve as a starting point for a renewed examination of the question of inspira-
tion, free from the constraints of traditional theories deriving their legitimacy 
from the majority support they enjoyed among scholars. Such an innovative 
approach would mean that the Qur’an retained its divine otherness, without the 
risk of anthropomorphism and, at the same time, its human aspect, its historicity 
and relativity. The two dimensions would not be separated, nor would either 
be inflated in importance or downplayed at the expense of the other, as tends 
to happen in the traditional Sunni vision, which minimises the Prophet’s will 
and his innate qualities.15 Is not the aim of the message of the Prophet to bring 
all people to participate in the divine experience which, in a distinctive way, was 
that of the Prophet? How can contemporary Muslims be forbidden from trying 
to explain, with their intellectual resources, matters about which revelation is 
silent? Do they not have the right to do what traditional scholars did when they 
tried to elucidate such questions, insofar as this was possible within their intel-
lectual universe? 
Muslim philosophers, using a certain number of terms existing in their 
culture, tried to explain the phenomenon of prophecy; philosophers, using a 
certain number of terms existing in their culture, tried to explain the phenom-
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enon of prophecy; al-Kindi (c. 185/802–252/866), for example, considered that 
the science of the prophets “was not a matter of research, mathematical schemes, 
logic, or time, but depended rather on the will of the Almighty to purify and 
enlighten their souls through righteousness, together with His assistance, inspi-
ration, and messages”. Al-Farābi (c. 259/872–339/950) used the categories of 
Aristotelian metaphysics when he wrote:
It is not impossible for the person whose imaginative powers were devel-
oped to the utmost, to receive from the active intellect the partial essences 
of the present and future, or their imitations in sensible form, as well as the 
imitations of the different categories and all the superior beings, and that 
he perceive them.16
It is clear from the attempts of the philosophers that they were trying to 
rationalise this central phenomenon in their religion and go beyond a viewpoint 
of fideism or simple faith, but they did not find, in order to support their point 
of view, any other concepts than those of purification, vision, a link between the 
particular and active intelligence, or a kind of spiritual communication between 
the human soul and the heavenly spheres enabling it to perceive therein the 
images of events, in the same way that things are reflected on the surface of a 
mirror. 
What this shows is that Muslims in former times were not all convinced by 
widely-held beliefs about prophecy, although they were not, in general, willing 
to assume the consequences of a recognition that Muhammad played an active 
role in transmitting the divine message, preferring a passive understanding of his 
role: God speaks in human language and the angel communicates this in audible 
form; God speaks and the angel translates into Arabic, then the Prophet hears 
the message through the angel and in a mechanical fashion he communicates 
what the angel has inspired. He plays no role in fashioning the message he is 
ordered to communicate. They were led to this understanding by the Qur’anic 
term “word of God”, which had two different meanings: on the one hand, the 
divine, transcendent quality of the message which cannot be encapsulated in any 
human form without risking anthropomorphism; and, on the other hand, the 
prophetic message itself, whose source is divine, but which is situated in time and 
in space, transmitted by someone who is human in every respect, who thinks and 
feels and imagines, hopes and despairs, is happy and angry and who is exposed 
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to unexpected events and contingencies in the same way as other humans. Their 
understanding of the term “God” was univocal, and they did not perceive that 
language has it limitations when communicating abstract terms. This leads in 
turn to its using expressions which communicate more than one meaning. 
The Prophet was living in a world in which the sacred, or magic to use the 
Weberian17 term, was omnipresent (as was the case for most of humanity until 
the seventeenth century ce), with divination and apparitions of supernatural 
beings dominating popular mentalities in cultures everywhere.18
That there are traces of these characteristics in what the Prophet communi-
cated to his people and to Muslims is unsurprising. Whether from the point of 
view of faith or from a neutral historical viewpoint, the presence of such charac-
teristics means only that God addresses his message to people in a language that 
they can understand; either the Prophet’s revelation was vain, or he had to use 
what existed and was understood in his environment.19 These elements are used 
in a way which transcends the limited historical context, reaching goals which 
were perhaps beyond what the contemporaries of the Prophet were prepared to 
accept. On this basis it is clear that the Prophet adopted without any qualms 
points of view held by his followers; the revelation gives them textual authority. 
For example, Al Barā’ ibn Ma‘rūr introduced the practice of turning toward the 
Kaaba instead of Syria before the revelation ordered the direction of the qibla 
(recess in a mosque indicating the direction of the Kaaba) to be changed.
When Muhammad arrived in Medina the Muslims were gathering for prayer 
without a call to prayer; he decided to make a horn similar to that used by the 
Jews for their call to prayer, then he gave up this idea. Then he ordered a bell to 
be made, which would be struck in order to bring the Muslims to prayer, before 
he accepted the opinion of Abdallah ibn Zaid ibn Thalaba, and gave Bilāl the 
task of calling the faithful to prayer in approximately the way which would 
become standard practice in the community. 
‘Abdallah ibn Jahash was the first to set aside a fifth of captured booty for 
the Prophet and shared out the rest when he attacked a caravan of the Quraysh 
in Nakhla, in the month of Harām (first month of the Islamic year). “Revela-
tion came about what ‘Abdallah ibn Jahash had done …” It justified fighting in 
the month of Harām and recognised the division of the fay’ (booty) in accor-
dance with what the leader of the sariyya (expedition) decided personally should 
be done, following in all probability a practice already existing in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, distinguishing the requirements of a tribal sheikh from those of the 
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other participants in the razzia.20 The book of the Sīra saw nothing wrong in 
recording this kind of incident and others of the same kind. 
It is on the same basis that one should understand the way in which the 
Qur’an integrates stories of previous prophets and nations that had passed away. 
What it says about them is intended, in a didactic way, to explain to the Proph-
et’s contemporaries how those who cast doubt on prophets announcing the One 
True God are punished, together with the need to turn away from their ancestral 
idols, as in the tales of the prophets and the Sūra of Hūd. 
Muhammad was accused of receiving these tales from a non-Arabic speaker.21 
This accusation was intended to deny Muhammad’s status as a prophet and to 
reject any idea of a special relationship between him and his Lord, which allowed 
him to learn things of which he had been unaware. The answer is provided by 
the revelation: “That is of the tidings of the Unseen that We reveal to thee; thou 
didst not know it, neither thy people before this” (Sūra 11:49) and “Not before 
this didst thou recite any Book” (Sūra 29:48). Muhammad had no knowledge of 
the supernatural world.22 
Revelation, then, was the source of his knowledge. This was an exceptional 
state in which consciousness is lost, human capacities are suspended and the 
hidden depths of the unconscious become manifest, an overwhelming force that 
the Prophet cannot resist or govern by his own will; he conforms to what the 
divine will dictates to him, this revelation of the absolute, the invisible, the limit-
less; ordinary people cannot attain this state by their own, inevitably limited, 
rational capacities. It is emphasised once again that, at this level, there is no 
contradiction between the point of view of the believer and that of the scien-
tific observer; the difference is only in their understanding of the origin of this 
overpowering force, not in its existence. The point of view of the believer attri-
butes the origin of this overwhelming force to God, while the scientific observer 
merely gives an explanation of phenomena; the believer tries to answer two 
questions: “from where?” and “how?”, while the scientist answers the question of 
how. The two points of view agree that Muhammad was honest and trustworthy 
when he said that he was not expressing his ideas but communicating a message 
from God.23 
Modern research  not only relies on the material context to explain history 
but also links these elements with the universe in all its dimensions and 
 recognises that events may have a higher significance going beyond mere sense 
perception.
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These stories, in any case, have a function which the revelation does not 
contest: it is to “strengthen the heart” of Muhammad: in today’s language, to 
give him confidence in himself and in the truth of his message.24 In his confron-
tation with those who accuse him of lying, he has only God’s testimony that 
what he says is true and that what he announces has its origin in God.25 So for 
that reason the revelation addresses him directly: “A book sent down to thee 
– let there be no impediment in thy breast because of it” (Sūra 7:2); he insists 
on many occasions that the revelation he receives is similar to that which the 
prophets received before him. He does not distinguish between the revelation 
they received and the revelation which concerned him and in which nobody 
else was associated: “We have revealed to thee as We revealed to Noah, and the 
Prophets after him, and We revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the 
Tribes, Jesus and Job, Jonah and Aaron, and Solomon’ (Sūra 4:163), among other 
references. 
He applies the same expressions to all the prophets without distinction 
(“bring down”, “come”, “inspire”, “send”, “choose”, “warn”, “announce”, “exhort”, 
“the Book”, “evidence”, “mention”, “wisdom”, “proofs”, the “words” and the 
“messages” of God, the “way’”, the “truth”, the “prophet”, the “envoy”).26 
The course and outcome of the prophecy of Muhammad was different from 
that of Moses and Jesus since the Torah was only codified many centuries after the 
death of Moses, following the Babylonian captivity. The Gospels were collected 
in various accounts of which only four were retained by the Church. Christ’s 
message, stories of his life and his preaching were all mingled. The message of 
Muhammad was codified shortly after his death and a distinction made between 
the content of his message and what was biographical in nature. The Qur’an had 
guarantees of authenticity which did not exist in the case of the two previous 
prophecies. This does not, however, mean that there is a basic difference in the 
nature of the three messages and in the difficulties which arise when one deals 
with them, especially after the passage from the oral to the written form, from 
the Qur’an to the written text. 
The Prophet time and again reminds his interlocutors that he has not intro-
duced innovations, and that he follows the way of the prophets, those of the 
people of Israel, such as Abraham, and those such as Sālih, from the Arabic-
speaking peoples.27 What he has to communicate to them is a confirmation of 
the prophetic messages that they and the people of Israel have already received.28 
Had not God already recorded since the time of Moses “on the Tablets of every-
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thing an admonition, and a distinguishing of everything” (Sūra 7:145)? One 
should not, therefore, be surprised that monotheism in a pure form represents 
the heart of the message of all the prophets, and that righteousness constitutes 
the unchanging message of the prophets, in the same way that they called for the 
rejection of polytheism, oppression, pride and evil in general. There is no need 
to expand on this point, as it is well known that Muslims unanimously believe 
in the prophets who preceded Muhammad, even if there were attempts to estab-
lish a hierarchy among them. The Qur’an alluded to the existence of this order 
of precedence without elaborating. In particular, the Qur’an did not consider 
that the message of Muhammad abrogated or invalidated previous messages, 
considering that it authenticated them, enjoying a type of supremacy over them, 
although supremacy does not mean abrogation. 
In this way it becomes apparent that the new message of Muhammad was a 
prolongation of previous monotheist messages, necessarily including elements 
from the culture of first/seventh century Mecca, as well as from Hejaz, the 
Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East. As it is addressed to people in a 
particular setting, this is only to be expected. It is clear that allusions to the Junūn 
(plural of jinn), the fall from Paradise and the role of Iblis, the devils, the angels, 
Noah and the Flood and other mythical elements, are derived from a traditional 
heritage which may seem today far removed from a contemporary worldview. 
The same is true of the myriad elements of wondrous fable and magic which do 
not have the same impact on a contemporary reader and are not understood in 
the same way.29
The presence of this kind of element should not, however, mean that another 
aspect of Muhammad’s message be overlooked: the way in which it sets itself 
against prevailing beliefs and values. The same is true of the other prophetic 
messages. The Prophet’s message takes existing realities as its starting point in 
order to change them and give them a new orientation, different from that which 
people had come to accept. The message may take account of generally accepted 
beliefs, but does not merely legitimise them. Had prophetic preaching not swept 
away prevailing beliefs inherited from the ancestors, beliefs which had become 
a natural part of dominant mentalities, had they not confronted clannish inter-
ests at a material and symbolic level, it would not be possible to account for the 
violent opposition which prophets (including Muhammad) encountered.30 The 
radical, ground-breaking challenge of prophecy represents the very reason for its 
existence as well as for its spread, its continuity and its capacity to attract people 
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of differing origins. As long as oppression and injustice exist, this will continue 
to be the case.
It is natural that prevailing opinions, values and morals did not fade away as 
soon as the Prophet’s message appeared. As a reed bends in the wind without 
breaking or withering away, so too proponents of these traditional values and 
those whose interests were threatened by the Prophet’s message waited for the 
storm to pass before rising up again, appearing on the surface in a new guise. 
They tried in particular to take advantage of situations of crisis and emergency 
and manipulate them for their own ends. At various times in the history of the 
Muslim community, these reactionary forces may even have enjoyed a degree 
of success, although at the expense of the lofty ideals of the original message, 
reduced at their hands to a backward-looking travesty.
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Before studying the outcome of the preaching of Muhammad’s message, it is initially worth examining a number of ways in which it has been interpreted, rectifying these interpretations and putting them in their 
correct context.
A religion, whatever its nature, cannot be reduced to its simple historical 
manifestation. However, that does not mean that it cannot be studied from an 
historical viewpoint. A distinction can be made between “open” and “closed” 
religion, to use the Bergsonian classification,1 between the initial preaching and 
the forms of religiosity in which ritual plays an important part and fulfils various 
social functions designed to reinforce the bonds between individuals and impose 
a minimum of discipline. Social allegiances and solidarities have primacy over 
the truth, and priority is given to group cohesion rather than to the demands of 
individual conscience. It is in this context that one may reconsider the nature of 
the Prophet’s message, cutting through confusion and obfuscation, using terms 
according to their original meaning and not that which they acquired over time 
due to various outside influences. 
The first point to be underlined is the oral nature of the Prophet’s discourse. 
Unlike those who were Companions of the Prophet for varying periods of time 
and who listened to him, neither present-day Muslims nor the generations who 
came after the “Followers” possess a direct knowledge of the specificities of this 
discourse, the precise circumstances surrounding it, the individual or individuals 
concerned, the aims of this discourse, or to other questions relating to each verse, 






sciences include what is known as “circumstances of revelation”, but the Compan-
ions of the Prophet were not concerned with these circumstances as they had 
lived through them. It was, in fact, subsequent generations who made an effort 
to examine the circumstances, and they were set down, albeit only partially, at a 
later period, at least two or three generations later. It is only natural that the text 
of the asbāb en nuzul is in parts marked by confusion and invention.2 
The tone of the discourse, revealing pleasure or anger, admonition, warning, 
or censure, has also been lost. Words alone do not reveal this. It suffices to 
consider the different tones used when pronouncing a familiar expression such 
as “Good morning”. The tone of voice can show whether the person is merely 
following the dictates of social convention, or is really pleased to be meeting 
the person he or she is greeting in the morning, or is angry because someone 
has arrived late, has been absent, or has forgotten something. Oral expression 
is also accompanied by facial expressions, a raising or a lowering of the voice 
and other similar means of communicating a message with a certain meaning. 
The context of discourse is, therefore, important although this is not reflected 
when discourse is codified in book form, and thus becomes subject, like texts 
in general and religious texts in particular, to varying and even contradictory 
interpretations. Variations in terminology play a part, as well as the variety of 
interests that may be at stake, together with the influence of temperament and 
mentality. Finally, a specific tradition, or group of competing traditions, take on 
a more or less fixed form, striving to secure a dominant position for an exclusive 
interpretation which is considered to be authentic. 
The term “Qur’an” should really be used only for the message which the 
Prophet conveyed orally to his contemporaries. As far as what was collected 
after his death in a particular order “between two covers” is concerned, it is 
known that the Prophet’s Companions were not initially in agreement about 
the legitimacy of this collection which the Prophet did not carry out or person-
ally order. Omar ibn al Khattab, for example, opposed Abu Bakr on this subject 
before “God enlightened his heart” on the initiative of his adviser. They were 
hesitant even about what name to give to the document before they agreed on 
the term mushaf (volume, book), a term they had encountered in Abyssinia, 
according to the chroniclers.3 The various transmitted versions were unified 
by a political decision taken at the period of ‘Uthmān; agreement was reached 
on a unified mushaf, while unofficial mushafs were burnt for fear that Muslims 
would disagree about their sacred text in the same way as did the Jews and the 
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Christians.4 The Ethiopian Church, in particular, familiar to the first Muslims, 
is the only Church to consider the Book of Enoch and the Jubilees as canonical. 
During the rule of Marwān ibn Hakam (64/684–65/685), the mushaf of Hafsa, 
the wife of the Prophet, was burnt after her death. The contemporary historian 
may regret the irrevocable loss of these documents, while also recognising that 
the move toward a standard text had, incontestably, a salutary effect: were it not 
for this the Muslim community might have been slow to agree on a unified text, 
with the possibility of divisions arising as result of this delay, divisions graver 
than those which the community experienced at the end of ‘Uthmān’s reign. The 
question of political power was never entirely absent, as the Islamic state’s exist-
ence and legitimacy derived from religion. State and religion interacted in both 
negative and positive ways.
In any case, the only logical conclusion is that the “reminder” that God 
undertook to perpetuate was the content and not the outer form, the content 
of Muhammad’s preaching, his proclamation, admonishment and guidance, 
rather than the expressions and words used from which the message was 
moulded, set down in a particular form and attributed to a particular people. 
This outer linguistic form has grammar, syntax and grammatical bases which 
are no different from those of any other language. The Prophet himself did not 
prohibit his Companions from varying their styles of reading aloud in public 
verses which they had memorised; all were considered licit, although some 
Companions adhered rigidly to the style that they had heard the Prophet using, 
considering a multiplicity of styles to be a deformation of God’s Word.5 
When the Qur’an challenged unbelievers to produce ten sūras or even one 
sūra rivalling the Qur’an, this is not because it is wondrously inimitable due to 
its style and rhetorical characteristics, but because of its divine origin, unattain-
able for most people; only the prophets and the divine envoys are privy to its 
mysteries. There is no doubt that the style of the Qur’an is distinct, unique and 
distinguished, and anyone reading it or listening to it is conscious of its unique 
status. However, great works of art, be they poetry, prose, drawings, sculptures, 
or musical masterpieces, are all, in their particular way, unique. They cannot, 
despite their human origins, be reproduced. They can, however, be imitated if 
someone has the necessary gifts and capabilities, and imitation always represents 
a decline when compared with the original created work. If a new creation is 
truly equivalent to the original, this means that it is, in fact, a new creation, far 
removed from a copy or an imitation. 
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As far as the Qur’an is concerned, from where could potential imitators 
derive the power given to the prophets alone? Certain early Mu’tazilites put 
forward the idea of sirfa, that is to say, that God averted human hearts from 
the possibility of producing another Qur’an: the Qur’an, insofar as it is stylisti-
cally distinctive, is not beyond human capability simply because of its distinct 
language.6 Most Muslim scholars hold the view that the inimitability (i’jāz) of 
the Qur’an is located in its style and form and what has been called since the 
time of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 473/1081), nazm, that is, the coherence and 
balance of the text. This tendency can be explained by their insistent attempts 
to demonstrate the truthful sincerity of the Prophet and the way in which the 
central tenets of Islam could stand up to empirical examination. However, the 
divine origin of the text cannot be proved by rational means, leaving faith or 
unbelief as the only possible choices. This tends to invalidate the competence of 
the theologians in its traditional form at least.
Muslims generally believe that the authenticity of their sacred text is guaran-
teed by the strict rules governing its memorisation and by the precautions taken 
at the time of the collection and recording of the text. Certain Muslims claim 
that this is a particularity of the Qur’an, although Orthodox Jews maintain the 
same is true of the Torah. Archaeological excavations in Palestine and serious 
research show that the events related in the Torah do not have a factual basis, 
and that they are an ideologically-based construction dating from the period of 
the Babylonian exile in the sixth century bce and the discovery by the Jews of a 
cultural world infinitely richer than their own. When they returned from exile 
and began to compose their own religious texts, they re-worked the foundation 
myths widespread across the region.7 Orthodox Jews cling to the details of rites 
and prohibitions transmitted in the Torah and in the rabbinical commentaries. 
Official teaching of Christian Churches until recent times followed the same 
trend, and fundamentalist Protestant Churches in particular still believe today 
in the literal truth of all the details contained in the Bible, covering the origins 
of humankind (they believe that the first man, Adam, appeared a few thousand 
years ago, not five million years as modern science has shown), the history of the 
world, and the most basic moral rules.8 
Confusion often also arises (in the context of discussion about the Qur’an) 
about the meaning of the term “book”, with many people believing that this 
means what is generally understood by the term “book”, that is to say, what is 
inscribed in the form of a written line on a supporting surface, be it a rock, bone, 
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papyrus, parchment, paper, or any other material support. The term Qur’an does 
not have this meaning at all when it refers to the Book in general, or the written 
Book, the “Book of God”, the “mother of books”, the book that was revealed to 
Muhammad or to the other prophets and divine messengers, or the “precious 
books” which are within the “immaculate pages” that the Prophet recites, or the 
“People of the Book”.9 All these terms refer not to the material book which the 
reader can touch, transcribe, open and close at a particular page, put in a store-
room or on a shelf, but rather to the content of the message that God saw fit to 
entrust to the prophets in order that they could communicate it to humankind, 
encouraging them to be righteous in every way, guiding them toward what is 
good for their lives and their destinies. There is no clearer proof for this than the 
way in which the revelation used the term “Book” when the Prophet had not 
received the complete Qur’an, revealed in instalments, at intervals of varying 
length. One should not forget that the roles of writing and reading can vary 
from one society to another; reading in the Arab setting, as was also the case for 
the Ancient Greeks and other societies, was an oral, public event: one person 
read while others listened, engaging in debate. There was no readily available text 
in the material sense. This would become available only in the second/eighth 
century when Chinese-inspired techniques of producing paper became known 
and the book in the accustomed sense of the word entered general circulation. 
In addition, Arabic writing at the time of the Prophet lacked points and vowel 
indications, and it was thus difficult to rely on a written text as a vehicle for trans-
mitting the content of a message. It is an exaggeration to claim that the Qur’an 
alone is the word of God. According to the logic of revelation, the Qur’an is the 
“copy”, taking into account prevailing conditions at the time of Muhammad and 
the existing intellectual and cultural context.
The same is true of the question of the word of God. All those who have even 
a slight knowledge of the history of Islamic intellectual developments have heard 
of the heated debates that took place during the Abbāsid period between philos-
ophers, jurists and hadīth specialists. In the third/ninth century the holders of 
political power entered the fray, at the time of the Caliphs al-Ma’mun, Mu’tasim, 
Wathiq and al-Mutawakkil, then in the fifth/eleventh century at the time of 
al-Qādir (381/991–422/1031), in order to secure the victory of one or other of 
the competing factions, thus promoting what they perceived as their interests. 
One such question was the created status of the Qur’an: was it, as the Word 
of God, created, or uncreated?10 Another question was the Ash‘arite distinction 
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between the interior word (nafsī) and the written word (lafzī). Muslims at that 
time realised the difficulties involved in proving the divine origin of Muham-
mad’s message without falling into the trap of anthropomorphism or reifica-
tion of the Word of God, but they did not take account of the way in which 
divine revelation used human expressions to convey transcendent truths which 
the Qur’an itself says cannot be enumerated, let alone contained in a material 
“receptacle” of whatever kind: “Say: if the sea were ink for the Words of the 
Lord, the sea would be spent before the Words of my Lord are spent, though we 
brought replenishment the like of it.”11 Nor did they realise that what was meant 
by the term “Qur’an” was not the discourse emanating from Muhammad himself 
but the content of the message that God wanted to communicate and which 
he described thus: “It is surely a noble Qur’an, in a hidden book none but the 
purified shall touch; a sending down from the Lord of all Being.”12 Here, as on 
numerous occasions, they took what could be empirically observed as the bench-
mark by which the unknown and mysterious workings of Providence could be 
studied, and thus imposed necessarily limited human categories and interpreta-
tions on the domain of the divine. This created a tendency toward anthropomor-
phism and other elements at which we shall look in due course. 
In order to avoid confusing abstract, invisible realities and tangible human 
realities situated in space and time, as though what is valid for one is valid for 
the other, one ought to be aware of the literary style of divine revelation, based 
on metaphor, allusion, suggestion and the use of proverbs so that the listener 
may grasp the intended message and adhere to it. Nor should the specific nature 
of mythical discourse be misunderstood and read as though it were related to, 
and in conformity with, conceptual discourse. The specialists in tafsīr went to 
great lengths in order to explain all the details of the most sweeping and general 
declarations, and to specify what was meant by every allusion. Symbols became 
tangible historical facts. It is not the commands and prohibitions relating to 
prevailing circumstances at the time of Muhammad’s preaching which should 
be studied, but their implicit aims and intentions. Observing inconsistencies 
between the orders and the interdictions, intended as they are for guidance and 
orientation, is not a new trend; scholars have traditionally endeavoured to go 
beyond perceived incompatibilities or contradictions using the notion of naskh, 
or abrogation of certain verses. This is a meaningful approach only when it draws 
attention to the need to take account of new situations which may arise: this is 
an approach contrary to that of the fundamentalists. 
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The question of textual interpretation is central, and from the second/eighth 
century onwards, Muslims adopted a literal approach to interpretation of the 
Qur’an. This period saw the development of fiqh and was also a time when the 
state became concerned with the organisation of society on a religious basis. 
It was also the period when the Qur’anic text was definitively established. 
Without going in to the details about the tendency to give one verse primacy 
over another, through subjective interpretation and text-twisting, and the way 
in which precepts (to use the jurists’ appellation) were based on hadīths authen-
ticated by one commentator rather than on Qur’anic verses, one can conclude 
that fiqh and its findings were part of the obligations of religion for Muslims for 
many centuries. It began to seem less self-evident in modern times, under the 
pressure of the many profound changes affecting Muslim societies. 
Four main contemporary trends can be identified: 
(1)  The position defended by the majority of scholars who have received a 
traditional training, which is a prolongation of the position traditionally taken 
by Muslims entailing, on the level of theory, standing by the traditional system, 
while, at the practical level of application, accepting that this system be violated. 
They consider it necessary for subjects to submit to the will of the ruler, even a 
tyrannical one, to the extent of obeying his edicts even if their link with fiqh is 
tenuous or non-existent. These scholars, even if they cling to traditional schemas, 
are unaware of the role played by fiqh at the time of its early development. They 
are equally unaware that the new context and its stakes are very different from 
those of the past. Many of these individuals are defending their personal or 
factional interests: this is legitimate enough, but at that point religion becomes 
a means of camouflaging these interests. The defence of religion is not, there-
fore, the main motive of those who proclaim themselves to be its heralds and 
champions.
(2)  The position of the contemporary Salafite movements and various 
thinkers aware of the need to go beyond traditional solutions. They do not reject 
the legislative aspect of the Qur’an, while recognising that precepts and prescrip-
tions, particularly about interpersonal rights and duties, can evolve if the circum-
stances surrounding the original judgment have changed. Most of the leaders 
of the Reform movement from Muhammad Abduh (1261/1849–1323/1905) 
onwards, such as Tahar Haddad (1306/1889–1354/1935) in Tunisia, Ben Badis 
(1306/1889–1358/1940) in Algeria and Allāl al Fāsi (1328/1910–1393/1974) in 
Morocco, have held this position. This conciliatory position was audacious in the 
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context of the early twentieth century, and is undeniably more progressive than 
that of the traditionalist sheikhs. This position does not present a fundamental 
solution to the basic dilemma, as its theoretical base is weak. Its supporters are 
few and the fundamentalist tide has marginalised them.
(3)  For contemporary Islamist movements, it is unthinkable to resign oneself 
to accepting the distance that has opened up between the Qur’an and everyday 
reality; reality must be changed and the golden age of the early Muslim commu-
nity restored. The text is not to be subjected to the test of quotidian reality. This 
position is based on a sort of unhistorical wishful thinking, even if its internal 
logic is more structured. It has attracted many young people and the oppressed 
and anxious in society, victims of failed modernisation. However, its theoretical 
base is weak, and its adherents include many uneducated propagandists. 
(4)  Mahmoud Muhammad Taha (1908–85) was alone in defending the 
point of view expressed in his book, ar-risāla atthāniya min al islām, and it cost 
him his life.13 Taha maintained that the message of Muhammad was a general 
message directed toward humankind at the Meccan period, while in the period 
at Medina it was directed toward the contemporaries of the Prophet. It follows 
then that particular judgments relevant to the historical circumstances of people 
at the beginning of the seventh century were no longer appropriate to their situa-
tion in the second half of the twentieth century. What was needed was a return 
to the universal message which remains valid despite changed circumstances.14
Each of these points of view can be justified and, according to one’s viewpoint, 
each has elements of validity. Their proponents see themselves as pragmatic, 
seeking ways of extricating the Muslim community from decadence and 
backwardness. In general they lack the appropriate theoretical basis with which 
to confront the questions facing them. These theoretical resources are as yet still 
caught up in secondary questions, and have not reached the level of argumenta-
tion and dialectic. History is still seen as immobile, and dynamics and movement 
go unnoticed. 
With regard to traditional scholars, their position is manifestly weak. They are 
unable to provide coherent responses, while the Utopian vision of the Islamist 
movements has no chance of success. It would condemn Muslim societies to 
being overtaken by the movement of history and its complexities, far removed 
from the simplicity of the early Muslim community. The values of the Enlighten-
ment, far from being rejected, are becoming more firmly established. The points 
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of view of Mahmoud Muhammad Taha and the Islamic reformers converge in 
that both call for part of the message of Muhammad to be retained, while the 
rest will be set aside or interpreted, without any guarantee that a particular inter-
pretation is more valid than its rivals.
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The first observation would be that revelation does not speak in terms of the Sharī‘a as a divine law; it speaks of it as a way1 for the believer to follow.2 From this point of view it is a binding commitment. The 
actual details of conduct are only sketched out; they are solutions to particular 
challenges facing the community at a given moment. This is why the solutions 
are diverse, reflecting as they do the variety of situations arising. Most questions, 
relating either to conditions prevailing at the time of Muhammad or to 
sub sequent eventualities, are not explicitly addressed in any given text.
These guidelines are essentially of a moral and educational nature and were 
present from the Meccan period onwards. They concern questions of liturgical 
practice, although they cannot be separated from the main thrust of divine 
revelation at that period: God’s unity, resurrection, reward and punishment for 
deeds committed, and the prophetic missions. Prayer, alms-giving, good deeds, 
truth, patience, forbearance, devoutness, faithfulness and loyalty, chastity, 
freeing slaves, caring for orphans, the destitute and prisoners, giving their due to 
family members and strangers alike: revelation gave priority to these questions 
during the Meccan period, while forbidding murder, injustice and aggression, 
tyranny and abuse of power, depravity and fornication, lies and defamation, 
squandering and hoarding of wealth, greed and miserliness, cavilling and 
backbiting, the chiding of beggars and the exploitation of orphans. All of these 
moral guidelines and prohibitions are signposts on the way the believer must 
follow. There is no difference between these elements and fasting, pilgrimage, 





theft, and other concerns of divine revelation during the Medinan period. 
Mahmoud Taha’s separation of the Meccan and the Medinan stages of 
Muhammad’s preaching seems unconvincing, nor is it possible to interpret each 
of the so-called “prescriptive verses” in isolation from the others, from their 
historical context and from the Qur’anic text as a whole. The fuqahā’ (plural of 
faqīh: specialist in jurisprudence) throughout history have done precisely this. 
Al-ahkām is an Islamic legal term indicating, in a descending order, what is oblig-
atory, recommended, licit, reprehensible and prohibited. These distinctions have 
no basis in the Qur’anic message. Muhammad’s preaching concerns what was 
good and evil at the moment of the revelation. The orientations given are the 
basic elements from which Muslims will deduce the criteria of good conduct 
and sound morals. This does not mean a slavishly literal observation of the text, 
rather a search for its spirit and aims. God alone will be worshipped, and each 
individual’s conscience will be the first and final arbitrator in determining their 
response to God’s initiative.
This reading of the text of the Qur’an will ensure that the message of Islam 
is credible wherever Muslims find themselves. With regard to what the Qur’an 
says about Adam, Eve, Iblīs, jinn-s, demons, angels and prophetic miracles, the 
believer will readily perceive that these stories are produced by a mentality which 
lends credence to myth. He or she can see them as symbols and allegories of a 
deeper message, not historical fact. Muslims will also readily accept interpreta-
tions of the Qur’anic rules relating to worship and social relations (on the few 
occasions where detailed texts exist) which recognise the influence of the simple 
way of life at the time of the Prophet in the region of the Hejaz, where relations 
between individuals were simpler than in other settings, especially modern 
societies in the Arab world and the West. 
The voluminous writings which consumed the energies of generations of 
‘ulamā’ (plural of ‘alīm: religious scholar) should be left aside and the recom-
mendations of the Qur’an concerning ritual prayer examined. The Qur’an delib-
erately avoids stipulating the number of prayers and how to carry them out. 
Little precision is given to the inner intentions of the person praying, to ritual 
purity, ablutions, upright posture, recital of the Fātiha (first sūra of the Qur’an), 
a verse or collection of verses, bowing, prostration and the concluding invoca-
tion. Nor are there detailed allusions to the number of bows, which can vary 
from one prayer to another, and the different role of imāms and the ordinary 
believer in communal prayer.3 It is clear that the traditions concerning the 
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number of prayers imposed on the occasion of the mi‘irāj (nocturnal journey of 
the Prophet to the seven heavens) and the famous incident when the Prophet 
and God haggled over the number of prayers (reduced from fifty to five on the 
recommendation of Moses) are produced by a mentality prone to believing in 
myths, and lack all credibility. What is important is that the Prophet prayed 
in a certain manner and that Muslims imitated him.4 Muslims everywhere are 
not, however, obliged to follow this down to the last detail, even supposing 
that there was a unified, unchanging method of praying during the Prophet’s 
lifetime. Were this the case, that would mean that the inhabitants of the Polar 
regions, where the summer day is so long as to leave almost no night (in winter 
the contrary is true) are less concerned by the teaching of Muhammad than the 
inhabitants of temperate regions where there is not a major difference between 
the length of day and the night whatever the season. The same could be said 
of those living in industrialised societies where machines impose lifestyles and 
work practices totally different from those existing in nomadic, agricultural and 
trading societies, or any people whose styles of life differ radically from simple 
traditional forms of life.5 
The historian may observe that certain rites were already familiar at the time 
of the revelation of Islam, such as ablutions (which existed in Jewish communi-
ties although in a different form), the upright posture for prayer (a practice of the 
Syriac Church), prostrations and bowing.6 That in no way diminishes the impor-
tance of the divine command to pray, or the need for each believer to periodically 
observe moments of retreat and meditation, and interrupt quotidian activities to 
humbly examine his or her conscience. This is not to contest the value of the five 
daily prayers, Friday prayer, or prayers on the occasion of the two great feasts, 
Eid el kabīr and Eid es-saghīr, at funerals and so on. Prayers on these occasions 
remain the ideal formula for two types of believers: those who believe that these 
prayers are obligatory and binding in their traditional form; and those who live 
in a setting which allows them to pray in the time-honoured manner. What of 
other believers who may have drifted away from the practice of their religion, or 
who struggle between ideals and the realities of life: should they too not have 
the right to adhere to the precepts of their religion without having necessarily to 
follow the teaching of bygone generations down to the very last detail? 
The same is true of alms-giving, as the Qur’an did not determine the amount 
or specify the exact purpose for which it was intended. The basic principle 
remains valid: the duty of solidarity between rich and poor. Alms-giving should 
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not be considered simply on the basis of the types of financial resources and the 
ways of using them which existed in the first/seventh century. Such an approach 
betrays narrow-mindedness and ignorance both of the aim of alms-giving and 
of modern forms of solidarity which represent a progress in comparison with 
traditional forms of largesse and munificence. These modern forms may well be 
closer to the spirit of Muhammad’s teaching according to which the poor have a 
right to share in the resources of the rich.7 The form that these resources take has 
evolved as well as the means of accumulating and disposing of them, and new 
forms of solidarity respect the needy and offer them assistance in ways which 
were non-existent in traditional societies, although considered today as essential 
human rights: education, employment, shelter, medical attention and so on.
Previous research has demonstrated how the Ramadhan fast was recom-
mended by the Qur’an in various forms: “Believers, fasting is decreed for you as 
it was decreed for those before you” (Sūra 2:183), “to fast is better for you” (Sūra 
2:184), and “Therefore whoever of you is present in that month, let him fast” 
(Sūra 2:185).8 The possibility of not fasting, and replacing the fast by donations 
of food to the poor was left open and verses such as “For those of you who can 
afford it there is a ransom: the feeding of a poor man” and “Allah desires your 
wellbeing, not your discomfort” (Sūra 2:184–5), were interpreted only as forbid-
ding the substitution of the fast with food gifts after the death of the Prophet. 
During his lifetime the practice was acceptable. Muslims today are often uneasy 
when they directly encounter the text of the Qur’an, and their reading of it is 
heavily influenced by the voluminous centuries-old commentaries of the fuqahā’ 
and the tafsīr (Qur’anic interpretation) scholars. It is, therefore, unsurprising 
that they find themselves in a dilemma: they merely comply with prevailing 
custom and put on an appearance of fasting. This is far from being the original 
aim of the fast. They can also try to devise casuistic solutions out of expediency: 
the authors of certain fatwas (formal legal opinions) suggest that the inhabitants 
situated to the north or south of a particular line of latitude (45th parallel) must 
observe the timetable foreseen for this latitude, without considering the time at 
which the sun rises and sets.9
It is also common knowledge that the pilgrimage was one of the pre-Islamic 
rites practised by the Arabs. Islam adopted it and conferred upon it a new 
meaning within the context of monotheism. It is incontestable that the rites of 
the pilgrimage retain the residues of age-old mythology, in particular the stoning 
of devils and offering of sacrifices. This is undeniably a way to release pent-up 
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emotions, canalising violence in a harmless way. Is it a binding obligation today 
for Muslims who may be unhappy with such practices and who nevertheless feel 
compelled to go through with them? Is it not right in this case for each believer 
to be honest with themselves rather than simply perform rituals without any 
personal convictions? These questions connected with the “pillars” (arkān) of 
Islam have not been raised deliberately to try to trouble religious sensitivities. 
Those who feel that they have to adhere to the prescriptions of the fuqahā’ should 
do what they hold to be binding; it is not for us or anyone else to minimise the 
important emotional dimension involved in any act of prayer or liturgy. These 
cannot be altered easily by the will of an individual or of a group, nor is it system-
atically desirable. One can observe, however, an increasing drift away from tradi-
tional rituals: people do not contest the “pillars” of Islam in general terms, it is 
simply that society has changed radically and the experience of previous genera-
tions seems remote. Identifying problems and seeking acceptable solutions does 
not necessarily indicate a deliberate trawling through murky waters, as it were, 
creating purely imaginary difficulties. Ghazāli, in his Ihyā’ ‘ulūm ed-dīn, urges 
individual Muslims repeatedly to “consult your heart”. This could be a suitable 
starting point for Muslims as they try to bridge the gap between religion and 
daily life, shaking off the tendency to imitate blindly in the absence of any valid 
justification. Honesty is a basic condition of religious practice, as well as being 
an integral part of personal balance and well-being. The person who chooses to 
speak the truth must be able to express his or her deepest aspirations without 
suffering any harm or becoming a scapegoat, and this happens only when 
freedom is respected and does not become a bargaining counter.
In the light of these observations about ritual practices, Qur’anic injunctions 
and interdictions, necessary in the context of the social conditions prevailing 
in the first/seventh century, begin to take on less problematic proportions. The 
Qur’an should be treated as a whole, without isolating a limited number of 
verses. Readers should be attentive to the intention behind the text, as well as to 
the reasons which led Muslims in the past to adopt the interpretation that they 
did. Less reliance should be placed on a mere tenth of the more than 6,000 verses 
in the Qur’an, without counting repetitions. A large proportion of the text is of 
a narrative rather than prescriptive character.10 The content of the Qur’anic text 
represents only a small proportion of the prescriptions set out by the fuqahā’, 
who nevertheless claimed that they had deduced them from the Qur’an using 
methods that were free from error. It is more important for a contemporary 
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reader to take account of changing circumstances, particularly with regard to the 
details of personal conduct. This includes such matters as the law of talion (retal-
iation in kind) in case of injury or aggression, in keeping with Jewish practice, 
and the forbidding of images, a practice that may have been justified in the first/
seventh century given that pagan idol worship was a recent phenomenon. In 
modern society, dominated by the image in various forms, this interdiction 
seems to have lost its raison d’être. 
Slavery is not a question high on the contemporary agenda. The Qur’an did 
not order its abolition, despite urging that slaves should be released and creating 
numerous opportunities and means of putting an end to this practice which is 
contrary to human dignity. Other questions weighing on the conscience of the 
community of believers need urgent solutions, as they are sources of conflict and 
tragedy which can result in innocent blood being shed. Such questions include 
apostasy, the application of the law of talion, theft, interest-generating loans, the 
relationship between state and religion and the organisation of family life.
The question of apostasy may be considered first. The Qur’an contains no 
allusion to a physical punishment to be inflicted on the apostate. It mentioned 
only a sanction in the next world which no human agent can administer. 
Curiously, many Muslims, including those who are thought to be expert in 
questions of faith, think that punishing apostates is a divine command simply 
because of an unreliable hadīth: “Kill the person who changes his religion”, 
taking Abū Bakr, who killed those described as “apostates” (or ahl al ridda), as an 
example. It is equally singular that archaic practices prevail over the principle of 
religious freedom contained in Muhammad’s message, a principle to be applied 
without exception or hesitation.11 It is as though there is an apprehension that 
non-application of the death penalty for apostasy will somehow lead simple folk 
to think that someone who leaves the Muslim community does so because their 
experience of Islam was an unhappy one. This will lead others to do the same, 
and thus reduce the number of Muslims! It is as though the touchstone of belief 
is external compliance and not interior conviction and free choice. Strange as it 
may seem, this is the fate of every prophetic message which suffers interpreta-
tions influenced by social or historical conditions which divert it from its aims. 
On grounds of fidelity, the essential message of a religion is contradicted.12 
As far as retributive killing is concerned, it is evident that every legal system, 
irrespective of its origins, punishes the crime of murder. The Qur’anic text stipu-
lates that the punishment for killing is death, a sanction limited to the assassin 
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alone, to the exclusion of any of his kinsfolk. The way is left open for pardon 
to be granted by the victim’s relations. This constitutes a recognition of the 
principle of individual and not communal punishment. It also goes beyond an 
automatic application of the sanction, contradicting subsequent decisions taken 
by the fuqahā’. It also shows that retaliatory killing is not an end in itself but is a 
way of dealing with the harsh realities of human existence. Substituting capital 
punishment with imprisonment or other sanctions does not mean contradicting 
the Qur’anic principle in general. In modern times, it is the state alone which 
can legally use violent means when dealing out punishments on various classes 
of offender. Formerly, in the context of a tribal system and in the absence of state 
institutions, the family of the victim could take matters into their own hands. 
There is no reason for not going further and abolishing capital punishment, 
especially in the complex setting of modern urban life where there is no guarantee 
that errors will not be made when passing judgment, leading to innocent lives 
being lost. If the accused person’s life is spared, there remains a possibility of 
rectifying such errors. In the case of a capital sentence, this  is  impossible. It is 
difficult to believe that the Muslim conscience would tolerate the sacrifice of an 
innocent person because of an obstinate adhesion to outmoded forms of punish-
ment that may have had their justification in traditional societies.
Some Muslims, relying on a supposedly categorical text, hold that that the 
amputation of a thief ’s hand is a divine command concerning which there is 
no room for interpretation.13 Research has shown that commentators and 
scholars have long debated the precise meaning of the terms “cut”, “hand”, and 
the  importance of the theft which leads to punishment by amputation.14 They 
stipulate that the term “theft” is restricted to property which has been placed 
under protection and in which the thief has no share, such as public funds. 
Certain commentators sought judicial loopholes to try to avoid applying this 
sanction. This approach characterised Sunni Muslim thought: one is supposed 
to respect a lofty but theoretical ideal, while in practice accepting ways around it 
that are often far removed from idealistic theory. This punishment is not applied 
for a number of possible reasons: either it goes against prevailing practices, or 
people’s consciences will not tolerate it. If the question can be considered in a 
socio-historical light, Muslims will perhaps be able to avoid this kind of uncom-
fortable double standard. 
There is no doubt that this kind of punishment existed in the pre-Islamic 
period, and, as in all nomadic societies based on subsistence economies, it is 
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only natural that theft should be punished severely as this type of crime put the 
victim’s very existence in jeopardy. It may be that draconian punishment of that 
kind was the only way to maintain a minimum of law and order in the absence 
of a political authority whose sway extended over society as a whole. Physical 
punishment in the form of beating, flogging and amputation were current as was 
capital punishment, and it was difficult to envisage any alternative guarantee of 
social stability. Qur’anic recommendations were in keeping with the prevailing 
situation in the first/seventh century, although this does not mean that the 
possibility of other forms of sanction should be excluded as society evolves and 
adopts values in keeping with its evolution. All forms of corporal punishment 
and torture have come to be considered as a denial of human dignity. In other 
words, sanctions of any kind (including the amputation of a thief ’s hand), are 
not ends in themselves. They can be discarded and replaced by others more in 
keeping with the conditions in which modern Muslim societies live, as long as 
they fulfil the ultimate aim of guaranteeing social stability by other means. The 
abolition of these punishments in the vast majority of Muslim countries has 
not led their inhabitants to deviate from the spirit of the Prophet’s teaching. 
Their application even today, on the pretext of applying the Sharī‘a, is the object 
of growing condemnation, particularly on the part of concerned and aware 
Muslims. This was what Muhammad Iqbal (1290/1873–1356/1938) meant when 
he said over seventy years ago: “The primary source of the law of Islam is the 
Quran. The Quran is not a legal code. Its main purpose is to awaken in man the 
higher consciousness of his relation with God and the universe.” He went on: 
The prophet’s method is to train one particular people and to use them 
as a nucleus for the building of a universal Shari‘at. In doing so he accen-
tuates the principles underlying the social life of mankind of human life 
and applies them to concrete cases in the light of the specific habits of the 
people before him. The Shari‘at values resulting from this application (e.g. 
rules relating to penalties for crimes) are in a sense specific to that people. 
Since their observance is not an end in itself they cannot be imposed in 
their exact form on future generations.15
The question of interest-generating loans (usury) also seems to be moving 
toward resolution. At the heart of the problem lies the question of whether trans-
actions with banks and similar institutions involving interest-generating loans 
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can be classed as usury. Two points need to be made here, first, both Christianity 
and Judaism forbid usury, although today their adherents no longer consider this 
interdiction as applying to interest-generating loans and borrowing. Secondly, 
the absolute ban on usury mentioned in numerous verses of the Qur’an applies 
to loans on which huge rates of interest are charged. This meant that one of the 
parties involved in the transaction was enriched without making any effort at the 
expense of the other, who was reduced to poverty because of the need for money 
at a particular point in time. In addition, non-payment of the debt, at this extor-
tionate rate of interest, could lead to the enslavement of the debtor. For these 
reasons, the Qur’anic ban on usury is quite natural, and can be justly applied to 
all cases where this kind of excess and illegal exploitation occurs. 
Borrowing from a bank and paying interest on the loan does not come into 
the category of forbidden activities. First, it is not a transaction involving two 
individuals, but rather a person, on the one hand, and a banking institution, on 
the other hand. At the time of the Prophet such institutions did not exist and it 
is difficult to imagine the prohibition of something that did not exist. Secondly, 
the interest levied by the bank does not amount to usury: it is at a rate set by the 
state in advance taking into account the rates of inflation, the cost of financial 
operations, the taxes paid by the bank and the revenue generated by the sum that 
has been borrowed. The consequences too are very different from those of usury, 
and include giving an impetus to economic activity and generating of produc-
tive projects. This said, the distress suffered by the poor in Muslim countries 
(and non-Muslim countries such as India) when they are obliged to borrow from 
moneylenders is glaringly obvious. The institutions which could set out their 
rights and responsibilities are absent from the scene. 
One thus returns again to the general principle of considering the reasons 
behind what is commanded and forbidden by the Qur’an, and the underlying 
wisdom of their teachings rather than the particular form they assumed at the 
time of the revelation. This is preferable to the manoeuvring of so-called “Islamic 
banks” which receive the blessing of certain official religious bodies. These banks 
are Islamic only in name and the interest charged on their loans (not described as 
such in order to disguise them) can be higher than that of ordinary banks. This 
favours those managing the banks more than it does their gullible customers.16 
Dealing with banks has become normal practice in Islamic countries, involved 
as they are in financial transactions governed by the law. The conscience of the 
Muslim community does not see anything wrong with these secular transac-
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tions. Things are very different when it comes to political decision-making and 
the family. In modern societies it is these two institutions which are the most 
resistant to secularisation; religion plays an important legitimising role in these 
institutions. It is difficult to change or suppress this dimension which has existed 
for generations. In reality, deriving political authority from divine right has 
traditionally functioned in conservative religious mentalities as a guarantee of 
stability and as a means of gaining support from a willing populace. Were it not 
for this divine right, why would a ruler be more competent than anyone else to 
legally use violent means for the administration of society and for dealing with 
inevitable conflicts? This solution was convenient for both ruler and subject, 
and the first contestations developed only when nation states grew up out of 
the rubble of the old empires. These states generally had stable borders and its 
citizens were subject to a unified legal code. 
This historical dimension is often overlooked by the proponents of an 
abstract view of religion and its so-called “essence”. They consider that the 
separation between religion and state in modern Western societies is somehow 
due to the innate nature of the Christian faith widespread in these societies.17 In 
their opinion Christianity believes that Caesar should be given what is Caesar’s 
and God that which is His. Christ exercised no political authority in contrast to 
the Prophet who, from the very beginnings of Islam, held out of necessity both 
spiritual and temporal power. In making this claim, they betray their ignorance 
of the many conflicts in Christian countries between church and state, and the 
subsequent exclusion of clerics from political life. At the same time they are 
unaware of the reality of political power as exercised by Muslim rulers and their 
links with the men making up the religious establishment. In the light of Ibn 
Khaldoun’s analysis of the nature of the different kinds of sovereign power it is 
not necessary to go into details about the way in which authority was exercised 
throughout history in Muslim states.
Of primary concern is the link between the preaching of Muhammad and 
his actions during the period between his departure from Mecca for Medina 
and his death. During this period of about ten years the Prophet himself 
commanded a number of military expeditions and dispatched his Compan-
ions on other such expeditions. He was the unchallenged leader of this small 
nucleus of followers who were at the origin of a vast Muslim empire. He was 
also the ultimate arbitrator in the various disputes arising among Muslims in 
different fields. It is necessary to clarify his attitude in the following areas: his 
Legislation
69
use of violent means; his leadership in the Muslim community; and the role of 
adjudication in disputes, and to examine their significance in the context of the 
time. Did Muhammad consistently instigate violence? Was he not driven to do 
this by the Quraysh who threatened the very existence of the incipient Muslim 
community? The Quraysh perceived the new religion as a threat to their trading 
interests and a potential death-blow to the system on which these interests were 
based. A whole range of methods were employed to win over the followers of the 
Prophet, followed by active persecution. Muhammad had no other choice but 
to break the bonds of tribal solidarity uniting his opponents, rally neighbouring 
tribes and thereby convince their leaders that resistance was useless. Force had to 
be used after peaceful persuasion had failed. 
The expedition against Tabūk, on the borders of the Byzantine empire, may 
be the only case of an offensive operation undertaken by the Muslims. This 
expedition was not designed to counter an imminent threat after the conquest 
of Mecca and the submission of Thaqīf in Hunayn. Subsequent generations of 
Muslims saw this expedition as an illustration of the duty of Muslims to impose 
Islam beyond the boundaries of the Hejaz and the Arabian Peninsula. It is to 
be noted, however, that this expedition was peaceful and bloodless, designed to 
test the faith of recent converts to Islam and instil cohesion in their ranks, which 
included Bedouins from around Medina and recent converts. Facing them were 
hesitant and disaffected elements called “hypocrites” by the Qur’an. The expedi-
tion took place during the hot season and the episode known as the construction 
of the “al Darar” mosque which seems to have been intended to rival that of the 
Prophet. All these elements indicate that booty and plunder were not the main 
reasons behind the expedition. Nor was it to direct attention toward an external 
enemy as happened during the conquests under the second and third caliphs.18 
Some may consider certain actions of the Prophet blameworthy or cruel, 
as in the case of the treatment meted out to the Jews when their interests and 
those of the Muslims diverged. Religious preaching has to take into account 
the dynamics that govern a society if it wishes to exist within a given histor-
ical setting. A balance of power between different centres of power is one such 
dynamic: division and disorder emanating from within a community or threat-
ening it from the outside cannot be tolerated. Critics should ask themselves if 
any monotheist religion has spread in a peaceful manner. Would the preaching 
of Muhammad have enjoyed any success among Arabs and non-Arabs had 
it remained limited to a beleaguered minority of a few hundred souls threat-
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ened by the Quraysh, who were determined to extirpate them by all possible 
means? The Jews were deliberately trying to sow dissension and division in 
Muslim ranks, defending their own religion and fearful of being marginalised or 
absorbed into the new religion which was taking shape. Violence is not, there-
fore, indispensable to Islam but rather was imposed by the historical context in 
which Islam developed. Any interpretation of verses concerning armed conflict 
which isolates them from their context flies in the face of historical reality.19
As for the role of leadership exercised by the Prophet in Medina, many Muslims 
believe that this was in the context of what is described, not without exaggera-
tion, as an “Islamic state”. In reality the Prophet did not adopt any of the titles 
befitting a position of leadership in such a “state”. The title of king was not used, 
nor that of prince or any other such titles current among Arabs and non-Arabs at 
that time. A state, of whatever kind, needs a basic structure, whereas the Prophet 
had no currency, no ministries, officials, or permanent governors. All he did was 
appoint certain individuals for a particular task, such as carrying out the duties 
of qādi in a particular area or commanding an armed expedition. For the rest, his 
moral authority alone was a rallying point for the Muslim community. The main 
difference between the Prophet and other figures of authority would be that 
their influence was limited to their tribe or clan, whereas the Prophet’s influence 
went beyond, and took precedence over, tribal allegiances without completely 
suppressing them. The authority of tribal chiefs was also based on their reputa-
tion and their possession of qualities, such as valour, manliness, courage and 
generosity required by their position in society. The Prophet relied on a religious 
legitimacy of which tribal chiefs did not dispose. In this sense his authority was 
not of a kind which could be bequeathed or applied as a criterion for a succes-
sor’s authority: the authority of the Prophet ceased with his death and the trans-
mission of his message.20 
The debate about the Prophet’s role in the Medinan period and the religious 
or political nature of his authority should have come to an end in 1344/1925 
with the clarifications provided by Ali Abdelraziq in his famous book, Islām 
wa Usūl al-hukm (Islam and the Foundations of Governance), which clarified a 
number of points. One might also consider the variety of governments under 
which Muslims have lived since Ataturk’s abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 
1343/1924, a change that has not affected the way in which Muslims practise their 
religion. The dead weight of tradition remained unchanged, while the transition 
has been difficult from a traditional empire using religion to buttress its legiti-
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macy to a modern nation state. Such a state is founded on the free election by 
citizens of their leaders and on the primacy of the will of the people as expressed 
in laws passed by representative assemblies. Law-making, executive and judicial 
powers are separated and all citizens are considered equal in rights and duties 
regardless of sex, belief, or other considerations.
What principles of morals and conduct are to be found in the sūras of the 
Qur’an revealed in the Medinan period? And what of the corpus of legislation 
drawn up by the fuqahā’ in the second/eighth century derived from the words 
and deeds of the Prophet, considered by the fuqahā’ as divine, binding law? It 
goes without saying that the Prophet had a daily teaching mission to those who 
had emigrated with him and to his Medinan allies (Ansār), working to change 
elements of traditional mentality and behaviour incompatible with Islamic 
values which rejected clan loyalty and tribalism, and were based on the common 
practice of pardon and forgiveness. The Prophet gave a constant example of 
upright behaviour and righteousness, while having a realistic attitude toward 
human nature and the character of his Companions, which oscillated between 
gentleness and violence, stubbornness, jealousy and the love of worldly pleasures. 
In the Prophet they had a “good example” to use the Qur’anic expression.21 In 
his directives, orders and interdictions the horizon of the world to come was 
continually present, giving the ultimate meaning to human actions and inner 
aspirations. In other words, the Prophet was not so much interested in detailed 
social rules and regulations as he was in knowing if they could conform or not 
to the values he preached, such as pardon, generosity, an inner readiness for 
judgment and the world to come. He, therefore, recognised and perpetuated 
existing customs which did not run counter to Islamic principles, while insisting 
on individual responsibility for good or evil deeds. It is not the case that the 
directives of the Medinan period reduced in any way this dimension of personal 
responsibility destined to be progressively effaced in Muslim society after the 
death of the Prophet. Muhammad, as divine revelation repeats time and again, 
was sent by God in the same way as the other prophets. The message which he 
preached is the same as that of the prophets: that people may act justly. His task 
is to remind, to bear witness, to announce a message and call for vigilance: he is 
not a sovereign or guardian; he has not to force anyone to believe: “Each person 
is responsible for what they have acquired” and “do not bear what is the respon-
sibility of another”.22
In the light of these elements, one can understand the Qur’anic command to 
Islam
72
obey God and the Prophet and, in the same way, the Qur’an’s instructions about 
the division of booty: “Whatever the Apostle gives you take; and whatever 
he forbids you, give over” (Sūra 59:7).23 Whether it is a question of the most 
basic rules of behaviour – greeting, asking for permission to come in, entering 
a house, buying and selling, mortgages and debt, managing the property of 
orphans, dealing with the Jews and Christians or “People of the Book” (Ahl al 
kitāb), unbelievers, hypocrites, marriage, divorce, adultery, inheritances – or 
other matters confronting the Prophet while he was guiding the nascent Islamic 
community, there were two governing principles: on the one hand, attention to 
local conditions; and, on the other hand, encouraging the best possible code of 
conduct. This is the permanent defining characteristic of divine revelation and 
the actions of the Prophet. No violence or duress was employed. No Muslims 
were forced to go against their convictions. Nor did the Prophet impose 
decisions using the threat of harsh consequences in case of non-compliance. 
Self-appointed religious authorities have sacrificed truth and loyalty on the altar 
of external uniformity.
Does this contradict the instructions of the Qur’an which made the Prophet 
an arbitrator in disputes arising between Muslims? Far from it: recourse to an 
arbitrator in the case of disputes was a widespread practice among Arab tribes 
in the absence of a central government appointing judges. The parties involved 
in the dispute agreed beforehand to accept the verdict of the judge accepted 
by both parties. In a break with the past, the Prophet was not appointed as 
a judge because of prevailing tradition but due to his religious authority and 
moral leadership which made him superior to judges “whom one consults in 
their home”, as the Arab proverb has it. It is natural that his authority should 
derive its legitimacy from a source unavailable to anyone else, that it should be 
the decision of God at a precise moment, so that Muslims could be educated 
according to Islamic values and morals, with justice and equality among believers 
superseding values weighted in favour of the rich and powerful at the expense of 
the weak and the poor. It is no mean task to change values and morals, especially 
in nomadic or quasi-nomadic societies which have deep-rooted traditions and 
customs, and where following tradition is the dominant trend. Without going 
into details about the solutions adopted by the Prophet in particular situations, 
it was in order to effect such a change that the Prophet carried out his mission.
The thrust of this research thus far leads inevitably to a radical overhaul of 
a central article of faith grounded in Islamic consciousness since the second/
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ninth century. One has to recognise that what is essential is not the particular, 
historical reason for the existence of a given text or the general meaning of the 
words of the text; one has to transcend such considerations and examine the 
aim and intention of the text. There is room in this quest for a variety of inter-
pretations, in the same way that people’s needs are different, according to where 
and when and within which cultural milieu they live. There is also room for 
evolution, if a believer considers that the message of Muhammad is a matter of 
concern in the here and now of the present moment, without being obliged to 
interpret the message of the Prophet in the same way as his first/seventh-century 
contemporaries or successive generations of Muslims did. Present-day knowl-
edge of traditional interpretations is in general second-hand and sketchy. It is 
as though Muslims, following blindly their scholars and leaders of legal schools 
and sects, have fallen into the same trap as the People of the Book before them, 
and worshipped false gods, a practice denounced by the Qur’an. Muslims have 
forgotten the flexibility which characterised the Prophet’s teaching and conduct, 
turning them into examples to be memorised mechanically rather than pondered 
over.
It is instructive to compare, for example, the attitude of the Prophet to those 
drinking wine (he went no further than chastisement with the fringe of a item of 
clothing, a palm frond or a sandal) with that of Umār ibn al Khattāb and Ali ibn 
abī Tālib, who decreed that flogging should be the punishment.24 The majority 
of the fuqahā’ considered wine imbibing to be a grave infraction requiring the 
application of the same sanction. This is simply one example of the drift away 
from the path opened up by the preaching of the Prophet. Another compar-
ison would be with the attitude of the Prophet toward a man who infringed the 
rule of Ramadhan by having sexual relations with his wife during the period of 
the Ramadhan fast. The Prophet requested that he make amends by making a 
charitable donation. As the man was poor the Prophet collected the sum due 
from his Companions.25 However, the same man considered that he was more 
entitled to the donation and made off with it. Books of fiqh are full of references 
to kaffārāt (reparations) and attempts to go into painstaking detail about fasting 
regulations. One begins to grasp the basic difference between the conduct of the 
Prophet, based on tolerance, flexibility and understanding and the rigid attitude 
which Muslim scholars tried to impose. 
To the above examples can be added the Qur’an’s insistence that women 
should not be deprived of their share of the inheritance, in stark contrast to the 
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imāms of legal schools and their successors who, right up until the present day, 
have considered the verses setting out this principle as a practical, obligatory and 
definitive solution to the question. In reality they are more akin to an initial, 
somewhat spontaneous reaction to the question which cannot, along with other 
verses relating to inheritance, be applied without recourse to arbitrary means or 
what scholars call “reductions”. The same is true of polygamy, mentioned once 
by the Qur’an at the beginning of the Sūra al-Nisā’ with a condition attached 
to it, namely that orphans be treated justly and equitably. The verse 129 of the 
same sūra states that this is impossible despite efforts in this direction. The same 
text authorises the taking of slaves as concubines, meaning that a free man can 
legitimately have sex with concubines of his choosing. The Qur’an was merely 
recognising what was current practice at the time in the Arabian peninsula and 
in numerous traditional societies. Certain elements, such as physical chastise-
ment, are unacceptable today, although the Qur’an calls for spouses to be well 
treated and for exploitation and injustice to be avoided. 
Muslims subsequently adopted attitudes to women which were far removed 
from, and even in outright contradiction to, this generally progressive outlook. 
This means that today there is an urgent need to carry out a comprehensive 
revision of the view that men and women exist in the context of a hierarchy 
and not as different and complementary. Women are seen as instruments for 
procuring pleasure for men. Women are not perceived as persons having the same 
rights and responsibilities as men. Demoted to an inferior position, women’s 
freedoms are limited, and they are confined to the roles of housewife and mother 
with the obligation to wear a veil. It is certain that women in Muslim societies 
are gaining recognition of rights of which they were deprived in the past, an 
important change in societies which are moving away from traditional lifestyles 
into a phase of industrialisation and integration in today’s global economy. This 
does not mean rejecting Islamic values, although it may mean the progressive 
abandonment of certain precepts for reasons of realism and practicality. Opposi-
tion will come from those groups in society in whose interest it is that women 
remain subservient, imagining at the same time that they are somehow more 
faithful than others to the teachings of their religion.26 
In the context of discussion of the family, it is necessary to address the 
question of adultery and its sanction. The Qur’an decreed flogging, not stoning 
to death.27 The fuqahā’ later decided on the latter penalty on the basis of an 
abrogated verse which retains its legal validity. A precedent set by the Prophet 
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exists, although its authenticity is dubious. Flogging is prescribed by the Qur’an, 
and it is the most severe sanction apart from that reserved for qadhf, accusing a 
woman of adultery without the four necessary witnesses.28 One hundred strokes 
are prescribed in the case of adultery, to be reduced by half when slaves were the 
guilty party, eighty in the case of qadhf.29
This sanction was intended to prevent the spread of adultery and the conse-
quent confusion over lineage and descendants in a society which attached 
great importance, as did all nomadic societies, to the purity of lineages. Men 
did not need to have sexual relations unlawfully, since they could have more 
than one wife and possess an unlimited number of concubines. The possibility 
also existed of a temporary marriage (zawāj al muta’a or “marriage of pleasure”) 
which has been abolished by the Sunnis, although not by the Shī‘a: it still exists 
in Iran, to the advantage of religious functionaries in particular.30 Islamic socie-
ties throughout history have, however, still not digested the novel principle of 
equality between men and women, nor have they been rigorous in applying the 
strict conditions required for the application of the punishment for adultery.31 
The requirement that there be four witnesses makes it virtually impossible to 
apply the sanction. 
One might also consider the question of divorced or widowed women and 
the “waiting period”. The reason for this practice is to make sure that the woman 
is not pregnant. This delay is obligatory for women while men can marry without 
delay. Today tried, tested and straightforward scientific means exist which show 
whether or not a woman is pregnant. Is it really necessary to wilfully ignore 
innovations in the field of science and physiology which have shed light on 
domains which remained obscure at the time of the Prophet? Does one have to 
cling to a literal interpretation of the sacred texts without trying to understand 
their finality in the light of scientific progress? These, and similar questions, 
should give food for thought to those who preach reconciliation between reason 
and tradition. Tradition always entails interpretation and the best interpretation 
is that which preserves the spirit of the text without turning it into something 
static and unchanging. 
Sexuality is a delicate subject in all societies, ancient and modern, one which 
religions, systems of morality and laws try to regulate. Account must be taken, 
however, of the changes in the relations between men and women.32 The place 
occupied by myth and superstition in these relations has been reduced, while 
women for the first time in history can exercise control over their own bodies 
Islam
76
and pregnancy has become a voluntary choice. Sanctions, whether they concern 
usury, theft, or other questions, are not simply to be applied out of blind obedi-
ence to unchanging divine commands unconnected to any particular time or 
place. These have been imposed by social and ethical imperatives which today 
are no longer relevant. They can be modified, influenced as they are by changing 
factors, social, economic or political in nature. 
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From these and similar examples one can deduce that the religious message of Muhammad had one significant distinguishing feature. This message belonged to what Muhammad Iqbal called “the ancient world”, not 
merely, as Iqbal pointed out, because of its source, but also because his message 
included a number of elements rooted in the society of the time. However, as 
Iqbal says, “insofar as the spirit of his revelation is concerned, he belongs to 
the modern world”.1 The need for an invisible source of power, the presence of 
images drawn from mythology, for rites uniformly accomplished with no room 
for variation among adherents of the religion,2 the consecration of a number of 
social values and practices: all of this reflects a way of looking at the world which 
is not fundamentally different from that of the Arabs and peoples everywhere 
over many centuries. It is impossible to impose this traditional way of looking at 
the world on those who have experienced transformations which have radically 
affected human consciousness as well as the material dimensions of existence. 
Human history does not stand still nor is its course reversed, although human 
needs are universal: food; clothing; sexual relations; shelter; self-expression; life 
in a community; a sense of security both physically and emotionally; and, above 
all, a need to give life and destiny some kind of meaning. These needs can be met 
in a simple, unsophisticated way or in a refined and complex way in the modern 
world. 
One question which needs to be answered, however the question is framed, 
would be the following: did the message of Muhammad aim at halting human 
development at a particular stage which would not be surpassed? Did the Prophet 
5
The Seal of Prophecy
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try to confer an aura of absolutism to his instructions and the guidance he gave? 
Or, on the contrary, did he strive to broaden people’s horizons and give them 
complete responsibility for the way that worship should be conducted and daily 
life organised? In doing this they would be free to follow the dictates of their 
conscience. The second facet of Muhammad’s message noted by Muhammad 
Iqbal should be reexamined. It is one that has tended to languish in obscurity 
and whose innovative capacity has been neglected. Muslims have been unused 
to exploring this hitherto hidden facet of Islam, uncovering its secrets and their 
meaning. Most Muslims, one may even venture to say, were unaware of its exist-
ence. This was not through negligence or inability on their part but simply 
because the confines of the culture and the context in which they lived imposed 
certain models of thought and conduct. 
Iqbal, in a remark that is concise yet charged with meaning, expressed all of 
this with unrivalled eloquence and insight when he said: “In Islam, prophecy 
reached its perfection in discovering the need for its own abolition. This involves 
the keen perception that life cannot be forever kept in drawing strings; that in 
order to reach full self-consciousness man must be thrown back on his own 
resources.”3 Yet, how can Iqbal or anyone else determine that “in Islam, prophecy 
reached its perfection in discovering the need for its own abolition” and then 
consider the necessity of abolition as the highest degree of prophetic perfection? 
Is this not imposing on Islam ideas that are foreign to it? The answer depends 
on how the term “seal of prophecy” is understood.4 Does it simply mean that 
Muhammad is the last of the prophets?
Logically there seem to be only two ways of interpreting the term “seal” of the 
prophecy. The first possibility that comes to mind, one that is widely circulated 
in Islamic texts, and with which the majority of Muslims agree, imagining that it 
is the only possibility, would be that line of prophets was closed from the inside, 
as it were, and that the last prophet concludes this line while remaining a part 
of it. He is necessarily an integral part of this line that he concludes, and cannot 
depart from it or transcend it in any way. He can be compared with someone 
who locks a door as he enters a house and remains confined inside. The term of 
“seal” in this sense indicates merely a chronological order and that Muhammad 
comes at the end of a series of prophets, the last of the long line beginning with 
Adam and ending with Muhammad. If this prophetic structure contained any 
common elements between Muhammad and his predecessors, then Muhammad 
would have to adopt those elements in their entirety, applying to himself what 
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applied to them down to the last detail, as there was no difference between their 
prophetic messages and his.
If the prophets before him were sent only to their own peoples, Muhammad 
was, therefore, primarily the prophet of the Arabs. If other prophets were kings, 
such as David and Solomon, Muhammad would be invested with the trappings 
of a king, a holder of political authority and the founder of a state. Where other 
prophets were legislators, such as Moses, Muhammad introduced legislation 
similar to their legislation or superior to it. As all the prophets worked miracles – 
Moses parting the waters with his staff, Jesus speaking while still in the cradle or 
bringing the dead to life – Muhammad was bound to do the same kind of physical 
miracles: multiplying quantities of food; causing water to gush forth; curing the 
sick, being endowed with exceptional sexual potency; and so on.5 In other words, 
Muhammad had to be like them in everything they did, while surpassing them in 
terms of the mission he accomplished and in the means he employed. The only 
difference was that Muhammad was the last of the prophets.6
This understanding of prophecy is hardly surprising since people generally 
tend to evaluate what is new and unexpected in terms of what is familiar and 
are rarely attentive to what is new. In other words, they can reflect only on the 
basis of what exists and what resonates within them. Something that is beyond 
the frontiers of thought at a particular moment and what is inconceivable to 
someone living at a particular period may nevertheless be present, one may say, 
in a latent or potential form. Its meaning remains hidden beneath dense layers of 
interpretation and understanding which have diverted it from its original aims 
and long-term aspirations. Its power remains latent, awaiting the appropriate 
moment and the most suitable setting and people. At that point it emerges into 
view, bursting onto the scene in such a way that people are astonished that it 
had languished in obscurity for so long without attracting attention and being 
taken up. 
Consider, for example, how Muslims until recently viewed the holder of 
political authority, whatever his title: caliph; king; amīr; or sultan; he “over 
whom there is no higher power”, to use the expression of Ibn Khaldoun. He 
was not held to account for what he did and obedience was owed to him even 
though he might be an oppressor. One may also consider the duty of the ruler 
(about which there is general agreement) to consult “citizens”, traditionally 
considered his “subjects”. Islamic thought from the time of the caliph Abu Bakr 
in the first/seventh century up until the nineteenth century went no further 
Islam
80
than the position outlined by al-Māwardi in the fifth/twelfth century in The 
Statutes of Government (al-ahkām as-sultāniyya) when he recognises that inves-
titure should be carried out, when the ruler’s office is vacant, by those who “have 
the power to bind and release”. No one envisaged consultation in other circum-
stances or while the ruler exercised his power.7
Today many Muslims (including some of the leaders of Islamist movements) 
do not refuse democracy on the grounds that it is “un-Islamic”; on the contrary, 
they see in the two Qur’anic verses mentioning consultation a reliable source 
justifying consultation and even democracy.8 They would not have interpreted 
the Qur’an in this way had not modern sensibility come to firmly reject absolute 
government, striving to limit absolute government and to keep them under 
formal supervision. This is just one way in which concepts which may have been 
unknown to Muslims in the past are no less legitimate than those of which they 
approved. When favourable circumstances allow latent insights to emerge, new 
ideas can replace older concepts without believers feeling that they are guilty of 
reckless innovation and transgression. 
The second possibility is to understand the term “seal of prophecy” as being a 
closure of the prophetic line from the outside, as it were. Seen in these terms the 
seal of prophecy is one that puts a definitive end to the human need to rely on 
an external source of knowledge and norm for conduct. It, therefore, announces 
the opening of a new era in human history, in which humans, having reached 
maturity, no longer require a guide on whom to rely in every aspect of existence 
no matter how trifling. The task of the Prophet of Islam is, therefore, to guide 
people to a new sense of responsibility and acceptance of the results of their 
own choices. The Prophet can, therefore, be compared with someone closing 
the door of a house, in this case the house of all the prophets, and closing it from 
the outside. The Prophet was, therefore, no longer a prisoner inside the house 
and was quite free. He had announced that people were free to live in houses 
constructed by their own efforts and guided by their reason and intelligence, as 
well as the interests of each individual and society. The Prophet is sent as a true 
witness, bearing good tidings and warning “O Prophet, we have sent thee as a 
witness, and good tidings to bear, and warning” and by his words and deeds is a 
“good example”, to use the Qur’anic expression.9 He gave an example of justice, 
charity, compassion, goodness and upright conduct generally adapted to the 
circumstances in which he lived. He had not determined once and for all what 
people should do and not do, in all circumstances and all situations. Had he 
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done this he would have reinforced the spirit of conformism that he had come in 
order to oppose, substituting one tradition with another, albeit superior to what 
already existed. 
The message of liberation brought by Islam is not compatible with the orien-
tation taken by Islamic thought, one that emphasised external compliance with 
the practices of the Prophet. The great Sufi thinkers constitute a possible excep-
tion. This imitation turned into the adoption of a rigid legal shell which was 
imposed on believers.10 True freedom comes only through understanding the 
reasons and experiences which shaped the practice of the Prophet and led him 
to adopt particular courses of action. One of the basic functions of religion is to 
reduce the angst that individuals experience, although if this entails a denial of 
human freedom people will end up living in a state similar to that of animals in 
hibernation in an extremely cold habitat: their activity is reduced to the basic 
functions which assure their survival. If individuals are prevented from acting, 
they merely drift into passivity and what is best in them withers away: imagina-
tion; creativity; courage in the face of oppression; an independent conscience, 
everything, in short, that represents an unfettered personality with a unique 
place in the world. 
It is true that the human quest for truth resembles the progress of a blind 
person who perceives the world by relying on senses other than sight, while 
religion, Islam in the present case, is the language which enables him or her to 
fathom the enigmas of human life. Nothing, though, can replace a personal 
quest for values which are worth striving for alongside other like-minded 
individuals, certainly not formal adhesion to an inherited form of religiosity, nor 
a programme of practice and prescriptions imposed by an institution, nor undis-
criminating and slavish imitation of a role model (were it the Prophet himself 
let alone sundry imāms and other religious figures) in the minutiae of daily life, 
such as what to wear. Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah thus concluded, or “put a seal” 
on the line of the prophets, ending the practices of repetition and learning by 
rote, opening the way toward a future that people will build together in a spirit 
of freedom, responsibility and solidarity. He laid down the solid foundation for 
a truly universal code of ethics, and his role as a Prophet was no longer one of 
offering ready-made patterns of behaviour for Muslims to apply in a mechanical 
fashion. 
One can imagine the chorus of disapproval that these ideas will provoke. Can 
the whole Muslim community have reached a consensus built on errors? What 
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will remain of Islam if Muslims turn away from the path followed hitherto? Some 
of this doom-mongering is fuelled by a desire to preserve material or spiritual 
interests and to perpetuate the status quo despite the crisis of traditional religious 
practice in modern society. The weight of the past and of tradition should also 
be set aside. Who gave these self-appointed spokesmen the right to speak in the 
name of the “real” Islam? Since when has the work of scholars been an expression 
of what is in the heart of Muslims? Do they share in God’s knowledge of people’s 
innermost thoughts? How do these spokesmen know that one day Muslims will 
not develop a deeper understanding of their faith than that which has prevailed 
for fourteen centuries, a period which is short when seen in the context of the 
broad sweep of human history? Are people not called upon to explore the world 
and examine it, created as it is by God? When they seriously take up this invita-
tion they discover that God addresses them through the “symphony of creation” 
in which they participate inasmuch as they are creatures capable, as no others 
are, of enriching the created world by the spontaneous fruits of their imagina-
tion and the disciplined processes of their intelligence. No one can replace them 
in this role; it is they alone who can add their voices to the hymn of creation that 
surrounds them if they are attentive to their deepest thoughts and the song of 
creation, be it audible or silent. Nothing can stand in the way of their search for 
the best and most suitable ways of organising their lives and attaining happiness. 
Muslims should be proud that the message of the Prophet exhorts them to do 
this, calling on them to react to events and not regulate their lives according 
to the practice of their forebears, to explore human existence in all its richness 
and not simply repeat slogans, and to bring up the next generation to think for 
themselves and not cling mulishly to a list of formulas learnt by heart. 
Roman Catholic theologians, in particular since the Second Vatican Council 
(1962–5), have tended to maintain that the Church has retreated from some of 
its previous positions (which were in some cases erroneous) because of a deeper 
understanding of the deposit of faith rather than because of a desire to disavow 
its own history, a desire which would deal a fatal blow to the dogma of infal-
libility.11 Islam does not recognise (fortunately, in our opinion) the principle 
of a clerical class, nor is it a matter of disquiet that Muslims may have made 
mistakes. None the less, a particular interpretation or a way of understanding 
adopted by one particular or several generations, although valid in a particular 
cultural or historical context, may need to be superseded or abandoned in a 
different context. This is equally true of Shī‘ite and Sunni thought, for both 
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address Muslims in a schoolmasterly tone. Shī‘ism requires a second “cycle”, the 
cycle of holiness (walāya), which perpetuates the process of revelation through 
the imām and the saints; their attributions have changed but their prophetic 
function remains. Sunnism retains only the most superficial understanding of 
the term “seal of prophecy”, clinging to a literal interpretation of the text and 
prescribing obedience to edicts based on the deductions of religious scholars of 
the second/eighth century, as if contemporary Muslims are incapable of making 
their own deductions.12 In both cases there is a clear deviation from what we 
believe God intended by ending the prophetic line. Sunnism and Shī‘ism keep 
individual believers in a state of subordination to religious leaders, whatever the 
names or titles they may be given. They instil a fear of both the responsibility 
brought by the message of Muhammad and the radical equality of rights and 
duties for all Muslims.
For all these reasons we can state unhesitatingly that the message of Islam took 
into account the needs of its time. The essence of the message was far in advance 
of its time and it far outstripped the thoughts and aspirations of Muhammad’s 
contemporaries. The message was rich in possibilities and perspectives, although 
Muslims were open only to those closest to the prevailing mentality. They 
cannot be blamed for the results of their efforts of interpretation and deduc-
tion: those who should be criticised are those who persist in adhering to tradi-
tional positions and do not give sufficient weight to the need of people today for 
spiritual sustenance which goes beyond automatic obedience and literal applica-
tion of orders and prohibitions. They do not perceive the important evolution 
that has taken place in what is known as “the public sphere”,13 moving from a 
situation in which everyone had a more or less equal chance of deriving knowl-
edge from a few uniform sources and only simple questions were debated to one 
unprecedented in history where sources of knowledge are well-nigh limitless. 
This is due to the spread of education across a broad sector of society, the diffu-
sion of books, magazines and newspapers and the rapid transmission (rendered 
instantaneous by the Internet) of audio-visual information across the world. 

Part Two
The Message in History
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People do not discover truth, they construct it, as they construct their history.
(P. Veyne)
This part will not be concerned with the detail of historical events, despite the 
need for a critical examination of the history of the Muslim community after 
the death of the Prophet, during the time of the rightly-guided caliphs,1 and the 
subsequent Umayyad period (41/661–126/744).2 It was only towards the middle 
of the second/eighth century that the period after the death of the Prophet began 
to be documented. This documentation was incomplete and influenced by the 
partisan rivalries of the different factions involved. Some Muslims accepted the 
official version of events, others contested it, while yet others gave tacit approval. 
Underlying these events is a question which this part aims to answer: given the 
nature of the message of Muhammad, why did the first Muslims not put this 
message into practice? Why did the Companions, the Followers,3 and those who 
came after them adopt solutions which seem unsatisfactory,and even spurious?
The divergence between the aims of Muhammad’s preaching and its historical 
form is not something that should cause surprise. This divergence is a feature of 
philosophical and religious movements. This is what happened in the case of 
Protestantism, which developed alongside modernity, leading to results which 
were far from conforming to the vision of the founding fathers of Protestantism, 
and in some cases, in contradiction to it.4 The same could be said of Marxism as 
applied in the former Soviet Union. It is not a question of analysing the inten-





were acting in complete fidelity to the new religion and its demands. They acted 
almost on impulse, without a theoretical framework to govern their conduct 
which only became a reference for the Muslim community long after this first 
generation of believers had left the scene.
The passage of time has rendered futile any attempt to unearth the motiva-
tion of that generation or that of any faction among them. It can be stated with 
some certainty that the aura of sinless perfection with which they have been 
surrounded does not reflect historical reality. This legend was grounded in the 
need of the political establishment for legitimacy, a need shared by the religious 
scholars or ‘ulamā’. History abounds with examples (which it is pointless to 
enumerate) of the first believers’ involvement in violent conflicts, as they rivalled 
one another in accumulating wealth and enjoying worldly pleasures: woman-
ising; owning concubines and slaves; revelling in palaces, clothes and luxury.5 
Such conduct was natural and unsurprising, as values which challenge prevailing 
customs take time to become established and adopted, before superseding tradi-
tional values. Their assimilation is a gradual process and depends on prevailing 




There were a number of possible scenarios for the transitional period after the Prophet’s death which saw the message of Muhammad begin to take on a socio-political dimension.
(1)  A return to the status quo prevailing in the Hejaz before Muhammad. 
This was inconceivable in the light of the new situation created by the preaching 
of the Prophet in the Hejaz and in the Arabian peninsula, with the inter personal 
and collective solidarities created by Islam transcending traditional tribal 
 structures. The initial signs of social fragmentation had already appeared before 
the beginning of Muhammad’s preaching, accompanied by a vague yet powerful 
yearning for change. In the light of these factors, it was inevitable that some kind 
of centralised decision-making process should begin to take form. The tribe of 
the Quraysh, because of its prestige among the Arabs, its illustrious history and 
its economic power had a strong chance of playing a central political role after the 
Prophet’s death. Tribal loyalties may also explain the revolt known as the ridda 
(apostasy) which broke out among tribes outside the Hejaz at the time of Abū 
Bakr. This movement was an expression of an obsolescent tribal solidarity which 
had begun to disintegrate. Even if Muhammad and the Muslim com munity had 
not decisively confronted the ridda, it was doomed to fail.
(2)  Another possible outcome could have been the adoption (for their own 
ends) of the preaching of the Prophet by the rich and powerful members of the 
Quraysh, although their initial resistance rendered this unlikely. The sub sequent 
course of events demonstrates that the Ummayads adopted this course of action 
once the passage of time had drawn a veil over their past record. At the same time, 
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the vast Islamic empire, composed of a multitude of races and interest groups, 
needed Umayyad skills in organisation and intrigue, as well as their economic 
resources and adeptness in political manoeuvre. 
(3)  Another eventuality was a revised version of the Sahīfa Agreement. This 
was an agreement of a non-religious character between the emigrants from Mecca 
(muhājirūn) and the inhabitants of Medina (Yathrib), Aws, Khazradj and the 
Jews.1 The weak position of the Muslim community prior to the expulsion of the 
Jews, the conquest of Mecca and the ensuing conversion to Islam of the penin-
sular tribes made such an agreement necessary. Changing circumstances removed 
the justification for such an agreement: as the community’s position had gone 
from one of weakness to strength, while Islamic principles had been applied in 
numerous areas and religious affiliation had become the basis of social cohesion.
(4)  The events surrounding the Sahīfa incident2 show that internal conflict 
could have divided the Muslim community. The Muhājirūn considered that 
the Quraysh were most qualified to exercise authority following the Prophet’s 
death, while the Ansār3 saw this as an attempt to marginalise them. Setting out 
their position, ‘Umar said: “And lo, they are trying to cut us off from our origin 
and wrest authority from us”. Their speaker continuing, replied: “We are God’s 
Helpers and the squadron of Islam; you, Muhājirūn, are a family of ours and a 
company of your people has come to settle.” All the Ansār would accept was a 
sharing of power: “Let us have one ruler, and you another, Quraysh.”4 ‘Umar 
provoked surprise by hastening to swear allegiance to Abū Bakr, exploiting 
the rivalry between Aws and Khazradj. Haunted by the spectre of a fratricidal 
struggle for power, he declared: 
We feared that if we left the assembly without having sworn allegiance to 
a Caliph, they would have chosen one of those present after we had left. 
We would have had to accept their choice even if we disapproved of it, or 
oppose them, which would have been a disaster.5
(5)  Yet another possibility would have been to entrust the Ahl al Bait 
(“People of the House”) in the form of ‘Ali or ‘Abbās with the control of affairs. 
This would have meant bringing together symbolic authority (being related to 
the Prophet) and temporal authority, which was the object of contention. ‘Ali’s 
personality may have played a part in excluding him, although it seems that 
there was also something of a reluctance to accept the principle of accumulating 
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different types of authority in the hands of one person. Power concentrated in 
this way, exercised for good or ill, would have been difficult to resist. The Arabs 
were unfamiliar with such practices and were unwilling to accept them even if 
the Shī‘a subsequently saw the convergence of symbolic and temporal authority 
as representing the highest degree of legality.
(6)  The last option, the one that came to pass, was adopted because of the 
dis advantages associated with the other possible outcomes. Abū Bakr was 
design ated as successor to the Prophet. The factors of age, experience and 
personal charisma played an important role in his nomination as tribal tradition 
demanded. The prestige that he enjoyed among the Muslims made it difficult 
for any rival faction to oppose him. As a member of the council of the Quraysh, 
the earliest form of a state institution, he was approved by the rich members of 
this tribe. Under his guidance, events during the ridda followed the traditional 
pattern in the peninsula: the Quraysh’s prestige continued to grow and refrac-
tory tribes were brought into its sphere of influence. 
Two remarks should be made at this point: first, that religious considerations 
were either completely absent or of secondary importance in the designation 
of Abū Bakr to succeed the Prophet. Claims that he was the preferred candi-
date because he was the first convert to Islam or because he led the community 
in prayer while the Prophet was ill were made a posteriori in order to confer 
legitimacy on this choice. Textual authority for the caliphate of Abū Bakr only 
appeared in certain Sunni circles at a later period as a reaction to Shī‘ite claims 
that ‘Ali was the rightful imām. The choice of a person to lead the community 
was a purely practical one, a necessity caused by the power vacuum after the death 
of the Prophet, who had exercised power without facing any opposition. It was 
also the application of a universal social law, namely that human collectivities, 
whatever their size, need a figure of authority who will represent them. If such 
a figure does not exist, anarchy will prevail and the organisation necessary to 
perpetuate the life of the collectivity will be gravely damaged.6 Islam developed 
in an environment in which the state was absent, which explains why religion 
and state converged from the time of Abū Bakr onwards. It became impossible 
to imagine the continued existence of Islam without it enjoying the protection 
of the state. This was at the expense of the vitality of the message and its capacity 
to develop. 
The second point to be made would be that the designation of Abū Bakr 
to this post, along with that of later caliphs, kings, amīrs and sultans was of no 
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concern to the overwhelming majority of Muslims.7 The only people concerned 
were leaders and those who had some influence over them, to whom the liter-
ature of the governmental statutes (al-ahkām al-sultāniyya) gave the name of 
“those who have the power to bind and loose”. Power could not be exercised by 
the governor except with their support or approval, or at least with their accept-
ance of his authority. This means that soon after the Prophet’s death there was a 
drift away from a spirit of equality between Muslims. There was a resurgence of 
traditional values at the expense of the revolutionary values proclaimed by the 
new religion. In other words, the institution of a democratic electoral system in 
today’s sense of the term was inconceivable to Muslims at that time. Democracy 
is the fruit of an evolution which has taken humankind two or three centuries 
and does not have a direct link with religion. Within religion there is a factor of 
alienation and at the same time religion bears the seeds of liberation from aliena-
tion: this potential remains latent until the conditions are ripe for it to take on 
a specific form within human history. Consultation of the people was limited 
to a very small number of individuals, before dwindling away completely and 
being replaced by an hereditary system and the nomination of successors. None 
of this was due to Islam. The role of religion is to confer legitimacy on existing or 
projected structures of power. Subjective religious consciousness present within 
each believer is the deciding factor in determining whether or not a particular 
system of government conforms to the principles of the message of the Prophet. 
It is evident that individual sensitivities change and evolve and are very different 
in the twenty-first century from what they were in the seventh century ce.
Various theoretical scenarios existed which could have filled the vacuum 
caused by the death of Muhammad, although the chances of their coming to pass 
varied greatly. The final turn of events did not necessarily conform most closely 
to the logic of the Prophet’s message: in the end prevailing historical circum-
stances determined which scenario came to pass. Two important areas of social 
life, slavery and women in society, were influenced by the prevailing context in 
such a way that the spirit of the of the Prophet’s message was set aside. They have 
been grouped together, as they lie at the heart of an eminent principle which is 
Qur’anic as well as human, that of personal dignity.
The first area is that of slavery, a phenomenon which is of merely historical 
interest today, although one may still wonder why Muslims enslaved their fellow 
men and women while remaining deaf to the message of revelation. The Qur’an 
emphasised the pre-eminent position that God has assigned to humankind as 
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a whole and also multiplied the occasions on which they could be freed: the 
practical result of this would be to put an end to the practice of slavery. It is 
noteworthy that the Qur’an does not mention a single case or set of circum-
stances in time of war or in peace which could lead to one individual enslaving 
other humans. The conquests (futūhāt) quickly became a means of acquiring 
fresh provender, with Arab masters exploiting male slaves for their own gain in 
various forms of forced labour while female slaves were totally subjected to their 
master’s whims and desires. Muslims seemed to forget the logic of the message 
of Islam and its aim, as well as its necessary gradualism and realism in not 
confronting directly existing interests. Their behaviour toward slaves was similar 
to that of non-Muslims, or the pre-Islamic inhabitants of Arabia, and sometimes 
worse. Worldly interest and greedy material considerations prevented a coherent 
interpretation of the Islamic message and Muslims lost the opportunity of being 
the first heralds of human rights in the broad, direct sense of the term, and the 
first to put them into practice among peoples for whom it was normal that not 
all people should be free. Jurists went no further than to enjoin slave owners to 
treat their slaves well, while making the same remarks with regard to animals.
The second area was that of women and their rights. Here again Muslims 
were no more innovative than other contemporary peoples. The inferiority of 
women was a firmly rooted belief in all ancient cultures, with the “second sex” 
being seen as associated with weakness, evil, an ally of Satan himself. Merely 
 physiological phenomena, such as menstrual blood, were in the eyes of most 
people signs of female impurity during menstruation. A woman could not 
approach food intended for other people lest it become unfit for consumption; 
she would be placed apart in a place set aside for this.8 Had not women been 
created from one of Adam’s ribs? Had she not led him astray by persuading him 
to eat the fruit of the tree, an act which was the source of sin and precipitated 
the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise? Muslims are well aware that the 
Qur’an says nothing about these two myths present in the Book of Genesis and, 
on the contrary, emphasises that people are created from a single vital source of 
life and that God created a partner for man that he might dwell with her. The 
Qur’an states equally clearly that Iblīs9 was the source of temptation, not Eve, 
and that God pardoned Adam thus effacing the act of disobedience. Instead of 
meditating on all of this, the Muslims set about adopting elements of the Jewish 
legends or isra’iliyyāt10 which reinforced preconceived ideas on women and 
interpreted the Qur’anic verses concerning women in an arbitrary way which 
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abolished the essential differences between the preaching of Muhammad and 
the texts of the Ahl al-Kitāb.11 They were, therefore, unable to attain the noble 
aims of the Qur’an and show how Islam was the basis of a system of values which 
broke with tradition and commonly held beliefs. 
Even more regrettable was the way in which they conceived Islam through 
the prism, as it were, of their desires, fancies and selfish interests, which meant 
that Islam became synonymous with the oppression and degradation of women 
who were confined to their homes behind bunker-like walls, deprived (because 
of Islam) of their basic human rights such as education and employment. Islam 
is manipulated in order to shore up an uncertain religious and cultural identity 
which asserts itself by a deluded obligation placed on young girls to wear the 
veil.12 Here, too, Muslims missed the opportunity of being the precursors in 
recognising men and women as equal. Where women have been able to obtain 
– with difficulty – certain of their legitimate rights, this has been against the will 
of men and without any cooperation on their part. This would not have been 
the case had they possessed a deep understanding of the message of Islam. What 
were the historical factors at the origin of this aberrant interpretation of Islam?
These factors are multiple and interconnected. It is difficult to isolate them 
from one another or to consider one more important than another. Some are 
of cultural origin, such as the residual pre-Islamic mentality among the Arabs 
or among Muslims belonging to other cultures and religions in the conquered 
territories. Those who embraced the new religion did not undergo a type 
of “brainwashing” but brought with them their way of looking at the world, 
together with their beliefs, sensitivities and values. In the light of all of these 
they came to understand the elements of Muhammad’s preaching with which 
they came into contact, as well as the texts that they had discovered. As might 
be expected in such circumstances, they fell back on old frames of reference in 
order to understand what was novel and unfamiliar. This led to a certain number 
of concerns being projected onto Islam, as it were, which were foreign to it, and 
even contrary to its spirit and aims. On the other hand, the existing knowledge 
of nature, its laws, human beings and their inner life and aspirations, society 
and its norms conditioned the way in which the first generations of Muslims 
understood religious teachings. This understanding acquired a sacred character 
with the passage of time which it was difficult to cast off even when learning 
progressed and set aside obsolete views. 
Other factors were political in character, connected with the need to conduct 
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the affairs of the community in a given historical environment. As the tribal and 
clan system prevailed in the Arabian peninsula, it was not to be expected that 
the designation of the leaders of the Islamic community and their exercise of 
power should somehow inaugurate new and unfamiliar forms. This is why the 
first three caliphs, known as the rāshidūn or “rightly-guided ones”,13 and the first 
Umayyad rulers behaved like tribal or factional chiefs despite the extent of their 
suzerainty which extended over groups of people very different from those ruled 
by tribal chiefs in the Arabian peninsula and covered an infinitely greater area. 
Kinship played an important role in the code of tribal ethics, and remained 
significant under Islam, with non-Arabs being denied the rights and privileges 
enjoyed by the Arabs. Muslims of Arab origin appropriated for themselves the 
highest political and military ranks in the nascent empire while the non-Arabs 
(mawāli)14 and foreign Muslims in general were excluded from them. The bitter-
ness that this exclusion fuelled made them easy prey for power-hungry insurgent 
movements and led them, in reaction to their exclusion, to swell the ranks of the 
largely Persian shu‘ubiyya movement.15 Many of the mawāli sought to surpass the 
Arabs in fields which the latter considered with disdain: science in general, as 
well as religious and linguistic studies. 
These political factors are also linked to the practical necessities of the 
construction of the state and the administrative apparatus, albeit rudimen-
tary, on which it reposed. It was natural that these administrative structures 
reproduced those existing in pre-Islamic Mecca. That environment had offered 
an experience limited in scope and of little value in the context of a multicul-
tural, multiethnic empire transcending the bounds of the tribal system with its 
uncomplicated components. Traditional structures of government had to be 
reinforced by drawing on the experience of neighbouring peoples in dealing 
with a civil service, money, taxes, land and its ownership. The running of the 
expanding empire necessitated the founding of a pensions office to compensate 
for the inability of memory alone to retain the names of those entitled to draw 
a pension and the amount each would receive. Then came other branches of 
the administration: army; post; chancellery; and the other services needed by 
a central authority.16 As these structures were set up, Muslims did not feel that 
they had to observe religious precepts: it was a practical question, consisting, on 
the one hand, of adopting systems existing among states of the region, and, on 
the other hand, of inventing solutions which would preserve social stability. This 
appears very clearly in the case of statutes concerning conquered land, which 
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varied from one locality to another. Another example would be the refusal of 
‘Umār to distribute the fertile land (sawād) of Iraq to those who had partici-
pated in their conquest. Human institutions require, as we have seen, legitimacy 
in the eyes of those who benefit from them as well in the eyes of those who 
submit to the authority of these institutions. No sooner had they been set up 
than a authoritative foundation was sought for them, which at that time was 
religious in nature. It is highly probable that the motivation for decisions taken 
at a political level was not so much religious as practical. Sometimes this meant 
following closely the principles of Muhammad’s message, at other times it meant 
departing from them.
Economic factors also played a significant role in the deviant interpretations 
of the message of Islam at the hands of the first generation of Muslims as well as 
in the way the message was lived out in practical terms. With the exception of the 
principal traders in Mecca, the inhabitants of the peninsula, whether Bedouin 
or sedentary, led hard, austere lives because of the desert environment. They also 
experienced poverty and privation because of the lack of natural resources. Such 
was their situation in the pre-Islamic period, and this continued at the time 
of the Prophet and during the caliphate of Abū Bakr. Scarcely had ‘Umar ibn 
al-Khattāb succeeded him than he realised in a moment of far-sighted genius 
that the best way to heal the antagonism between adherents of the new religion 
and the divisions caused by the civil war which had occupied his predecessor, 
Abū Bakr, was to direct the combatants’ energies toward an external enemy. This 
was a classic solution applied in many similar circumstances, although in this 
case rapidity of execution and exploitation of the element of surprise meant that 
success was total even if the balance of force was tilted clearly in favour of the 
two great powers of the time, Persia and Byzantium. They did not anticipate 
that the Arabs would attack them, a people whom they had grown accustomed 
to consider as being fragmented and fractious. They had underestimated the 
profound transformation brought about by Islam, one that affected the mentality 
of the Arabs and led to shared religious faith superseding tribal solidarities.
The amazing speed and relative ease with which the conquests were carried 
out during the caliphate of ‘Umar are almost without historical parallels: Byzan-
tium lost control of Syria and Egypt, while the Persian empire in Iraq and Iran 
was swept away. In comparison with the short-lived conquest by Alexander 
the Great of vast swathes of the known world in the fourth century bce, the 
Arab conquests had consequences which outlasted the caliphate of ‘Umar and 
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survived the transfer of power to his successors. A series of victories in North 
Africa brought the Arabs to the frontiers of Europe in the Iberian Peninsula 
and the south of what is now France, battle lines which were stable for about a 
century. Two aspects of these conquests are of particular interest in the context 
of this book and are discussed below.
First, by conquering countries which were rich in natural resources, arts and 
crafts, and where ancient civilisations had flourished, the Arabs had amassed 
booty which surpassed their expectations and even their wildest dreams, given 
the poor environment in which they lived and the impoverished state of the 
Arabian peninsula.17 The direct result of this was the growth of a class of nouveaux 
riches belonging to the traditional Qurayshi governing class who had organised 
and led the conquests, as well as a number of the Ansār who had distinguished 
themselves at that time. Predictably, “treasures of gold and silver” were amassed, 
in contradiction to the message of the Qur’an.18 The opposition voiced by Abū 
Dhurr al Ghifāri and others was to no avail. As Muslim believers, they were 
shocked by the amassing of wealth and the resulting harmful disparities between 
different classes of Muslims, with a minority possessing vast tracts of fertile 
land generating wealth for their owners who then flaunted it in marriages, rival 
building projects, fine clothes, armies of servants and livestock and sumptuous 
lifestyles in general. Abd er Rahmān ibn ‘Awf, al-Zubayr ibn al-‘Awāmm and 
Talha ibn ‘Ubayd Allah19 exemplified this trend, while the majority of Arabs and 
foreign converts to Islam experienced economic hardship and did not benefit 
from the booty accumulated during the conquests, or other consequences of the 
conquests: income; territory; estates; the extension of trading routes; as well as 
the benefits deriving from holding high office in the various provinces under the 
suzerainty of the caliph.
The effects of the conquest were not limited to the material sphere. They 
engendered an entrepreneurial mentality, one that calculated the relation 
between aims and means of achieving them, reinforcing tendencies already 
present in the mercantile mentality of Qurayshi notables in the pre-Islamic 
period. In the same way it buttressed relations based on obedience, factional 
loyalties and the submission of the weak to the strong, all of which flew in the 
face of the relations that Islam tried to install which were founded on justice 
and equality. Obedience can eventually turn into refusal and rebellion, and 
it is no surprise that the seeds of organised sedition and revolt which marked 
Islamic history from that early period of the conquests, producing their deadly 
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fruit at the time of ‘Uthmān’s caliphate. Subsequent theories of law, theology 
and ethics were also influenced by all these developments, with the ‘ulamā’ 
willingly adopting Persian values and taking the emperors as models of conduct, 
as though there were no difference between imperial values and the message 
of Islam.20 This system of subservience also had an effect on the education of 
the young in society, with the following generations growing up accustomed to 
complying with what others wanted, instead of cultivating within them mutual 
respect and equality. An ethical approach based on freedom and responsibility 
did not develop. This would have allowed them to respect the rules of society, 
while recognising that these could evolve by democratic means.21
The second significant aspect of the conquests is their legitimacy from the 
point of view of the logic of the message of the Prophet. Merely raising this 
may appear singular, as Muslims have been used to considering what befell their 
ancestors in the first century of Islam as a benediction which led them from the 
darkness into the light and guided them onto the road of righteousness after they 
had wandered astray. In the context of the present study, however, the question is 
not raised from this point of view. One may, however, wonder if the occupation 
of the conquered territories was a holy war (  jihād ) in the Qur’anic sense, given 
that the Arabs set themselves up as lords and masters, made male inhabitants 
into prisoners and women into objects of pleasure, while exploiting the region’s 
resources. Was not all of this a military operation brought about by the expan-
sion of the empire and deriving its legitimacy from Islam? In other words, did the 
propagation of a religion require the use of violence to guide people in the way 
of righteousness? A glance at the map of the Islamic world is sufficient to dispel 
any doubts: nearly three-fifths of Muslims live in regions which embraced Islam 
in a peaceful manner, through trade, the presence of the ‘ulamā’ and members of 
Sufi fraternities in regions such as Indonesia, China and large tracts of the Indian 
subcontinent and sub-Saharan Africa. This clearly shows that Islam does not rely 
on the use of force in order to spread and that worldly, material considerations 
were the real motives for the wars waged by the first generations of Muslims 
against neighbouring countries. There has always been a reluctance to describe 
these operations for what they were in reality – occupation, invasion, colonisa-
tion (to use modern terminology) – considering them instead as a combat waged 
in God’s name, in accordance with His will and the sunna (practice) of His 
Prophet. As a result, the defensive forays carried out by the Prophet to safeguard 
the very existence of the nascent religion were interpreted as being offensive in 
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intent, and were assimilated to the campaigns subsequently waged by Muslims. 
These latter campaigns thus acquired a legitimacy that they would not otherwise 
have possessed. The point of view of Sufyān al Thawri,22 who held that fighting 
with the polytheists was obligatory only when they themselves initiated hostili-
ties remained an exception among ‘ulamā’ and political figures.
Recognition of historical reality does not mean denying the good faith of 
those who carried out the conquests. They were confident that they were in the 
right, and that they were merely carrying out the instructions of the Prophet. 
One can also readily recognise that many of those who took part in the conquest 
sacrificed their lives and resources in a noble cause, and in God’s name, hoping 
merely for reward in the world to come. This does not mean that other aspects of 
the situation or the latent reasons behind the conquests should be ignored. They 
constituted a clear deviation from the aims of the message of Islam: jihād, in its 
violent, aggressive form (together with the iniquities which resulted) prevailed 
at the expense of freedom of conscience and the call to a better life.23 It may well 
be that the spread of Islam could have taken on a more positive form, without 
violence and exploitation. Perhaps it would have been more firmly implanted in 
the hearts of believers, and would have had less need of states and governments 
and institutions which call people to account and practice intellectual and even 
physical forms of terrorism. It is not a question of going back over the past and 
hauling previous generations before the tribunal of history on account of their 
actions; one can, however, demystify human history and, free from any lingering 





The core beliefs and initial message of all religions tend to undergo a process of organisation and institutionalisation, and Islam was no excep-tion in this respect. The basic principles of the message of Islam could 
not take form in the setting of the history of the first/seventh century without 
undergoing a similar process. Institutionalisation involves passing from theory 
to application, from what is potentially present to that which exists in reality. 
This inevitably means that first principles will lose a greater or lesser degree of 
their initial élan, and acquire characteristics that reflect a specific historical situa-
tion with all its ramifications and contradictions. One should not be surprised to 
find that one of many potential or existing interpretations attracts the adhesion 
of individuals or groups, prevails over the others and marginalises them, gradu-
ally acquiring the status of authentic and self-evident truth. This is because the 
interpretation in question conforms to ways of thinking at that time and to the 
prevailing balance of socio-economic and political power.
There were three main orientations in this process: first, differentiation from 
other groups, stressing what separated Muslims from other communities, be 
they polytheists or ahl al-kitāb. This is unsurprising, given that the Muslims 
were initially a minority among the inhabitants of the conquered territories, 
afraid of being absorbed into the religious and racial mix surrounding them. 
They, therefore, needed to create ways in which they would easily recognise one 
another in matters of dress, clothes and general conduct. One manifestation of 
this desire for distinction was the obligation placed on the dhimmis ( Jewish and 
Christian minorities) to wear distinctive dress. They were also forbidden to ride 
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on horseback, and restrictions were placed on the construction of churches and 
synagogues, along with other measures known as “the clauses of ‘Umar”.1 Their 
attribution to ‘Umar and the extent of their application are questionable. The 
need for the fuqahā’ to underline the need for these measures may be proof of 
their non-application. The proclamation of such measures could also be a means, 
together with the abolition of taxes, for rulers to curry favour with the common 
people when necessary. In general the status quo ante was soon restored.2
Muslims behaved more or less similarly to the followers of other religions 
when, after the death of the individual bearing their initial message, and, thanks 
to those who were the effective founders of these religions, they formed commu-
nities possessing shared rites, beliefs and taboos. One could cite as examples Ezra, 
after the Babylonian exile in the sixth century bce, in the case of Judaism, and 
Paul and his non-Jewish disciples in the case of Christianity. This tendency to 
form a separate community manifested itself progressively among the Muslims 
from the period of ‘Umar onwards as a direct result of the expansion of the terri-
tories under their control and the spread of Muslim populations across these 
regions. One should, however, note that the formation of a Muslim community 
with a pattern of behaviour distinct from that of other religious communities was 
a phenomenon affecting city dwellers rather than country people. Rural dwellers 
became Muslims and discovered Islam’s texts, rites and code of conduct at a later 
period.3 Rural societies were more cohesive, and strategies of differentiation 
more difficult to implement. When Islam spread into rural areas it was inconceiv-
able to imagine women being obliged to wear the veil or being confined to their 
homes as happened in urban settings. This shows that the desire for difference 
comes up against limits, connected with social conventions and established ways 
of life. It takes on a religious coloration in function of the surrounding environ-
ment, and its legislation aims to exclude the “other” focusing on what divides 
people rather than what unites them in complementary, supportive groups.
Institutionalisation also meant transforming varying forms of worship 
into uniform liturgies in which there was no scope for personal initiative or 
departure from a number of unchanging principles. Ritualism is a phenom-
enon present in all religions. Islam in its historical form did not constitute an 
exception and gradually the idea took hold among Muslims that worship, in 
the forms of prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage could be carried out only in a set 
manner. Certain elements were obligatory, others traditional, while yet others 
were super erogatory, to be carried out voluntarily. If, as we have previously 
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noted, the message of Islam was initially marked by considerable flexibility in 
this respect, this tended to disappear, with the way that the Prophet prayed held 
to be binding in all its details. In reality these details were not stable during the 
life of the Prophet, and varied due to a number of external factors. This explains, 
to some extent, the divergences which subsequently arose, pitting the imāms and 
their followers from one legal school against those belonging to another school. 
Certain details were given preference over others, and the collective Muslim 
memory retained only those about which there was a consensus or an approxi-
mate version thereof, leaving aside the question of whether the Prophet had in 
fact observed these details or was merely imagined by the community to have 
done so. The Muslims, and their ‘ulamā’ in particular, did not have a natural 
propensity toward a uniform ritual, but they could envisage no other way of 
safeguarding the unity of the community. The sects which developed under the 
caliphate of ‘Ali also sought to give their ritual distinctive characteristics, some 
of which caused violent strife. The Shī‘a, for example, insist on employing the 
formula “Come and accomplish the worthiest action”, while the Sunnis refuse 
this.4 It occurred to no one to leave Muslims free to worship in the way that 
seemed the most appropriate, as society at that time did not look on pluralism 
and variety as sources of enrichment, without which human existence soon loses 
its flavour. Diversity was a source of apprehension, and treated with the utmost 
wariness. The result was that formalism triumphed over fervour and devotion, 
sincerity and spontaneity. Prayer became a series of bows and prostrations at set 
times of the day, mechanical actions carried out by the person praying, often 
in ignorance of their significance and intent. In the majority of Muslim socie-
ties, the Ramadhan fast has come to mean abstaining from food and drink and 
reducing physical effort during the day, while overeating in the evening to the 
point of being unwell. Late nights and cheap entertainment complete this unpre-
possessing tableau. As for the pilgrimage, it is merely a set of unchanging rites 
which take no account of the number of people involved, or distinguish between 
long, dangerous and fatiguing journeys or swift and undemanding ones.
The growth of this ritualism was one of the most important reasons behind 
the growth of Sufism on the margins of institutionalised Islam, because of 
dissatisfaction with the merely external forms of piety imposed by the fuqahā’. 
Sufism subsequently evolved into a constellation of fraternities around which 
developed all manner of affiliations while fulfilling a number of symbolic and 
practical functions, especially when central authority weakened and the fabric 
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of society began to unravel both in the Maghreb and the Mashreq. The Sufis 
reacted  critically to the exorbitant wealth of the upper class as well as to the 
empty superficiality of a prosperous society such as that of the Abbasids. At 
the same time, the dutiful performance of rituals did not provide the Sufis with 
sufficient spiritual sustenance. A number of leading Sufis rejected ritualism, 
although a majority adopted a more conciliatory attitude. From the beginning 
of the third/ninth century the Sufis belonging to the Sunni school prevailed over 
their opponents, and managed to balance the competing demands of “Law” and 
“Truth”, and reconcile the respect of external reality with the desire to explore 
the inner depths of the soul. However, they remained tolerant of popular piety 
with its multiple expressions in which the imagination played an important role. 
These included the intercession and mediation of holy men and women, bodily 
expression, the performance of set collective rites, recitation of the Qur’an, 
litanies, and the invocations associated with each tarīqa or Sufi  spiritual “family”.5
The third consequence of the institutionalisation of religion was the forma-
tion of a series of binding dogmas. It is evident that it is not possible to make a 
comparison with Christianity in this respect as Islam has no need of dogmas 
concerning subjects such as the Trinity, the incarnation, salvation, original sin 
and other matters which give rise to disparate and conflicting interpretations. 
Dogmas nevertheless developed within Islam which, with the passage of time, 
became set in stone. These often concerned the rules associated with what was 
considered to be correct conduct rather than the content of faith itself. Shī‘ites 
became convinced of the centrality of the imamate restricted to Ali and his 
descendants, while the Sunnis replied by stressing the primacy of the “rightly-
guided” caliphs, according to the chronological order of their succession to the 
leadership of the Muslim community. Both groups considered that the Qur’an 
contained a series of prescriptions to be applied in a literal manner, regardless of 
the time and place. This gradually led to the formation of a unchanging system of 
thought and practice which was considered the Sunna of  the Prophet, similar to 
the Qur’an insofar as it was held to be divinely inspired, although in a different 
manner. This in turn led to a strict delimitation of the methods of interpreting 
the text, relying heavily on analogy (qiyās). 
The traditions recounting the words of the Prophet were assigned a position 
of unassailable authority, being considered the “way leading to knowledge” 
( jihat-al-‘ilm).The authority of the first two generations who transmitted the 
traditions (the Sahāba or Companions, and the Tābi‘ūn or Followers) was 
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 unchallengeable, although that of subsequent generations could be contested. A 
rapid survey of the dogmas of the Sunna reveals how Muslims were compelled 
to accept a collection of “eternal truths” which had originally been the object 
of controversy. A whole range of subjects including the creation of the Qur’an, 
belief in the preordaining of human acts towards good or evil and the concomi-
tant denial of human freedom to choose, an irrational view of social and natural 
phenomena, the arbitrary nature of divine approval, the perception of God in this 
world or the next, the punishment of the tomb, the questioning of the believer 
by Munkar and Nākir,6 the infallibility of the Companions, to name but a few, 
were considered to be self-evident truths. This delimitation of what Muslims 
must believe serves only to validate the solutions adopted by the dominant intel-
lectual class of the time, and to close off avenues of debate and dissension so as to 
perpetuate the power of the ‘ulamā’ and the representatives of the religious estab-
lishment. There was no room for free thought or informed individual search for 
answers to existential and metaphysical questions; questions to which no one 
can claim to possess precise and complete answers.
This third aspect of the institutionalisation of religion did not manifest itself 
clearly from the beginning, since the transformation of a religion into an institu-
tion always takes place gradually. There is an initial stage of spontaneous piety 
whose form is not imposed from the outside. Institutionalisation requires the 
formation of a group exclusively or primarily occupied with religious matters. 
Such a development became necessary in a society transformed by the conquests 
where there was a natural tendency toward specialisation as Islamic civilisation 
became more prosperous and complex. There was also a need for a pact between 
this religious group and the holders of political power who monopolised the 
legal use of violence. Whatever may have been the degree of independence 
enjoyed by these “men of religion” in relation to the holders of political power – 
and many shied away from authority, declining even the post of qādi and other 
official titles – the divergence was not between the interests of the political and 
religious notables but rather between this politico-religious establishment and 
the mass of the people, including women and slaves, who were deprived of any 
kind of authority, even if they formed the majority of the population. Religious 
notables could be of non-Arab origin (mawāli) or of lowly origin, but once they 
obtained official recognition, they belonged henceforth to the elite and enjoyed 
its privileges. Political and religious elites needed each other’s support, which 
gave rise to negotiation, compromise, and sometimes conflict, especially with 
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the founding of the Abbasid empire (749–1258/132–656) which used religious 
ideology to buttress its legitimacy.
The study of these three areas – distinction between Muslims and non- 
Muslims, the formalising of ritual and the development of dogma – leads the 
observer to the conclusion that the diversion of the message of Islam caused 
by the process of institutionalisation is part of a common trend affecting any 
message or programme, religious or otherwise. Any attempt to realise these in 
history has quite unexpected results, different from what was foreseen. People’s 
opinions and behaviour cannot be programmed in advance like a machine, or 
foreseen as animal behaviour can be, governed as it is by instinct. Changing 
external circumstances affect the way people act, and they are influenced by their 
needs, be they psychological or cultural, which have varied from one milieu to 
another. It is possible that the increase in the number of Muslims may have been 
a cause of qualitative decline, insofar as institutional or organised religion toler-
ates the natural tendency of ordinary believers to content themselves with the 
bare minimum of observance, which consists of performing external rituals while 
adopting an unforgiving attitude toward tendencies which seem to threaten its 
structures. This religious “establishment” refuses any individual appropriation of 
religion, or a return to the ideals of the founding generation.
In other words, it is a mistake to unquestioningly follow in every detail the 
path mapped out by the early generations of Muslims who sought to put the 
message of the Prophet into practice. Their understanding of the message was 
conditioned by their context and they interpreted it according to their inter-
ests, their intellectual horizons and the conflicts in which they found themselves 
caught up. Imitation of previous generations and fear of innovation were not so 
much a phenomenon accompanying early applications of Islamic teaching as the 
product of other factors, including the balance of forces which resulted from the 
victory of the hadīth party over their Mu‘tazalite adversaries at the beginning of 
the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil (232–247/845–861).7 
One should evaluate critically the positions defended by the first generations 
of Muslims, especially when one recalls the contradictory opinions attributed to 
distinguished members of these generations. This was not due to an evolution in 
their thought, or a change brought about by external events, but because of the 
way in which, from the beginning of the second/eighth century onwards illus-
trious names surrounded by a halo of sanctity were brandished in order to give 
credibility to the hulūl 8 defended by the fuqahā’ and the hadīth scholars. Two 
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examples illustrate this. The hadīth collections give a privileged place to the tradi-
tions transmitted by Abū Huraira despite his having accompanied the Prophet 
for only a few months. His conduct at the time of Mu’awiya was not a model of 
rectitude.9 The books of exegesis (tafsīr), such as those of Tabari and those who 
followed in his footsteps, are full of traditions attributed to ‘Abdallah ibn Abbās, 
who, although he was a scholar, was also a participant in the conquests, being 
one of the seven ‘Abdallahs involved in the first expedition against Ifrīqiya. He 
was active in politics, although his conduct when he was appointed governor of 
Kufa by Ali was far from noble. In addition, his age – he was around twelve when 
the Prophet died– made him too young to have been a Companion in the precise 
sense of the word or a trustworthy witness to the events that took place at the 
time of the revelation. It would have been inconceivable in the Abbāsid period 
to accuse the “ancestor of the caliphs” of lying or to question the  pertinence of 
his opinions, supposing for a moment that they were true or partially true.10
The institutionalised version of Islam which is the subject of this chapter, 
and which has survived until the present day, is that which progressively took 
form once the situation stabilised in the second/eighth century, after the trans-
formations which took place during the life of the Prophet and the following 
decades. The first generation of Muslims had, due to the Conquests, lived 
through swift and far-reaching changes in all areas of their lives. They emerged 
from relative isolation in the Arabian peninsula and found themselves mingling 
with peoples who had their own beliefs, moral codes, customs, traditions and 
social  organisation. 
Naturally the Arabs were influenced by all of this, and Islamic trappings 
were given to many of these cultural elements (as long as they did not counter 
the basic principles of the new religion) in areas which the Qur’an had passed 
over in silence or for which there was no precedent in revelation. By living in 
the conquered lands, and intermarrying with their inhabitants, they discovered 
other civilisations, of which some were superior to their own, together with ways 
of life, systems of thought and sensibilities far removed from those to which they 
were accustomed.11 Knowledge, crafts and techniques spread among the Arabs 
as they adopted urban lifestyles and passed from a lifestyle of simple necessities 
to one of convenience (al-hājji) and luxury (al-kamāli) to use the terms of Ibn 
Khaldoun (732–808/1332–1406).12 Their leaders and notables also went from a 
life of austerity to one of luxury and abundant wealth. They founded an imperial 
state and were subjected to a central government in Medina, then in Damascus, 
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and finally Baghdad which could either act as a substitute for the moral authority 
of the tribal chief, or leave him certain prerogatives. 
It was to be expected that these and other changes would have an effect on 
the Islamic system that was taking form. Muslims, however, generally refused 
to acknowledge this, despite the profound and obvious effect of these trans-
formations. This explains why, at the time of the Abbasid Caliphate, attempts 
were made to construct an historical theory which glossed over the historical 
factors driving these changes. Scholars sought to affirm continuity between the 
period of the Prophet and the period when the new institutions had developed. 
The result was that their image of the message of Islam was not one that took 
account of the message, its logic and its intentions. Their Islam was the distilla-
tion of more than a century’s practice and application, a reading of the Qur’an 
and an interpretation of the Prophet’s life according to the views and the value 
system of their period, within the interpretative framework that had taken form 
over more than a century using standard models of thought, common to the 
cultures of the region.13 Herein resides the difficulty of our undertaking, aiming 
as it does to explore this obscure period and strip away the accumulation of 
commonplace clichés to reveal the reality. It is an attempt to delve into what has 
been eliminated, deliberately forgotten, confused, or deformed, striving also to 
discover why certain solutions enjoy legitimacy while others do not, while yet 
others went unnoticed by Muslims and their scholars. One may also wonder 
why certain solutions were the object of reflection for outstanding scholars, but 
did not find a favourable environment in which account might have been taken 
of them.
Observe, for example, the following brief extract from the I‘lām of al-‘Amīrī, 
where he discusses the art of fiqh: 
Although personal interpretations may have been forbidden, for imāms 
there are only two alternatives: affirming, as do the “Twelvers” or Imāmīs, 
that the imām is infallible or recognising that what is approved by reason 
is licit, as al-Nazzām stated. The infallible imām will not be replaced and 
should the need arise there will be no possibility of having recourse to him. 
As for adopting what reason suggests, this is, in the eyes of the Hanbalites 
and Imamites, a major heresy. The only solution is, therefore, to go back to 
the source, retaining the practices of the best of the Companions.14
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Al-‘Amīrī does not explain how one can dispense with the infallible imām 
and the “practices of the best of the Companions” and rely on reason alone. He 
does not consider “declaring licit what reason approves” to be heresy in itself, 
although it was seen as such by the Hanbalites and the Imamites. In the end he 
does not retain this rational principle as he sought elements of unity and not 
division. This brief allusion suffices to show that certain Muslims in the third/
ninth century believed that humans did not need a divine law, whatever its 
source, in order to help society to function. In other words, there was no contra-
diction between Islam and existing laws: in this respect they can be described as 
pioneering “secular” thinkers. For this reason their opinions were marginalised 
and forgotten, or deliberately overlooked, and their contemporaries took no 
notice of the potentialities of their thought or the horizons that it could have 
opened up. For this to happen agreement would have been needed on rational 
efforts to organise society and the message of Islam would not have been trans-
formed into legal corpus.
A detailed study of the period following the death of the Prophet up until 
the middle of the second/eighth century, a period for which there exist only 
secondary sources, is beyond the scope of this book. Nor is it possible to study all 
the ways in which Muslim practice diverged from the objectives of the message. 
This would require monographs on the different areas of Islamic thought as it 
took form before its codification in treatises and collections which have acquired 
the status of authoritative reference works. These include the Sīra of Ibn Ishāq 
and Ibn Hishām, the Tabaqāt of Ibn Sa‘d, al-Fiqh al-akbar of ’Abu Hanīfa, the 
Muwatta’ of Mālik, the Risāla of Shāfi‘i, the Sahīh of Muslim and the Tafsīr of 
Tabari.15 These Mu‘tazilite, Sunnite and Shī‘ite volumes on fiqh, tafsīr, hadīth, the 
science of kalām, along with the Sufi literature, are the sole existing sources for 
the study of Islamic thought. 
On the basis of these sources we shall concentrate our efforts on the major 
orientations and turning points of Islamic thought. We shall bring together a 
number of specific examples, representing the major themes treated by Islamic 
literature, even if it is difficult to present an abridged version of these themes 
without distorting them, given their varied and abundant nature. It is vain to 
use texts and quotations as weapons of controversy; what really matters is to try 
to better understand historical events without unwittingly adopting positions 





The Elaboration of Institutional Theory
Having studied how Islam inevitably took on the characteristics of an  institutional religion, we can go on to demonstrate how this affected the theories elaborated by Muslim scholars in the different fields of 
Islamic thought. These fields were not, originally, independent of one another; 
tafsīr, for example, was not an autonomous speciality, nor were hadīth or fiqh 
clearly defined. The areas of theological research were not yet delimitated, while 
the study of the origins of fiqh came into being only after the development of fiqh 
itself in order to set out the methods by which laws could be established through a 
process of deduction. These questions were interconnected and complementary, 
and were responses to practical questions arising in specific circumstances. They 
were not the outcome of specialised study or abstract calculation. The multi-
plicity of problems confronting the first generations of Muslims led them to find 
timely solutions which were intended to give a distinctive identity to the Muslim 
community and foster internal solidarity. Factors of division were numerous: 
racial origin; social standing; language or dialect; as well as contrasting cultures, 
economic and administrative institutions, and other diverging interests. In these 
circumstances, it was natural to reduce the manifestations of disunity and strive, 
insofar as possible, for a unified code of conduct and shared inner convictions. 
The message announced by the Prophet dealt with only a very small number 
of questions, while the texts, however varied their interpretation, were limited 
in contrast to the boundless variety of human history. The construction of an 
organised, coherent structure with a religious foundation was an urgent task. 
After hesitation, stumbling and controversy the Muslim community set about 
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this task. With the passage of time a structure of thought and practice began to 
take form.
Nevertheless, it is an illusion to believe that the fiqh developed by the ‘ulamā’ 
at the time of codification and the earlier solutions adopted by the first genera-
tion of believers are complementary. This belief is based on the impression of 
continuity created by the uninterrupted chains (isnād ) of transmitters of hadīth 
and the exploitation of the traditions as arguments to support particular points 
of view, as though these traditions were free from any trace of falsification, defor-
mation, inaccurate recall, carelessness, or negligence. The founders of Islam, and 
particularly the first generation of believers at the time of the “simple faith”, to use 
the expression of Ibn Khaldoun, were primarily interested in practical solutions, 
which varied according to the circumstances and the people and issues involved. 
It would not have occurred to them that these solutions needed to be uniform or 
that they needed a religious guarantee in order to be acceptable and applicable.1
To underline this point of view we put forward as an example the standpoint 
expounded by Ibn Khaldoun when he criticises the errors of the historians. The 
reader will excuse this lengthy quotation from the beginning of the Muqad-
dimah as it is a perfect expression of the methodology appropriate to the subject 
under discussion. Ibn Khaldoun writes thus on the: 
excellence of historiography, an appreciation of the various approaches 
to history, a glimpse of the different kinds of errors to which historians 
are liable, and some of the causes which result in errors, notes that ‘the 
writing of history needs numerous sources and greatly varied knowledge. 
It requires a good speculative mind and thoroughness. Possession of these 
two qualities leads the historian to the truth and keeps him from slips 
and errors. If he trusts historical information in its plain, transmitted 
form and has no clear idea of the principles resulting from custom, the 
fundamental facts of politics, nature of civilisation or the conditions 
governing human social organisation, and if, furthermore, he does not 
evaluate remote or ancient material through comparison with near or 
contemporary material, he often cannot avoid stumbling and slipping and 
deviating from the highroad of truth. Historians, Qur’an commentators 
and leading transmitters have committed frequent errors in the stories and 
events they reported. They accepted them in the plain transmitted form, 
without regard for its value. They did not check them with the principles 
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 underlying such historical situations, nor did they compare them with 
similar material. Also, they did not probe more deeply with the yardstick 
of philosophy, with the help of knowledge of the nature of things, or with 
the help of speculation and historical insight. They strayed from the truth 
and found themselves lost in the desert of baseless assumptions and errors.2
Having given examples of what he considered error and illusion, Ibn Khaldoun 
adds: 
The scholar needs to know the principles of politics, the true nature of 
existent things and the differences among nations, places and periods with 
regard to ways of life, character, qualities, customs, sects, schools, and every-
thing else. He needs a comprehensive knowledge of present conditions in 
all these respects. He must compare similarities in certain cases and differ-
ences in others. He must be aware of the differing origins and beginnings 
of different dynasties and religions, as well as of the reasons and incentives 
that brought them into being and the circumstances and history of the 
people that supported them. His goal must be to have complete knowledge 
of the reasons for every happening, and be acquainted with the origin of 
every event. Then he must check transmitted information with the basic 
principles he knows. If it fulfils their requirements, it is sound. Otherwise 
the historian must consider it as spurious and dispense with it … a hidden 
pitfall in historiography is disregard for the fact that conditions within 
the nations and races change with the change of periods and the passing 
of days. This is a sore affliction and deeply hidden, becoming noticeable 
only after a long time; rarely do more than a few individuals become aware 
of it. The condition of the world and of nations, their customs and sects, 
does not persist in the same form or in a constant manner. There are differ-
ences according to days and periods, and changes from one condition to 
another. This is the case with individuals, times and cities and in the same 
manner it happens in connection with regions and districts, periods and 
dynasties.3 
In the first book of the Muqadimmah concerned with the nature of civilisation, 




Untruth naturally affects historical information. There are various reasons 
which make this unavoidable. One of them is partisanship for opinions 
and schools. If the soul is impartial in receiving information, it devotes 
to that information the share of critical investigation the information 
deserves, and its truth or untruth thus becomes clear. However if the soul 
is infected with partisanship for a particular opinion, it accepts without 
a moment’s hesitation the information that is agreeable to it. Prejudice 
and partisanship obscure the critical faculty and preclude critical investiga-
tion, with the result that falsehoods are accepted and transmitted. Another 
reason making untruth unavoidable in historical information is reliance 
on transmitters … while another is unawareness of the purpose of events, 
unfounded assumptions as to the truth of a thing. This is frequent and 
caused by reliance on transmitters. Another reason is ignorance of how 
conditions conform to reality. They are often affected by ambiguities and 
artificial distortions. The fact is that people as a rule approach great and 
high-ranking persons with praise and encomia. They embellish  conditions 
and spread the fame of great men. The information made public in such cases 
is not truthful. Another reason making untruth unavoidable, and one that 
is more powerful than all the reasons previously mentioned, is ignorance of 
the various conditions arising in civilisation. Every event (or phenomenon) 
whether it comes into being in connection with some essence as the result 
of an action, must inevitably possess a nature peculiar to its essence as to 
the accidental conditions that may attach themselves to it. If the student 
knows the nature of events and the circumstances and requirements in the 
world of existence, it will help him to distinguish truth from untruth in 
investigating the historical information critically … it is superior to inves-
tigations that rely upon criticism of the personalities of transmitters. Such 
personality criticism should not be resorted to until it has been ascertained 
whether a particular piece of information is in itself possible or not. If it is 
absurd there is no use engaging in personality  criticism.4
One might think that this text was written yesterday rather than over six 
centuries ago, as it shows little sign of its antiquity, and were it not for certain 
stylistic features one might attribute it to a contemporary author should one 
ignore its source. Ibn Khaldoun was, however, labouring under a handicap (one 
that was psychological in nature, although also a consequence of the prevailing 
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mentality of his time) which prevented him from applying his method to tradi-
tions linked to the religious sciences. This leads him to affirm, after his preceding 
description of the direct causes of falsehood, that:
personality criticism is only taken into consideration in connection with 
the soundness or lack of soundness of Muslim religious information, 
because this religious information contains injunctions in accordance 
with which the lawgiver (Muhammad) enjoined Muslims to act whenever 
it can be presumed that the information is genuine. The way to achieve 
presumptive soundness is to ascertain the probity and exactness of the 
transmitters.5 
He sums up his position at the end of the chapter which he devotes to hadīth 
sciences: “Of all people scholars most deserve that one may have a good opinion 
of them and that one be eager to find sound excuses for them.”6 
If this is the case, the time has come to overcome the handicap which led Ibn 
Khaldoun to distort reality when he claims that the prescriptions of Muslim law 
are, for the most part, arbitrary prescriptions. Consultation of any volume of 
fiqh, tafsīr, (Qur’anic exegesis) or hadīth from the second or third centuries after 
the Hijra will reveal the inaccuracy of this affirmation. These prescriptions are 
contained within traditions guaranteed by a chain (isnād) of transmitters going 
back in some cases to the Prophet and most of the time to the Companions, the 
Followers and particularly the imāms of the schools of jurisprudence. Arbitrary 
prescriptions cannot be separated from tradition.7 Ibn Khaldoun makes the very 
error that he himself denounces in the non-religious domain, namely “partisan-
ship for a particular opinion” or “reliance on transmitters” or “ignorance of the 
nature of various conditions in civilization”, in the Khaldounian sense of this 
latter term, which includes social institutions, crafts, science and learning. It is 
less a question of reliance on transmitters or considering them unreliable than 
an awareness of the errors to which any transmitter is prone: illusions, forgetful-
ness, error, or confusion can affect even a transmitter of tradition who strives to 
pass on what he has heard in an authentic and faithful manner without adding 
or omitting elements. No historian worthy of the name will today rely on the 
isnād or set any store by its presentation of past or present events, regardless of 




No historian claims to possess absolute truth. Events and facts do not have 
a unique and objective way of existing, but take on meaning through the way 
in which they are perceived by each person according to their point of view, 
their faculties of perception and the context in which they exist. The historian 
produces the past as much as he or she narrates it. An historian, conscious of the 
limits of the knowledge available, will not only consider it with caution but will 
also be vigilant in examining the numerous material or intellectual factors which 
may influence the way in which events are interpreted. Without succumbing to 
sterile relativism, a correct and scholarly approach requires that the historian 
uncover the coherence of the elements available without projecting on to them 
contemporary or personal considerations, or making anachronistic judgments or 
appreciations. Certain elements of received wisdom of events in the first century 
of the Hegira need to be reexamined, especially when it comes to the question of 
how loyal the first generations of Muslims were to the principles of the message 
of Muhammad, as it was their vocation to embody these values. 
We shall not repeat here what has already been noted about the conduct of 
the Prophet when faced with the responsibility of presiding over the destiny 
of the Muslim community during its incipient phase in Mecca and subsequent 
formative period in Medina. It is sufficient to mention the flexibility character-
ising his conduct, and his overall aim of educating Muslims in new ethical values 
going against many aspects of pre-Islamic customs, while on other occasions 
conforming to them, taking account of prevailing realities, proceeding gradually 
and giving priority to what was essential in the light of prevailing circumstances 
and the balance of forces.9 
Arbitration between rival parties was one of the most important tasks of the 
Prophet, one that he exercised in person when circumstances required or that 
he delegated to certain of his Companions in remote regions, such as Yemen. 
After the death of the Prophet, the caliphs themselves assumed this duty in the 
empire’s main centre and conferred this responsibility to qādis in the conquered 
territories. Inevitably, the traditional tribal instance of arbitration was super-
seded by the position of the qādi, who acted according to the requirements of 
the new central authority. The qādi’s authority was no longer derived from the 
acceptance of his authority by the two parties, but was an extension of the polit-
ical authority which had appointed him to that post. This same central authority 
would help him implement his judgments, by force if necessary. 
These judges did not initially undergo any particular preparation, nor did 
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they refer to a legal code similar to that promulgated by the Byzantine emperor, 
Justinian, in the sixth century ce. They were, for the most part, familiar to 
varying degrees with the precedents established by the Prophet or set out by 
revelation. However, not all these judges had been alive at the time of the various 
stages of revelation of the Qur’an nor had they witnessed personally the events 
of that period. The cases with which these qādis had to deal were more numerous 
than existing precedents and certain of them were more complicated, related to 
socio-economic problems very different from those of the Prophet’s time and 
involving people whose ethical values, customs, traditions and ways of life were 
very different from those of the Arabs in the Hejaz and in the Arabian peninsula 
as a whole. The inhabitants of Iraq, Persia, Syria and Egypt had inherited civili-
sations and institutions of a high degree of refinement, while life in the fertile 
agricultural basins of the great rivers (Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates) was thus very 
different from that in arid desert regions. This context shaped social relations 
and the way in which people envisaged the functions of central government 
and its representatives, such as tax collectors, judges and other agents of central 
authority. 
Muslim qādis, therefore, sought to adapt to these circumstances, recognising 
numerous practices of the peoples of the conquered territories when they did 
not seem to fundamentally contradict the principles of the new religion. On 
the other hand, they attempted to apply the customs that they had known in 
their own Arab environment. Some qādis, for practical reasons, sought to famil-
iarise themselves with the legal provisions existing in the conquered regions 
particularly in relation to taxes and administration, and thus acquired exper-
tise in Jewish, Byzantine and Persian law. This, among other elements, explains 
the degree of resemblance between the Muslim judicial system and laws existing 
around the Mediterranean basin region.10 It was only natural, in the absence of 
any detailed texts and codified criteria, that the judgments made should vary 
from place to place, according to temperament, nature, persons and circum-
stances. This was a cause of unease among governors and subjects alike, especially 
as the questions dealt with concerned not only the usual insignificant disputes 
but involved blood feuds, crimes of honour and other vital interests and could 




These inconsistencies in the decisions made by qādis were destined to make an 
enduring mark on fiqh, although scholars initially endeavoured to bridge the 
gap between contradictory practices and coordinate the various decisions made 
in different regions of the Muslim world. Their attempts to produce a coherent 
system followed the same rationale as the expanding empire. This meant 
giving the Islamic community, destined to expand and absorb large numbers 
of communities and individuals, a more or less unified system of worship and 
practices governing social relations. The diversity of the empire’s subjects and 
their origins prevented the complete harmonisation of legislation. ‘Ulamā’ in 
each metro polis, especially in the Hejaz, Syria and Iraq, strove to demonstrate 
the sound foundations for their decisions and furnish justifications for them. 
Traditions attributed to the Prophet and handed down by a chain of transmit-
ters were used to support particular solutions and present them in a favourable 
light.
This observation may lead the historian to relativise the dispute between the 
champions of personal opinion and discernment (ahl al-ray), on the one hand, 
and hadīth scholars, on the other hand. This dispute developed in the second 
century of the Hegira, gathering strength in the third/ninth century as imāms 
came to prominence for each school of jurisprudence. Their disciples took it upon 
themselves to defend their masters’ opinions. Personal opinion and free interpre-
tation prevailed immediately after the time of the Prophet, and continued to do 
so unchallenged at least throughout the first/seventh century, in the absence of 
systematic recourse to the text of the Qur’an, or to the acts or declarations of the 
Prophet concerning great or small issues. The drawing of analogies between past 
and present, or between cases arising ( far‘ )11 and an existing precedent (asl ), to 
use the terminology of the fuqahā’, was not an established practice. This explains 
why fiqh, even after taking on a fixed and codified form, remained a peculiarly 
dense mass of cases divided into sections and chapters. It is well-nigh impos-
sible to ground these individual cases in all-embracing general principles which 
explain their different parts and details. The law codes are evidence of this. There 
is no trace in the vast fiqh literature of any attempt to explain reasons or aims. 
It did not prove possible to establish a legislative structure in the precise sense 
of this term. It may, however, have made possible a kind of balanced interac-
tion between members of society, based on trust, a moral rather than a juridical 
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quality, or on threats and coercion, which produce results contrary to mutual 
concord and tolerance. 
One should not be misled by one juridical school’s acceptance of a particular 
source of fiqh, particularly consensus or analogy, while another school refuses 
it. This happened in the case of the Hanafite and Zahirite schools, as well as 
the Ja’afarite and Hanbalite. The disagreement between these schools does not 
concern the solutions which each may accept, but has to do rather with the 
justification for these solutions. Whether one turns to the Mudawwana of the 
Malekite scholar, Sahnūn (d. 240/850), the Muhallā of the Zahirite, Ibn Hazm 
(d. 453/1063), or even the Da’āim of the Ismailian qādi, al-Nu’umān (d. 363/971), 
one finds differences over the basis for the legal prescriptions. In one case it may 
be a tradition originating with a Shī‘a imām, in another the tradition will be 
handed down by a single unbroken line of transmitters. Sahnūn relies on the 
opinion of Mālik and Ibn al-Qāsim and on existing practice in Medina. The 
divergences between these sources are no more considerable than those existing 
between the Umm of al-Shā’fi‘ī (d. 202/819), the Mabsūt of the Hanefite, 
al-Shaybani (d. 189/804) or the Mughni of the Hanbalite, Ibn Qudama (d. 
620/1223). The fiqh elaborated by these schools retained a large proportion of 
the contradictory solutions which characterised the initial period of Islamic 
history, while giving them an Islamic veneer. It is clear that they were the product 
of particular circumstances, which in their turn created convergences and differ-
ences between the solutions adopted. 
Arab readers may be generally aware that Mālik declined the offer of the 
caliph Mansūr to make the Muwatta’ an official basis for Abbasid political and 
juridical decisions. They will also have heard of the famous debate between the 
Caliph Ma’mūn and a Zoroastrian, an event of which the Caliph was particularly 
proud. He supported implicitly the point of view of Mālik, that the differences 
between Muslims concern the branches and not the origin. This does not harm 
the soundness of religion or belief but rather opens up wider possibilities for 
interpretation. Numerous works deal with the question of divergences between 
the fuqahā’, the most widely-known being Bidāyat al-mudjtahid wa nihāyat 
al-muqtasid by Ibn Rushd in the sixth/twelfth century, and rahmat al’umma 
fi ikhtilāf al-a’imma by the Shāfi‘ite, al-Dimashqi in the eighth/fourteenth 
century.12 Without going into details about subjects, such as the famous Hanefite 
capacity to find ways around the application of legal sanctions or the disputed 
legitimacy of talfīq (choosing between the decisions of the various schools), or 
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the numerous inconclusive conferences and congresses organised to promote 
convergence between the schools, one may note that publications still appear 
today on the subject of divergences between schools, such as al-Jazīri’s al-fiqh 
‘ala madhāhib al-arba‘a (Islamic jurisprudence according to the four schools). 
According to the dominant point of view fiqh, in all circumstances, and whatever 
the degree of discord between the fuqahā’, contains the “judgment of God”, or the 
“judgment of canonical law”.13 Contrary as it may seem to all available evidence, 
one encounters the following affirmations: judgments made by the imāms of the 
various schools and their pupils are not human legislation as God alone is legis-
lator. He is the source of all righteousness. Disagreement is, therefore, of little 
importance. These two articles of faith merit closer  examination. 
In order to go beyond mere theory, we shall quote the exact text of a number 
of examples from the aforementioned book of al-Dimashqi, illustrating the 
subjects about which the fuqahā’ were in unanimous agreement as well as areas 
of disagreement. We can demonstrate their degree of fidelity to the divine law, 
bearing in mind our previous remarks about the ultimate aim of the preaching 
of Muhammad.
According to Mālik and Shā’fi‘ī the prayer of a man who has a woman beside 
him is licit. Abū Hanīfa affirms that prayer in these circumstances is invalid. 
There was a divergence of opinion concerning the presence of a river or a road 
separating the imām from the persons praying. According to Mālik and Shā’fi‘ī, 
the latter may follow the imām, an opinion contradicted by Abū Hanīfa. If the 
believer prays at home while being guided by the imām who is in the mosque, 
and an obstacle prevents the believer from seeing the lines of people praying, 
Mālik and Shā’fi‘ī and Ahmad ibn Hanbal agree that the prayer is not valid. Abū 
Hanīfa maintains that it is.
There is general agreement that the funeral prayer requires a state of ritual 
purity and the covering of the private parts. Sha‘abi and Tabari maintain that the 
prayer is valid without the state of ritual purity.
There is general agreement that it is licit to pray for someone who has 
committed suicide. But according to al-Awzā‘ī one should not. Qatāda says that 
one should not pray for an illegitimate child, while al-Hasan says that prayers 
should not be said for a woman giving birth.
If someone begins a journey after having started to fast, he is not allowed 
to break the fast, according to the three schools. But according to Ahmed ibn 
Hanbal, he may do so.
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The sacrifice (‘aqīqa) offered seven days after birth is a recognised precept in 
the eyes of Mālik and Shā’fi‘ī Abū Hanīfa says “It is merely authorised. I would 
not say that it is desirable.” Ahmed ibn Hanbal maintains that there are two 
traditions: the more well-known states that it is desirable, the other that it is 
obligatory. Certain of his disciples have chosen the latter. Al-Hasan and Daoud 
say that it is obligatory. The ‘aqīqa consists of the sacrifice of two sheep for a boy 
and one for a girl. According to Mālik, the sacrifice consists of the offering of one 
beast for a boy or a girl.
Can the house of a bankrupt person be sold if he cannot do without it? 
Abū Hanīfa and Ahmad ibn Hanbal reply no. The former adds: no part of his 
property or his livestock can be sold. On the contrary, say Mālik and Shā’fi‘ī, all 
of these can be sold. 
The fuqahā’ belonging to the generation of the Companions and Followers in 
the various regions of the newly-conquered territories together with the imāms 
of the different schools agreed that the contracts of musāqāt are licit, although 
Abū Hanīfa declares that they are null and void.14
Another area of contention was that of relatives on the maternal side of a 
family to whom the Qur’an had not given the right to inherit. Mālik and Shāfi‘ī 
deny them this right, adding that the inheritance should go to the Public Treasury. 
Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, Zayd, al-Zuhri, al-Awzā‘ī and Daoud share this point 
of view. On the contrary Abū Hanīfa and Ahmad recognise their right to inherit, 
according to a tradition recounted by ‘Ali, Ibn Masoud and Ibn ‘Abbās. There is 
unanimous agreement that this right can be exercised only in the absence of the 
inheritors mentioned by the Qur’an (ashāb al-furūd) and male inheritors.
According to Shāfi‘ī and Ahmad, marriage is valid only when there is a male 
guardian. If a woman contracts a marriage by herself, it is invalid. Abū Hanīfa 
says that a woman has the right to contract a marriage or delegate this right if she 
is accustomed to looking after her own affairs. This can be opposed only when 
she envisages marriage with someone of inferior social condition. In that case the 
guardian can oppose the marriage. Mālik maintains that if the woman belongs 
to that class of woman sought in marriage because of their nobility and their 
beauty, a guardian is necessary. Should this not be the case, she may consent to a 
person outside her family assuming the role of guardian.
According to Shāfi‘ī, Ahmad, and Abū Hanīfa, marriage is valid only when 
witnesses are present. Mālik says that it is valid in their absence, although it must 
have a public character. The spouses must not give their consent in secret. Shāfi‘ī, 
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Ahmad and Abū Hanīfa do not consider that secret consent invalidates the 
marriage as long as there are two witnesses.
Repudiation: is it a right reserved to men or not? Yes, say Shāfi‘ī’, Mālik and 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, while Abū Hanīfa says that women too have this right.
All agree that the minimum duration of the period of pregnancy is six months, 
while disagreeing about its maximum period. Abū Hanīfa says two years, while 
Mālik mentions four, five, or even seven years. Shā’fi’ gives a figure of four years. 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal has two traditions on this subject, the more well-known 
gives the same period as Shāfi‘ī, the other that of Abū Hanīfa. 
Another area of disagreement concerns the case of a man who is seized by 
another man while a third person kills him. Abū Hanīfa and Shāfi‘ī’ say that the 
punishment due is inflicted on the man who dealt the mortal blow, but not to the 
other, to whom a discretionary sanction is applied. Mālik says that they are both 
party to the crime of murder and should be punished accordingly if the assassin 
could only have killed his victim with the aid of his accomplice who seized the 
victim, and if this action rendered flight impossible. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, in two 
separate traditions, says that the murderer should be killed and his accomplice 
imprisoned for life, while in another tradition he says that both the assassin and 
his accomplice should be put to death.15
There is agreement that the blood-price (diya) for a free Muslim woman 
(as opposed to a slave) is half that of a free Muslim man. There is disagreement 
about whether or not in case of injury there is an equal blood-price.
In the case of involuntary homicide, all the schools agree that the tribe of 
the person who perpetrated the homicide has to pay the diya over a period not 
exceeding three years. They disagree about whether the guilty person is himself 
bound to make payments along with his tribe. They also disagree about whether 
or not the diya is a fixed sum, or determined according to the capacity for 
payment or left to the appreciation of the judge. 
They also disagreed about the penalty for drinking wine: eighty-four lashes 
according to Abū Hanīfa and Mālik, while Shāfi’ī says forty. Ahmad ibn Hanbal 
quotes both these texts. They agree that the whip should be used to administer 
the punishment, although Shā’fi’ī stipulates that the hands, sandals, or the fringe 
of a piece of clothing should be used. 
Can a woman be a qādi? No, says Mālik, Shāfi’ī and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 
although Abū Hanīfa replies that she can officiate in all cases in which the 
evidence of a woman is admissible, which in his view includes all cases except 
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those involving legal sanctions and injury. According to Ibn Jarīr et-Tabari, it is 
possible for a woman to be a qādi in all circumstances.
From these examples one may draw the following conclusions:
(1) All of these questions lack a textual basis in the Qur’an, even if they were 
sometimes used by way of analogy and interpreted in particular ways. Contra-
dictory hadīth are also quoted, with a chain of transmitters going back to the 
Prophet or one of his Companions. Such hadīth were very probably invented 
with the aim of giving credibility to solutions approved by the imāms of the legal 
schools.
(2) These questions concern worship as well relations within society. The 
first element addresses the legitimate concern of the Muslims to have unified 
liturgical practices, although the conferral of a quasi-sacred status on everyday 
social customs in a particular historical context was a development destined to 
subsequently hinder the evolution of Muslim societies when a changed context 
required a new basis for social interaction.
(3) The consequences of these disagreements could be grave, entailing as they 
sometimes did the validity or invalidity of religious obligations as in the case 
of a man praying in proximity to a woman, the fasting required of travellers, 
the validity or otherwise of sexual relations, as well as questions concerning the 
legal tutor and the witnesses to a marriage It could even be a question of life and 
death, as in the case of the assassin and his accomplice. 
(4) It is clear that agreement or disagreement between the fuqahā’ reflected 
prevailing values during the period when fiqh began to develop in Islamic 
societies sharing a certain number of distinctive traits and differing in other 
respects. The jurists were in agreement concerning the unequal blood-price 
for men and women, given their view of women in general. It may be that Abū 
Hanīfa and al-Tabari gave women the right to divorce and allowed them to be 
qādis because women in Iraq had a different position in society compared with 
that of women in the Hejaz or in Egypt. 
(5) Tribal customs and certain rites existing in the Arabian peninsula also 
influenced the evolution of jurisprudence: examples could include collective 
tribal responsibility in the case of individual crime, or the practice of the ‘aqīqa. 
The general level of learning at the time also played a part in such matters as the 
upper limit placed on the period of pregnancy (to be sure that a child born after 
a divorce was not conceived out of wedlock) and the question of prayers for a 
woman in childbed. 
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(6) Last but not least these divergences show that the fuqahā’, in making 
judgments, took into account sometimes contradictory economic  interests 
which led to disagreements about the inheritance due to relatives on the maternal 
side, the statutes concerning irrigation and the vexed question of the sale of the 
belongings of a person declared bankrupt, especially his house. 
Leaving aside areas of agreement and disagreement between the fuqahā’ it is 
possible to identify a number of common characteristics.
First, the fuqahā’ wanted to preserve an appearance of conformity with 
rites and practices rather than develop an interior self-awareness which would 
guide Muslims toward good and make them hold evil in abhorrence. The needs 
of communal life prevailed over a sense of individual responsibility and duties 
rather than rights were given primacy. This was inevitable given their belief that 
Muslims were not all subject to the same degree of obedience to religious obliga-
tions. They took it upon themselves to speak in the name of God, possessing, as 
they thought, exclusive knowledge of God’s will, of what pleases him, of what 
he holds in abhorrence and of what he forbids. What is more, they con sidered 
that “God did not want certain Muslims to understand His will and He did not 
impose it upon them” and that women, even in matters which most concerned 
them such as menstruation, were “subject to the will of God who wanted them 
to observe the rules concerning menstruation, on condition that the mufti 
pronounce a fatwa to this end.”16 This, in our opinion, is merely a result of a 
division of labour produced by a particular economic situation, and has no 
connection at all with the will of God.
Claims to exclusive knowledge by one group led inevitably to similar claims by 
others, and the followers of the various schools – Sunnis, Kharidjites, moderate or 
extremist Shī‘ites – considered that their school was more knowledgeable about 
the truth than the others. The case of Sahnoun (160/777–240/855), leader of 
the Malekites in Aghlabid Ifrīqiya is a well-known illustration of this tendency: 
he hounded the Hanefites out of the study circles in the Kairouan mosque. This 
kind of conduct persisted until recently in Muslim countries whose inhabitants 
belonged to more than one legal school or to sects competing for legitimacy and 
followers. In this competition fatwas were used as a weapon by representatives of 
the various schools, to such an extent that a term was invented to describe this 
quarrel: the tafāti or “fatwa war”. When the Sufis attained a dominant position, 
they looked down on the fuqahā’ who themselves looked down on the mass of 
the people, especially women, children and slaves. They considered them as the 
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“scholars of evil”, comparable to a rock that falls into the source of a river: it 
does not drink the water and does not allow it to flow out towards the fields.17 
Philosophers in turn considered themselves better qualified than tafsīr scholars 
and theologians to understand and interpret religion.18
Secondly, the formation of a class of specialists who had the exclusive respon-
sibility for “managing” sacred matters resulted in the deviation of this class away 
from their essential task toward the reprehensible behaviour denounced by 
al-Kindi, who described the religious scholars of his time as people who were:
strangers to truth, although they deck themselves in its finery undeserv-
edly. They want to control religion, and trade in it, although they are 
without faith, since he who trades in something sells it and he who sells 
something no longer has it in his possession. The trader in religion has 
no religion. The person who appropriated truth and called it infidelity 
deserves to be denied the solace of religion.19
Abū al Hasan al-‘Amīri confirmed the nature of this deviance, describing its 
manifestations: 
Since the fuqahā’ have reduced the aims of their noble profession to the 
domination of the common people, the currying of favour with rulers, 
and the seizure of the property of the weak, and have given themselves the 
authority to abolish rights and dues, their profession has gone from being 
praiseworthy to being blameworthy.20
There are numerous testimonies to such deviance, unsurprising when one 
considers the difficulty involved in opposing those who claim to speak in God’s 
name, and who form a class united in the defence of its interests, in the absence of 
an effective counterweight. This was the prevailing situation in ancient societies, 
be they Islamic or not.
Thirdly, the desire of the fuqahā’ to imitate the founding fathers of the first 
generation led to the development of various traditions linked to behaviour 
completely unconnected to religion, but which became firmly established in 
Muslim codes of manners. The following anecdote, one of many, demonstrates 
the failings of this approach: “Iyādh recounts, having heard it from Malik, that 
the latter entered ‘Abdallah ibn Sālih’s house. ‘Abdallah was governor of Medina. 
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He sat for a while, then invited those present to wash their hands and eat, saying: 
‘Begin with Abū ‘Abdallah.’ Malik replied: ‘Abū Abdallah’ – he meant himself 
– ‘does not wash his hands.’ ‘Abdallah ibn Sālih asked: ‘Why?’ Malik answered: 
‘That is not what I learned from the scholars in our city. That is the custom of 
foreigners. When ‘Umar ate, he wiped his hand on the soles of his feet.’ He 
added: ‘Do not order someone to wash his hand, because he would take that as 
being an obligation, and it is not the case. Abolish the foreign custom and revive 
that of the Arabs!’”21
This kind of approach, together with other factors, resulted in a way of 
thinking that gave little place to the analysis of natural causes, preferring to 
identify immediately a first cause, that is to say God, to whom illness and healing 
are attributed, while medicines and treatments have no effect. Those who have 
recourse to them are threatened with dire punishment, as in the following verses 
attributed to an Andalusian poet at the period of the Banu Nasr dynasty who 
ruled Grenada between 629/1231–897/1491:
He who thinks that he will cure disease with a remedy will receive a dire 
punishment; 
 Cast aside all that you see, and entrust yourself to Him who is 
all-powerful, all-knowing.22 
This is unsurprising, given the way that ignorance was built into a system, and 
that love of learning and a spirit of enquiry had been killed off since servile imita-
tion had come to dominate intellectual life. In the words of a poet of the Hafsid 
era:
All science save that of the Qur’an is the work of miscreants, except hadīth 
and fiqh;
 Learning has its source in what has been handed down to us and all else 
is but devilish suggestion.23
Fourthly, the most serious consequence of the activities of the fuqahā’ has 
been the progressive drift away from direct contact with the text of the Qur’an. 
Muslims give priority instead to secondary texts which claim to correctly deduce 
the teachings of the Qur’an, while in reality hindering personal understanding 
and independent reflection, free from external guidance and constraint. In the 
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same way that the figure of the Prophet took on exaggerated proportions, and 
was invested with lofty and idealised characteristics, so too the leaders of the 
schools of jurisprudence became quasi-infallible in the eyes of many Muslims. 
No one dared to criticise them or draw attention to the way in which the histor-
ical context inevitably influenced their teachings. 
One may also note two major lacunae in the work of the fuqahā’.24 The first 
concerns the statutes about land ownership. Treatises of fiqh said little more 
than that the land belongs to those who cultivate it, with particular attention to 
questions of boundaries of land and water resources, pre-emption and endow-
ment, as well as questions pertaining to land seized as booty ( fay’ ) and conquered 
territories. It is not surprising that most cultivated land was collectively owned 
by the tribe unless it belonged to the state, in which case it was allotted to those 
whom the central authority wanted to reward. The exploitation of the land was 
entrusted to peasants in return for payment of a land tax or other form of tax. 
This situation had a number of consequences: private landholdings were rare, 
a stable agricultural class did not develop and neither the exploitation of land 
nor investment in its long-term viability were promoted. For these reasons, the 
introduction by the Ottomans in 1274/1858 of a land law represented a radical 
change in the way in which land was legally acquired. It removed the lacunae 
hitherto existing in this area of fiqh and was followed by laws organising land 
ownership in the various areas of the Islamic world, all derived to various degrees 
from the legislation existing in Western countries.25
Fiqh had lagged behind in land-related questions, and contributed to the 
deterioration of agriculture over the course of time in the Islamic world: unfair 
monopolies; inflation; disorder; malnutrition; famine; and epidemics. Hardly 
a year went by without chroniclers recording one or other of these disasters. 
Another consequence was that the prime beneficiaries of the new laws giving 
official property deeds to landowners were tribal chiefs in rural areas and 
notables and business leaders in towns, at the expense of ordinary tribespeople 
and peasants on land that was collectively “owned”, although without any legally 
recognised title deeds.
The second lacuna in the work of the fuqahā’ is in the political domain. During 
the first four centuries of Islamic history, little attention was given to the organi-
sation of this essential aspect of social life. The fuqahā’ did not seek to specify 
precise norms for organising state institutions, merely calling for obedience to 
be given to the holder of power, no matter how he had obtained or exercised this 
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authority. Their fear of innovation and decision-taking unsanctioned by their 
forebears led them to neglect their function in the domain of governance. They 
also failed to keep up with changes in society which required new methods of 
legal procedure besides Qur’anic jurisprudence, such as the mazālim (tribunals), 
the hisba (supervision of markets and public morals) and, in modern times, the 
civil courts. Consequently, theologians took it upon themselves to make up for 
these insufficiencies with their study of the question of the imamate and the 
conditions governing it, although from a specialised point of view. A less fortu-
nate consequence was that those in authority held unfettered sway over their 
subjects rarely following the requirements of justice and equity. When, in the 
fifth/eleventh century al-Māwardi founded a political jurisprudence, his Statutes 
of Government were an attempt to justify the past and confer legitimacy on 
present practices characterised for the most part by tyranny and the primacy 
of personal interests rather than laying down a rational system derived from 
Qur’anic principles. The fuqahā’ had little awareness of the importance of the 
duty of which the Prophet in his wisdom had been a proponent: coming to the 
aid of the oppressed fellow believer or even the oppressor, bringing the latter 
to abandon tyranny. Nor did they consider, as Muhammad did, the ruler as a 
shepherd. Muhammad extended the sense of “shepherding” and gave the tradi-
tional term a novel interpretation: “each one of you is a shepherd”. The fuqahā’ 
went along with an imperial model of authority, glorifying the ruler and making 
him into a remote, unaccountable figure. In exchange for this unquestioning 
allegiance, they had a free hand in the organisation of society and through long 
established rites they embodied a guarantee of cohesion between groups and 
individuals. 
The Origins of Jurisprudence
One might expect that the discipline known as usūl al fiqh would have dealt 
with theoretical dimensions which fiqh itself was unable to treat, dealing exclu-
sively as it did with furū‘. In reality the specialists in usūl al fiqh sought to clarify 
and set out the dynamics of deductive research, while defending the solutions 
of the first generations of Muslims and providing them with convincing justi-
fications. Their aim was to limit and circumscribe the divergences existing 
between the decisions of the caliphs and qādis and subsequently the fuqahā’, 
for nearly two centuries. They certainly prevented this discord from dimin-
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ishing the  credibility of these decisions, although they were unable to develop 
another form of fiqh, or rather, another system of jurisprudence which would 
have sought to establish justice and order on different bases, despite the diffi-
culty of the undertaking. It is true that the desire to give an Islamic gloss to 
solutions proposed by the fuqahā’ to real difficulties or what were presented 
as such manifested itself before the time of the Imām Shāfi‘ī at the end of the 
second century of the Hijra. Shāfi‘ī was, however, instrumental in making this 
as yet inchoate aspiration into part of the Muslim “mind-set” and in regrouping 
its various disparate elements into a coherent whole.26 From the time of the 
composition of Shāfi’ī’s Risāla onwards, Muslims came to accept that there were 
four sources of jurisprudence: the Qur’an, Sunna, consensus and analogy. While 
a detailed study of each of these subjects goes beyond the bounds of the present 
study, it is possible to examine the extent to which they remained faithful to the 
message of Islam.
Relying on the text of the Qur’an in order to make deductions of a legal 
nature presupposes that one considers the text as a collection of ready-made 
prescriptions applicable in all circumstances. The Qur’an, like any written text, 
and particularly texts associated with the foundations of a religion, is open to a 
limitless number of interpretations, even in the case of verses which may appear 
clear.27 Scholars specialising in the sources of jurisprudence did not, however, 
take account of the aims behind particular solutions figuring in the text of the 
Qur’an or of the context of individual verses that were the object of study.28 
While it is, of course, natural that the Qur’an be adopted as a reference and a 
guide by those striving to be authentic Muslims, believers need to be humble 
and prudent when dealing with the sacred text in order to avoid projecting onto 
the text subjective criteria and preferences inevitably affected by the prevailing 
environment. The written document enjoyed a quasi-sacred status among those 
scholars who imagined that their methodological research in the linguistic field 
would lead them to absolute truth, allowing them to pronounce that the same 
imperative form of the verb indicated on certain occasions an obligation and 
on other occasions a free choice. In reality they projected their personal preoc-
cupations and criteria of judgment onto the text, making it say what, in fact, 
it did not say. This led them to different conclusions about two formulations 
involving the imperative: wine is forbidden because of the word “avoid!” and 
the drinker is duly punished, while “write!” in the case of “writing a debt” leaves 
Muslims to choose whether to make a written record of the debt or not.29
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This flawed approach to the text of the Qur’an is particularly manifest when 
verses are separated from one other and isolated from their context, be it that 
of a particular sūra or in a number of sūras. Among the most flagrant examples 
of this is the interpretation of verse 3 of the sūra al-Nisā’. On the one hand, 
they have clearly manipulated the phrase by splitting the conditional phrase “If 
you fear that you will not act justly towards the orphans, marry such women as 
seem good to you, two, three, four” into two parts, in contravention of the most 
elementary rules of grammar and logic. Moreover, by authorising four wives in 
all cases, they took no account of the feelings of the women who were obliged 
to share their husbands with others, and other questions such as an age disparity 
between spouses, the social inequalities of which women were victims and the 
fate of children (and their education) in an atmosphere of conflict between 
wives. They ignored the many verses which are the basis for an ethic of marriage 
in a Qur’anic perspective: mutual trust between spouses; tenderness; compas-
sion; kindness and justice.30 They also ignored the real reason for the authori-
sation of polygamy, namely the fear of being unjust towards orphans, as well 
as the particular historical context of this decision.31 An existing social practice 
was legitimised, and values defended which one can unhesitatingly qualify as 
being contrary to those of the Qur’an, supported only by consensus (a question 
which will be examined later in this chapter) and not by what is imagined to be 
a faithful application of the text. The question is not whether or not the Qur’an 
was considered one of the sources of legislation but how Muslims scholars and 
others used it as a reference, dealt with it and interpreted it. Was it interpreted in 
a way which conformed to its spirit and internal logic or one that went no further 
than a literal reading of a limited number of verses which were then interpreted 
in a subjective manner? Scholars may have thought (or so they claimed) that 
they were faithfully transmitting the will and the wisdom of God Himself.
The second source of fiqh is the Sunna transmitted through hadīth. In the 
chapter of the Muqadimmah dealing with hadīth sciences, Ibn Khaldoun relates 
that “it is said that the number of traditions that Abū Hanīfa (d. 150/767) trans-
mitted came to only seventeen or so. Mālik (d. 179/795) accepted as sound only 
the traditions found in the Muwatta’. They are at most only three hundred or 
so. Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855) has 30,000 traditions in his Musnad. Ibn 
Hanbal said of the Musnad “In this book I have chosen from among 750,000 
hadīth”.32 Ibn Khaldoun made this ostensibly simple observation in his role as 
an historian. Its significance generally goes unnoticed by the defenders of Sunna 
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and hadīth. It is of little concern to us that Ibn Khaldoun evades the question 
of the enormous quantitative variation between the two imāms in the number 
of authentic traditions, merely repeating what Muslims held to be true since the 
ahl al-hadīth (“people of hadīth”) had imposed their viewpoint on the commu-
nity as a whole. One should note the prodigious proliferation in the number of 
traditions judged “authentic” in the period extending from the first half of the 
second century of the Hijra to the first half of the third century: from seven-
teen to 30,000 or 40,000. These figures alone should give grounds for doubting 
the authenticity of traditions attributed to the Prophet, when all of these are 
transmitted by a relatively small number of individuals.33 Invention reached 
such proportions that the work carried out by al-Bukhāri, Muslim and other 
authors of the hadīth collections of the third century of the Hijra was in vain. 
In reality recourse to hadīth was necessary for the continuation of the activities 
of the fuqahā’, and when Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/819) did his utmost to give Sunna a 
solid foundation, he was in reality defending a particular vision of social order to 
which religion could give a necessary legitimacy. The Qur’an could do this only 
in a very limited way, whereas hadīth fulfilled this role through its capacity to 
generate a kind of unconscious collective fervour.
Only a handful of scholars challenged this manner of proceeding, but they 
were swamped by the dominant tendency, and it is unknown if they left any 
written documents. Little is known of them as individuals, nor do we have 
any idea of their number and importance. The most conclusive evidence for 
their existence is contained in a reference in the chapter Jimā ‘al ‘ilm in Shāfi‘ī’s 
al-Umm. Shāfi‘ī quotes this person, “a distinguished scholar in his school”, as 
having said: 
Concerning something that God has commanded, how can you say on 
one occasion that it is a universal obligation, and on another that it is 
limited. You say that the divine command entails an obligation, while 
on another occasion it is merely an indication, or even that it indicates 
an authorisation. Very often, these different appreciations come from a 
hadīth which you have received from such and such a person, according 
to another, according to another, or from two or three hadīths, going back 
finally to the Prophet himself. As for those transmitters of hadīth you 
put forward as being of sound memory and authenticity you underline, 
I see that you and those who belong to your school of thought do not 
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excuse any of those transmitters of hadīth of error, forgetfulness, or error 
in their hadīth. I see that you say, in the case of a number of them, that 
‘Such and such a scholar made a mistake in this or that hadīth.’ And when 
someone challenges you about a hadīth known only to the specialists on 
the grounds that the Prophet did not actually say what is contained in 
the hadīth, and that therefore you (or those who informed you) were in 
error, I have seen that you do not ask him to repent but merely say to him: 
“What you have said is evil!” Is it permissible to distinguish between the 
precepts of the Qur’an when its meaning is evident for those who hearing 
it on the basis of information received from individuals? And we have seen 
how you describe them! Have you the right to put their remarks in the 
place of the Book of God, using them to give and to refuse?
Shāfi‘ī, quoting this objector, continues: 
If you persist in accepting their traditions with all the defects that you have 
evoked, what argument can you use against the person who refuses them? 
I accept nothing if there is the possibility of error therein; I accept only 
that of which I bear witness before God as I bear witness to the truth of 
his book of which no one can doubt a single word. No one can claim an 
exhaustive knowledge that he does not possess.34 
It is not surprising that Shāfi‘ī, having replied at length to the objection 
presented here in a summarised form, considers that refusal to accept a tradi-
tion when the Book of God is clear “is an opinion whose consequences are grave 
indeed”. The objector declared: “The person who carries out a gesture that can be 
called prayer or the minimum act qualifying as zakāt (charity) has fulfilled the 
obligation without taking account of the time, even if he only made two prostra-
tions each day. Where the Book of God has not clearly laid down a rule, there is 
no obligation involved.”
This contestation of the Sunna had very little chance of developing. It was 
radically opposed to the prevailing orientation toward, on the one hand, a strict 
imposition of pre-Islamic mentalities, and an exaggeration of the role of the 
Prophet at the expense of his message, on the other hand. This orientation was 
influenced by popular mentality which sought a material expression of religious 
faith and the Prophet represented an historical figure with whom believers could 
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identify. Words and deeds were attributed to the Prophet which, for the most 
part, reveal preoccupations unconnected with the personality of the Prophet as 
it is revealed in the most trustworthy source, namely the text of the Qur’an, and 
quite foreign to the simple and spontaneous spirit of the Prophet’s time. They 
were the product of conflicts and challenges arising as the territory controlled 
by the Muslims expanded and the number of believers increased. Discord devel-
oped for political and other reasons. The historical context in which fiqh and its 
components developed made it virtually impossible to avoid strife between the 
main Muslim tendencies, especially the Shī‘ites, the Khārijites and those who 
would come to be known as “the people of the Sunna and the Community”. 
Each of these had their own chains of transmitters with the Shī‘ites relying only 
on their imāms and the Khārijites imposing rigorous conditions for the authen-
ticity of transmitters and generally accepted only hadīth transmitted by their 
own scholars while criticising those of the Sunnis: 
We see these specialists in hadīth criticising one of the hadīth transmitters 
for a trifling reasons, then go on, despite their knowledge of these attacks, 
to accept the traditions of the Companions and accept the versions of the 
person who rebukes as well as that of the person who is rebuked. This is 
nothing to do with religion. These specialists kow-tow to whoever holds 
power and are slaves of whoever is stronger. They hand down hadīth which 
favour the rulers of their country, and transfer their allegiance elsewhere 
when those rulers fall from power.35
On the other hand, Sunni scholars reject the traditions of their adversaries, 
whom they describe as being “subjected to passion and innovation”. 
It is noteworthy that the dispute about the transmission, as in similar cases in 
the field of fiqh, did not put in question the text of the hadīth except concerning 
questions which divided the community, such as the imamate. This consensus 
brought together members of the factions and schools despite the rivalries and 
conflicts in other areas. They shared the same bases and methods for their reflec-
tion, although their positions were far removed from the aspirations of the 
Prophetic message, which strove to give religious reflection an orientation based 
on a blend of gratuitous divine love and human obedience and responsibility. 
Obedience did not exclude divine gratuity and human responsibility.
The research undertaken by the specialists in usūl al-fiqh for authoritative texts 
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did not always produce positive results. The first generation of Muslims did not 
undertake such a quest, considering it unnecessary. The development of urban 
life as conditions stabilised in the conquered territories, new ways of working, 
and concomitant transformations in an evermore complex way of life brought 
about legal situations requiring legislation for which there were no precedents at 
the time of the Prophet or in the period immediately following. This is what led 
to consensus (ijmā’ ) becoming the third basis for legislation, in the absence of a 
text.36 The specialists in usūl al-fiqh made great efforts to produce textual support 
for this source, realising that the verses relied upon by certain scholars required a 
degree of manipulation in order to constitute decisive proof. The hadīth mobil-
ised to this end were more pertinent to the needs of the com munity than they 
were to the question of consensus on a particular judgment about a question for 
which there was no text in the Qur’an or in Sunna. These hadīth were inferior to 
the hadīth mutawātir supported by multiple isnāds (lines of transmission) which 
guarantee certitude according to the criteria of the specialists in hadīth and usūl 
al-fiqh.37 The end result is a circular argument according to which consensus 
is the only authentic basis for consensus. Ghazāli, fully aware of this impasse 
to which he alluded in the Mustasfā, thought that it could be solved through 
use of the concept of “custom”, but the difficulty was not resolved in this way. 
Despite its somewhat scanty legitimacy, consensus continued to be considered 
the “origin of origins”, while the Hanbalite Ibn ‘Aqīl (d. 513/1119) gave it prece-
dence over the text: 
It is a degree surer than the text, as the text, even if it is the word of an 
infallible person, can be replaced by another text which contradicts and 
abrogates it. Consensus, on the other hand, cannot err, safe from contra-
diction or abrogation, since there is nothing similar to it which can prevail 
over it.38
Whatever the difficulties arising from such claims, it is opportune to recall that 
consensus is one of the mainstays of Judaism and Christianity, although under 
different names. Institutional religions certainly need some kind of consensus 
as otherwise it is difficult to demonstrate the solidity of unified doctrine, 
liturgy and ethics which religious authorities try to impose on the community 
of believers. The move toward making consensus one of the foundations of 
fiqh encountered opposition later qualified as “deviance” as Sunna became an 
The Elaboration of Institutional Theory
135
 established cultural entity. It is likely that al-Nazzām (d. 230/844) was not the 
only person to reject the consensus, as all the usūl texts say, quoting one another, 
although the details of his and his companions’ arguments are unknown. Was it 
because of the practical impossibility of arriving at such a consensus, or because 
of its fragility as a reference, or some other reason?39 Two points may be noted:
First, the premises of the usūl specialists are far removed from their conclu-
sions. Their starting point is the consensus of the Islamic community as a whole, 
illustrated (according to their interpretation) by the following verse: (Sūra 
2:143): “Thus We appointed you a midmost nation that you might be witnesses 
to the people and the Messenger might be a witness to you.” They conclude by 
saying that the only valid consensus is that of the experts in interpretation, to the 
exclusion of all others, especially the common people and those whose opinion 
is of little worth, let alone women and slaves.40 Certain subjects have been 
mono polised by those who consider that they speak in God’s name and know 
what He commands and what He forbids. In the words of one scholar: “These 
are matters understood by the scholars alone and have not been entrusted to 
others.”41 This is a blatant form of marginalisation, exercised against the majority 
of the Muslim community, considered as minors in need of a tutor, a practice 
entirely contrary to the spirit of the Prophet’s message which makes not the 
slightest allusion to this kind of elitism. The message of the Prophet is addressed 
to all people and to all believers without distinction. This was one of the main 
reasons why the leaders of the Quraysh initially did not believe the preaching of 
Muhammad and refused to follow him: “When it is said to them: ‘believe as the 
people believe’, they say, ‘Shall we believe as fools believe?’” (Sūra 2:13).42
The second observation would be that consensus could be a force for innova-
tion and adaptation to changing circumstances if it were based on democratic 
principles and corresponded to the aspirations of the majority of people in 
quotidian concerns, such as food, dress, economic relations and ethics. What 
has, in fact, happened is that the consensus of a particular period in history, that 
of the fuqahā’ in the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries, has been consid-
ered binding for all time, along with the myriad detailed conditions attached by 
the usūl specialists from the fifth/eleventh century onwards, when this branch 
of learning was formally organised. The solutions adopted at a particular point 
in time, that of the rightly-guided (rāshidūn) caliphs, the Companions and 
the chief Followers, were made into an unchangeable set of founding precepts. 
It might have been possible in so doing to retain the relative spontaneity and 
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flexibility of the period instead of sanctifying the past, a past which the ‘ulamā’ 
who codified fiqh imagined to have been a period of perfect uniformity within 
the Muslim community. They camouflaged the rich variety which existed in 
reality, where differences of opinion coexisted with concord and harmony. At 
times, those in authority imposed their point of view, while at other moments 
in history heated debate took place and scholars competed in good faith as they 
sought truth. As in all human history, qualities and defects were interwoven. 
Although the hadīth “What Muslims approve, God approves” only appears in 
the Musnad of Ibn Hanbal, and its authenticity is questionable, it is worthy 
of being adopted as a factor of Muslim unity in the face of trials or imminent 
danger.43 In other circumstances diversity is desirable, and one should take into 
account the opinion of the community at a particular point in time, be it in 
conformity with tradition or not, especially when the circumstances and situa-
tions of consensus have undergone radical change. 
The same causes tend to produce the same effects and the multiplication of 
“cases” for which it was not possible to find a text or obtain a consensus led 
to analogy or qiyās being made the fourth basis for legislation. “For everything 
that befalls a Muslim there is a statute applicable or there is an indication of 
the way of truth”: this is the famous expression of Shāfi‘ī.44 There are grounds 
for contesting this axiom which is far removed from the spirit and letter of the 
Qur’an: the evaluation of human acts may vary in function of historical factors, 
while religion should not pass judgment on appearances which sometimes do 
not reflect interior attitudes. Human responsibility means pursuing evolving 
ideals, with the aim of reconciling individual freedom and the higher inter-
ests of the community. This point of view may seem self-evident to a modern 
mentality, but its adoption fatally undermines the foundations of fiqh along 
with the process of reasoning by analogy. This method does not always provide 
a stable foundation for a “branch” of fiqh in need of a statute, because once such 
a statute has been found it becomes in its turn a fixed basis for the practice of 
analogy. The decisions of the fuqahā’ are not based on a uniform pattern of 
logic, an observation made long ago by those opposed to analogical reasoning. 
Analogy, they noted, cannot be applied in the case of furūdh: all the legal 
schools require that women fast to make up for the fasting they missed during 
Ramadhan because of their periods, although they do not require that she make 
up for prayers missed for the same reason. No logical or rational explanation is 
given for this.45
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Reliance on analogy produced a backward-looking mentality insufficiently 
focused on the present, let alone the future. The present, however, with its values 
and factional interests influences the way that the past is understood: analogy 
(qiyās) is far from being a neutral operation, and takes insufficient account of 
the intentions of the message of Islam. Analogical reasoning is fundamentally 
flawed, as the fuqahā’ who use it, particularly in recent times, do not recognise 
that its justifications are purely formal, believing that through it they express the 
will of God. In other words, the preoccupation in the field of qiyās (as in other 
areas) with proving the continuity of practice between the time of the Prophet 
and other periods had a number of dangerous consequences:
it failed to achieve the ultimate objective of every legislative system, namely 
justice, which presupposes freedom and individual reponsibility;46
it claimed (a claim which does not stand up to critical historical examina-
tion or objective consideration) that analogy is an expression of divine, 
rather than human judgment in the cases in which it is the deciding factor; 
and
it closed off access to the revealed text for those who wish to encounter it 
directly without having to use the fuqahā’ and exegetes as intermediaries.47 
Usūl al fiqh underwent no real evolution since the work of scholars, such as 
Abu al Husain al Basri (d. 436/1044), author of the Mu‘tamid, Imām al-Haramain 
al Juwaini (d. 478/1085), author of the Burhān, Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1063), author 
of the Ihkām, al-Ghazāli (d. 505/1111), author of the al-Mustasfa, and Fakhr 
al-dīn al-Rāzi (d. 606/1209). Subsequent authors depended on them, merely 
exposing, summing up, or defending the point of view of the school to which 
they belonged. Hanefite scholars, for example, put forward the theory of tacit 
consensus, in contrast to other schools of fiqh. Scholars also defended secondary 
elements of usūl al fiqh accepted by certain schools, including personal inter-
pretation (istihsān), the presumption of continued exercise of a right (istishāb), 
rights deriving from custom and the public interest (masālih mursala). Abu 
Ishāq al-Shātibi (538/1144–590/1194) attempted to take into account not 
only questions of terminology but also the ultimate aims of Islamic law in 
his Muwāfaqāt, a work that stands apart from the rest. There were, however, 
no other scholars able to continue this approach and remove the vestiges of 
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the ossified mentality of the usūl al fiqh specialists. Muhammad al Tāhir Ben 
Achour and Allāl al-Fāsi (1329/1910–1393/1974) were aware of the challenges 
and adumbrated possible solutions, although their work does not really repre-
sent a clearly formulated and complete break with prevailing approaches in the 
area of usūl al fiqh, which even today continues to repeat traditional discourse in 
social and intellectual context transformed out of all recognition.48 Recent work 
can even be said to more superficial than the great works of past scholars, who 
had a better grasp of the questions studied.49
Qur’anic Exegesis (tafsīr)
Qur’anic exegesis cannot, of course, be separated from other branches of Islamic 
learning. It, too, gradually became an independent field of study, with fuqahā’, 
specialists in the foundations of religious law, theologians, hadīth specialists, 
historians and linguists all working in this area. These specialities were comple-
mentary and interconnected, and scholars shared values and a way of looking at 
the world and approached religious questions in similar ways. All believed the 
Qur’an to be a legislative text whose prescriptions were valid across frontiers of 
space and time. None of them imagined that the message of the Prophet was 
one intended to liberate people from the servile imitation of their  ancestors 
(even though they were considered the pious founding fathers) and guide their 
conduct in society, encouraging them to act responsibly. This message frees 
believers from the danger of alienation, as God is the only absolute and all other 
cultural phenomena belong to the domain of human history and are, there-
fore, relative, prone to change and subject to criticism and analysis. They can be 
improved or amended. 
We have emphasised the fundamental characteristics of Qur’anic exegesis 
(which are also present in other areas of Islamic thought), in order to demon-
strate that there is a clear distinction between the essence of the message of 
Islam and its application. The preoccupations of the founding generations of 
Islam are equally remote from those of contemporary Muslims. We do not wish 
to denigrate the scholarly endeavours of the past, to which today’s Muslims 
are indebted, but simply to demonstrate that the solutions they elaborated to 
questions confronting them were valid for their time. These solutions were 
connected to the context in which they lived, one very different from that in 
which we and our contemporaries live, whatever their race, language, religion, 
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way of thinking and civilisation. This recognition of change and evolution runs 
contrary to the natural human tendency to cling to what is familiar, and which 
resists novelty and innovation. Religion has in the past been a guarantee against 
chaos and has been an irreplaceable source of legitimacy for social institutions. It 
is difficult to imagine how they could be considered legitimate without the legit-
imacy conferred by religion. Religion is not responsible for this course of events, 
but it can be made to play this role more efficiently than other highly fragile 
sources of legitimacy. Life is itself an uncertain balance of conflicting elements 
and if this takes on a fixed, unchanging form, death is imminent. It is no surprise 
then that people should endeavour to forget this tragic condition by searching 
for stability: they seek solace in religion under the illusion that religion can 
guarantee this stability. At the same time they overlook the price that has to be 
paid for this sense of security, one that is authentic and false at the same time. Is 
there a higher price to be paid than that of renouncing the challenge of facing 
reality, and losing that which is most distinctively human: freedom and respon-
sibility, without which humans sink to the level of animals?
The traditional view that Muslims have of tafsīr is an idealistic one.50 Since 
the message of Islam was seen by many as having a legislative character, people 
believed that the Prophet explained to his contemporaries the more obscure 
aspects of the Qur’an’s prescriptions. The Companions were, therefore, better 
equipped than other believers after the death of the Prophet to elucidate obscure 
verses or general dispositions which were not set out in detail. However, did the 
Prophet really have to explain the revelation? Its content was sufficiently clear 
and generally relevant to the context in which the Companions lived. Muslims 
came to believe with time, and as their way of life began to change, that the 
Qur’an alone was insufficient to provide the solutions required by an institution-
alised religion. They, therefore, ascribed to the Prophet and Companions the 
capacities to compensate for this lack, justifying through the prophetic hadīth 
the imitation of the Companions (“my companions are as stars: imitate them 
and be guided by them” etc.), then that of the Followers and preceding genera-
tions in general. This was especially the case when a significant group of Muslims, 
from the fourth/eleventh century onwards and in periods of decline, considered 
that the glories of Muslim civilisation were waning (“The best century is mine, 
then those following it”). There was a deeply-felt desire to return to the origins of 
faith and culture, seen as a golden age of plenitude and perfection.51
Qur’anic exegesis was necessary to determine how religious rites should 
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be accomplished, and also to give detailed accounts of prophets and ancient 
peoples presented by the Qur’an in a summary fashion. In the case of the former, 
the Qur’an deliberately avoided going into details, and succinct verses were 
explained by relying on Sunna in its lived-out dimension, the ritual practices 
which gradually became formalised over time. Subsequently, hadīth describing 
the deeds and directives of the prophets were recounted, and it was decided 
that the Prophet’s example should be followed. With regard to the stories of the 
prophets, the practice was to consult the “people of the book” who had become 
Muslims, such Ka’b al-Ahbār and Wahb ibn Munabbih who were familiar with 
the sacred texts of the Jews and Christians, or at least the oral traditions circu-
lating in their milieu which were a mixture of historical and marvellous elements. 
This led to the inclusion in Qur’anic exegesis of what are known as the israiliyyāt, 
whose fabulous character has left a lasting imprint on tafsīr, one that will persist 
if modern historical science is not better employed to help commentators distin-
guish between the style of these stories (which reflect the state of learning at the 
time of the Prophet and the first generation of commentators) on the one hand, 
and the aim of exegesis, on the other hand, namely, to guide following genera-
tions of Muslims in their reflection and discernment.
At the beginning of the second/eighth century, when fiqh became an autono-
mous science and theology developed its rational and textual enquiries, scholars 
began to search in the Qur’an for justifications for juridical provisions related 
to socio-economic questions, and for textual support and guidance in the diffi-
cult questions beginning to trouble believers: divine justice and the existence 
of evil; the extent of human freedom; justice in the world to come and so on. 
Each legal school, each group of theologians, projected onto the text the views 
of their leaders, along with the opinions and beliefs they expressed. Certain 
verses were considered clear and precise while others were abrogated or ambig-
uous. The exegetes did not, however, take into account the essential difference 
between the nature of the discourse of revelation which relies on symbol and 
metaphor and the conceptual discourse which characterises human science in 
general. Exegetical texts became the obligatory means of access to the text of 
the Qur’an, and these secondary texts impeded direct understanding of the text 
and free personal reflection. Exegetical research was accompanied by linguistic 
explanations of the text, be they lexicological, grammatical, syntactical, or 
rhetorical, justifying rather than serving as a basis for the various texts that were 
selected, despite their disparate and even contradictory nature. The interest of 
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al- Zamkhshari (d.  538/1143) in the language did not prevent him from using the 
Qur’an to defend his own Mu‘tazilite point of view, as did his contemporaries 
Tabari (d.  310/922) and Rāzi (d. 606/1209) (in the Sunni camp), or the Shī‘ites 
Tūsi (d. 460/1067) and Tabari (d. 548/1153). If it is the case that the text can 
take on meaning only in the light of the rules of discourse and language, then 
a written text has multiple meanings which reflect the expectations of a reader 
in particular circumstances. The Qur’an, as Ali Ibn Abī Tālib said, does not 
speak of itself, it is men who speak through it. The aim of tafsīr was, therefore, to 
enclose the text in a zeriba of interpretations approved by the theological current 
or school of jurisprudence to which exegetical writers belonged. The door was 
closed to free research untrammelled by time honoured controversy, despite 
tafsīr being considered to be a science which no one could claim to have brought 
to its final stage of development. These two factors may explain why successive 
generations of Muslims compiled works of tafsīr which leave the reader with an 
impression of the same subject-matter being treated by one author after another, 
who merely fall into line or tinker with already existing points of view. Ever since 
tafsīr became an independent art or craft (sinā‘ā) all the exegetes have felt duty 
bound to follow the sūra and verses in the order of the mushaf one after the other, 
limiting themselves (or being compelled to do so by outside circumstances) to 
the juxtaposition of different opinions instead of following a different approach 
which would have brought them, through personal reflection, to discover the 
aims and main themes of the Qur’anic texts.
Prior to embarking on this kind of intellectual enterprise, scholars needed to 
be knowledgeable in the sciences of the Qur’an, to ensure that deductions were 
not made on an unsound basis. It is unsurprising that many volumes of exegesis 
are incomplete, as their authors died before completing them. Along with the 
history of the text, language sciences and the qira’āt, volumes of tafsīr contain 
the israiliyyāt, incoherent traditions, the ponderous considerations of the fuqahā’ 
as well as traditions whose origins are in popular, oral culture.52 The overall aim 
of the Qur’an is swamped by these disparate elements, and the text becomes a 
pretext or an occasion to defend values tenuously connected with the Qur’an 
and which are often undesirable. Tabari hesitates between fideism and humility 
before the Word of God, between speaking in the name of God, on the one 
hand, and giving his own interpretation after the verse: “God, may His Name be 
exalted” (or some similar expression) says …, or suggesting what seems to Him to 
be the probable meaning of the verse: “According to me, the nearest to the truth 
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is …” (or some similar expression), on the other hand. The former approach is the 
one that came to dominate tafsīr after Tabari, marked by an exaggerated fideism 
and the rejection of everything the exegete considers alien to his options and 
those of his school of thought. 
In reality certain leading exegetes, particularly Rāzi, were broad-minded. Far 
from remaining silent about the difficulties they encountered, they set them out 
clearly and tried to surmount them insofar as possible, examining the question 
from different points of view, bringing to bear the full weight of their culture and 
learning. If they failed to find a convincing solution, they left the matter in God’s 
hands and recognised their inability. They were influenced by a deeply-rooted 
cultural tradition which prevented them from directly engaging with the text, 
unencumbered by the interpretative baggage of previous generations.53 In other 
words, tafsīr was a complete structure from which no element could be withdrawn 
without the whole structure trembling. This explains the resistance of the repre-
sentatives of traditional culture to any position which diverged from tradition. 
They were unaware that this tradition existed within history and that it was 
linked to situations and values far removed from those of present-day Muslims. 
This is why a renewal of Qur’anic exegesis is needed, taking account of the results 
of human sciences, and with different premises from those of the defenders of the 
traditional system, which has become a burden for Islamic thought.
Hadīth
The problems associated with hadīth have already been discussed, in particular 
the fact that Sunna was considered one of the sources of fiqh. It will be dealt 
with here simply as one of the essential elements of the Islamic sciences. Rarely is 
there such a difference between the linguistic and the technical sense of a word 
as there is in the case of hadīth and Sunna. Their meaning has evolved and they 
have come to designate the same object or two very similar ones. They are used 
indifferently to indicate the words, deeds and decisions of the Prophet, in the 
form fixed by the hadīth collections approved by the Sunnis and codified in the 
third/ninth century.54 
Hadīth infringes the Prophet’s command that only the Qur’an was to be 
written down, a command that strips hadīth of its legitimacy and leaves the 
Qur’an as the guiding light for Muslims in this world and the next. The Proph-
et’s personal declarations were not to be normative or obligatory. Muslims had 
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exactly opposing aspirations. The radically new nature of their vocation and 
their lack of preparedness to take on the organisation of their lives as believers 
prevented them from heeding the Prophet’s invitation. The first generation of 
Muslims doubtless heeded the Prophet’s invitation not to record what they may 
have heard him say. The rare individuals who recorded in a scattered fashion 
the words of the Prophet which they heard from the Companions wanted to 
keep what they heard for their own spiritual nourishment rather than diffusing 
it around them. It is not by chance that this principle was transgressed by the 
caliph, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al‘Aziz at the beginning of the second/eighth century, 
the caliph remembered by the Muslim community as the fifth of the rightly-
guided (rashidūn) caliphs. He needed to produce a symbol of virtue and piety 
in order to have a chance of being accepted. According to the Sunnis, it was 
al-Zuhri who took upon himself the codification, opening the door through 
which would stream reliable transmitters of hadīth and fabricators alike.
Hadīth began to be codified at the same time as other branches of learning, 
pre-Islamic poetry in particular. This poetry was the basis chosen by linguistic 
scholars for the collecting together of the different elements of the Arabic language 
and for laying down rules for the language. This poetry naturally contained rare 
terms and unfamiliar constructions requiring explanation, in the same way that 
numerous Qur’anic terms required a commentary. It is striking that the scholars 
of the second/eighth century did not consider hadīth as a proof, and they did 
not use it to lay down rules or for commentary and explanation, despite their 
insistence on the eloquence of the Prophet. They were unsure whether statements 
attributed to him had been narrated in the very words of the Prophet or simply in 
a way which preserved their general meaning. The hadīth were collected together 
more than a century after the time of the Prophet. In addition, the non-Arab 
mawāli (clients) formed the majority of transmitters of hadīth. Why should the 
faithful believe in hadīths whose number grew daily, with invention and falsifica-
tion rife? The spread of hadīth falsification was, therefore, a sufficient reason to 
doubt their authenticity. It was also one of the elements which stimulated the 
zealous quest of the hadīth collectors, when their compilations gradually took on 
a degree of sacredness approaching that of the Qur’an itself to the extent that the 
expression “recounted by the two sheikhs” (al-Bukhāri and Muslim) was sufficient 
to validate a hadīth and make it binding. The imām Mālik had little need, in the 
context of the Hejaz in the west of the Arabian peninsula, to invent hadīth. His 
Muwatta’ contains only around 300 hadīth, and was considered the most reliable 
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book after the book of God Himself. Bukhāri, Muslim and the authors of hadīth 
compilations in the third/ninth century followed a different method, selecting 
as authentic according to their criteria only a very small number of the hadīth 
which had come down to them. The Shī‘ite hadīth collections of the fourth/tenth 
century likewise followed their own methods of authentication, as the only valid 
line of transmission is that of the imāms, even if the divergences between these 
collections and the Sunni collections concerned only a limited number of cases. 
The criteria of authenticity were not sufficiently established at the time of the 
compilation of the hadīth collections for scholars to apply them automatically; 
scholars had to search for these criteria without being able to rely on precedents. 
All the available evidence seems to show that they were models of honesty, 
 rectitude and abnegation, seeking only the rewards of the world to come. They 
shied away from any criticism of the content of traditions attributed to the 
Prophet or of the form of these traditions, and were likewise reluctant to express 
a personal opinion about the information contained in the hadīth. They, there-
fore, concentrated on the chain of transmitters rather than on the text itself, to 
establish the authenticity of the mass of hadīth they had laboriously gathered 
together or about which they had learned in various ways
Hadīth scholars stipulated that for a hadīth to be acceptable, it needed to 
fulfil the following conditions. The chain of transmitters would be composed 
of specific individuals who could be identified clearly and not simply by a name, 
a vague surname, or an epithet. Each transmitter also had to have been of an 
age which allowed him to have recognised the person he claims to have met 
and whose statement he transmitted. At the very least, grounds should exist for 
supposing that such a meeting took place. They also stipulated that transmitters 
be reputed for their capacities for memorising, their precision and their clarity. 
Among other conditions they set out were the need for the transmitter of hadīth 
to be of honourable character, with nothing in his conduct which detracted 
from his standing as a man of virtue and honour, qualities grouped under the 
heading of al-murū’a.55 Nor was he to be associated with dubious innovators 
and impetuous hotheads. In this way the criteria for authenticating the chain of 
transmission gradually took form, and became the main preoccupation of the 
hadīth collectors under the name of “the science of invalidation and declaration 
of credibility” (‘ilm al jarh wa-l-t‘adīl ). Initially hadīth collectors did not accord 
great importance to the ways in which traditions were transmitted, although 
the exigencies of research led scholars to give greater attention to this. They 
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distinguished between various categories, according to whether the hadīth could 
be traced back to the Prophet, to a Companion quoting the Prophet directly, 
or to another person quoting the words of a Companion. Hadīth which had 
only one transmitter were differentiated from those which had several trans-
mitters. Other categories included hadīth read in the presence of a sheikh who 
verified the authenticity of the text containing the hadīth, as distinct from a 
hadīth recounted by a sheikh relying on his memory alone. Yet another category 
included copies of hadīth entrusted by the sheikh to his student, with or without 
permission to transmit it. These are some of the categories which gradually fixed 
technical terms, the difference between which could be understood only by 
scholars practised in this arcane science, able to grasp the difference between 
“he informed me” and “he informed us”, between “he told me” and “he told us”, 
between “according to someone” and “I heard from someone” or “I read in the 
presence of someone”. Each of these ways of transmission has a corresponding 
grade: the hadīth can be valid, accurate, good, weak, isolated among other quali-
fications. The implicit aim of the classification was for scholars to give preference 
to the hadīth transmitted by the school to which they belonged. 
The meticulous research involved in hadīth studies demonstrates that 
the question of the authenticity of prophetic hadīth was a dilemma for early 
scholars.56 Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), in his treatise entitled ta’wīl mukhtalif 
al-hadīth57 dating from shortly after the period of collection and compilation, 
shows that scholarly concern with formal aspects of hadīth masked contra-
dictory, irrational, and counter-Qur’anic elements in the hadīth corpus, couched 
in mediocre and outlandish language. All this reveals the extent to which hadīth 
were falsified, credible only on the basis of arbitrary interpretation. Faced 
with these discrepancies, a small number of ‘ulamā’ belonging to later genera-
tions attempted to harmonise the different versions. Al-Māzāri (d.  536/1141), 
al-Nawawī (d.  676/1277), al-‘Asqalānī (d.  852/1448), and al-Qastallānī 
(d.  923/1517) set about commenting on the different collections, making 
tremendous efforts to defend their coherence and present them in a way which 
conformed to established dogmas, prescriptions and opinion. To do this they 
drew on all their linguistic and historical knowledge.
In the light of these observations, the following three significant conclusions 
may be noted.
First, the field of hadīth study is considered one of the sciences which are part 
of the Muslim heritage. Reason has no role to play, and individual believers have 
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merely to assent to hadīth which the Muslim community has agreed to accept. 
Approved traditions were in reality those acceptable to a particular scholarly 
faction which had carried the day for reasons unconnected with the value 
and significance of the hadīth which were adopted. Collecting and classifying 
involved selection, which meant retaining certain elements and eliminating 
others. This can happen only by applying methods of rational criticism to hadīth, 
even if specialists maintain that only the chain of transmission will be critically 
examined.58 The corpus finally retained reflects the community’s representation 
of the Prophet after the period of revelation, against a background of radical 
change. Hadīth collections also mirror prevailing values among hadīth scholars, 
as distinct from scholars in other fields. 
Secondly, the contents of hadīth collections are constituted for the most part 
of traditions transmitted by a single scholar (ahād ), and are not limited to the 
words and deeds attributed to the Prophet. Words and deeds of the Compan-
ions were also included, and they were accorded the same exemplary value as 
those of the Prophet. In addition, the definition of “Companion” was widened 
to include anyone who had seen the Prophet, even once. These persons then 
became the basis for a chain of transmission as did those who had in fact lived 
with the Prophet over a period of time, believed in him and attributed to him 
qualities of perfection and infallibility. The initial link in the chain of transmis-
sion cannot be criticised, unlike the other elements. 
Thirdly, hadīth was treated in the same way as the Qur’an and was considered 
of equal rank. Believers clung to the literal meaning of traditions, memorised 
them, read them without due reflection and celebrated the completion of study 
in this field. Consequently, hadīth was a subject of research in the field of fiqh 
in the same way as the Qur’an: questions examined included abrogation, the 
particular and the general, what was implicit or explicit, absolute and restricted, 
as well as other traditional research in the field of Qur’anic science. Scholars 
were insufficiently prudent, given the context in which hadīth were codified. 
One might imagine that these elements taken together mean that the Muslim 
community’s heritage of Prophetic hadīth is somehow valueless. Nothing could 
be further from the truth. Hadīth represents a storehouse of living piety, evoking 
noble and timeless aspirations. Its content is varied in quality, with values juxta-
posed with others which are arid and lifeless. One finds vestiges of traditional 
values together with ideals which the passage of time has not eroded, and which 
remain valid in all circumstances. All this material needs to be examined and 
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evaluated, in the light of the main thrust of the message of Islam. Hadīth should 
not be considered sacred or interpreted literally. If these requirements are met, 
hadīth will remain alive in the hearts of believers. Will Muslims rise to the 
challenges facing them?
Theology ( kalām)
The interpenetration of fiqh, tafsīr and hadīth, on the one hand, and kalām, on 
the other hand, is largely responsible for the impasse in which the Islamic sciences 
find themselves. Since time immemorial Muslims have thought of theology as a 
system of rational apologetics. In the words of Ibn Khaldoun, in the chapter 
devoted to theology in the sixth chapter of the Muqadimmah “this is a science 
which involves arguing with logical proofs in defence of the articles of faith and 
refuting innovators who deviate in their dogmas from the early Muslims and 
Muslim orthodoxy”.59 
Such a definition leaves to one side, and even refutes, large swathes of theolog-
ical reflection, in particular that undertaken by the Mu‘tazilites. Elements of this 
have penetrated into Sunni, Ash‘arite and Maturidite thought. Such a definition 
concentrates on the apologetic dimension of theology, where the eternal truths 
appear as a set of unchanging data which have merely to be defended, a vision 
far removed from historical reality. Contemporary researchers agree on the close 
link between the first attempts at systematic theological thought and the  political 
realities prevailing after the “Great Schism”, which saw a struggle for power and a 
conflict among the Companions for which the Muslim community was unpre-
pared. Many questions were raised about what attitude believers should have 
toward the combatants, their victims and those who remained neutral. Could 
they all be in the right? If not, who was in error and who was right? 
Against the background of these events which played a determining role in 
the development of the first attempts at theological reflection, the passage from 
spontaneous to rational faith was not accompanied by a process of reflection 
based only on Qur’anic verses dealing with themes such as destiny, the existence 
of evil in the world, sanctions in the next world and other questions with which 
theological reflection has to engage. Rational theological reflection could take 
form only through the prism of the community’s culture, either that of their own 
native environment or that of neighbouring or rival cultures. Islamic theology 
developed by collecting together these elements and blending them with the 
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data of the text. This needs to be borne in mind lest one be tempted to see kalām 
as an autonomous science, free from the constraints of time and space. Kalām 
did take on these characteristics, although only after methods, categories and 
logical processes developed which led to successive theses being elaborated. 
The debate surrounding them made its mark on the solutions destined to be 
propagated and diffused. This is at the heart of the commonly held idea that true 
belief existed among the members of the first generations of Muslims before the 
appearance of doubts and innovations through capriciousness and error. Sunni 
doctrine had, however, emerged from conflict between rival interpretations, 
and it can be said to owe its existence to them. Some of these interpretations 
were retained while others were rejected for a variety of factors, which led to 
the ultimate triumph of one faction over another. Ibn Khaldoun, in considering 
that theology is not necessary at the present time for the scholar since heretics 
and innovators have disappeared, demonstrates that he has fallen victim to the 
complacent mentality of his time which considered theological reflection super-
fluous. This was thought to be a positive development: in reality it is a sign of the 
immobility that sets in before death ensues. 
This means that apologetics, which characterised kalām in its later stages, 
stands in the way of its primary and fundamental task of understanding and 
expounding divine revelation, not by an indiscriminate reliance on the opinions 
of previous scholars but by letting each generation exploit the learning available 
to them, whether or not this runs counter to traditional beliefs. This is the only 
way to be convinced of one’s beliefs, and to be a convincing witness to them. 
For this reason philosophy, history, sociology, psychology and linguistics, along 
with other disciplines should not be competitors or handmaidens of theology. 
Each of them has its particular field, methods, premises and conclusions. It is in 
the theologian’s interest to follow modern learning and exploit it to the best lest 
a gap open up between theology and contemporary science, making theolog-
ical language incomprehensible even if theologians have committed their 
learning to memory and can repeat it, parrot-like, to perfection.60 Theologians 
must revise in particular learning that has become obsolete and fallen behind 
contemporary intellectual development. Jāhiz (c. 160–255/c. 776–868) long ago 
observed: 
The theologian can only muster a unified knowledge of kalām and master 
this art as leader of a school by being equally competent in theology 
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and philosophy. The scholar is the person who is knowledgeable in both 
subjects.61
Here, as elsewhere in this book, the history of theology or the other Islamic 
sciences will not be set out in detail; rather these disciplines will be examined 
to see to what extent they are in keeping with the spirit of the message of the 
Prophet as it has been presented here. Three main characteristics should be 
noted: first, theology as developed in the work of scholars of various schools is 
not simply an Islamic science but is of Greco-Islamic character. The theologians, 
to quote the qādi Abd al-Jabbār, “studied only that which aided the victory 
of monotheism and divine justice”, although to attain this aim they used the 
categories and logic of Greek philosophy.62 One should not imagine that the 
intellectual instrument employed is innocent or neutral: in reality it influences 
the content of the science in question, orientating it in a direction different 
from that which it would have taken had another instrument been used. Hadīth 
specialists realised this along with all those who rejected philosophy and refused 
to adapt its concepts to the religious faith of the first generation of Muslims. 
It goes without saying that the logic of the Greeks and other peoples of antiq-
uity differed from modern logic. Traditional logic was linked in particular to 
mathematical science which has progressed over the last two centuries in a 
prodigious manner, to the extent that this traditional logic is no longer valid. 
The same can be said of numerous categories and philosophical terms used 
by scholars studying divinity, prophethood, the world to come, among other 
subjects which seem religious or merely Islamic in character. These categories 
and terms, borrowed from the physics, astronomy and geography of a thousand 
years ago, reflect a bygone age and are of historical and documentary interest 
only. These categories and terms were intended to render the language of belief 
in conceptual terms comprehensible to cultivated Muslims in the first centuries. 
They were reduced to mere rote learning and repetition in an age of intellectual 
stagnation.
The second characteristic of theology from its beginnings was a tendency for 
debates to become inflexible when the subjects under discussion should have 
been examined with prudence and humility. Divergence of opinions often led to 
mutual exclusion and accusations of unbelief and heresy. Theologians generally 
sought to crush their opponents by bombarding them with arguments without 
examining how valid or erroneous their own positions were, or if they were 
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contradictory or inaccurate. Abu Hanifa, summing up the situation at his time 
(before it deteriorated further) said: 
We looked at one another in silence, fearing that our companions would 
make an error. You too look at one another and want your companion to 
make a mistake. He who wants to see his companion stumble wants to 
call him an unbeliever: the person who wants to call his companion an 
unbeliever is perhaps an unbeliever himself.63 
Those who rejected kalām, in particular the hadīth specialists who described 
the Mu‘tazalites and theologians in general as dangerous innovators, were as 
inflexible as their opponents. Ibn Hanbal, for example, states with complete self-
assurance:
These are the teachings of people of learning and influence … anyone who 
contradicts or criticises these teachings or reproves those who propound 
them is a dangerous innovator, he is excluded from the community, he has 
strayed from the way of Sunna and truth.64 
In general, exaggerated fideism and dogmatism65 were dominant, leaving no 
room for personal research since truth was seen as ready-made: Muslims had 
only to discover it. Truth was behind or above believers, not in front of them. 
The third characteristic feature of kalām is its relation to politics. Certain 
members of the first generation of theologians, such as Ghaylān al-Dimashqi, 
Ja‘d ibn Dirham and Jahm ibn Safwān paid with their lives for their opposition 
to the Ummayad regime.66 Mu‘tazilism enjoyed for a period the support of the 
Abbasids before falling into disfavour. The adherents of Asha‘ari and al-Matūridi 
gave Sunni theology a defensive orientation from the fourth/tenth century 
onwards, concerned ostensibly with questions of doctrine. In reality, socio-
political issues were the principal preoccupation of scholars. Servile submission 
was legitimised under the guise of obedience. Intentionally or not theologians, 
such as al-Bāqillāni (d. 403/1012), ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādi (d.  428/1036), 
al-Ghazāli (d. 505/1111) and their successors served the interests of existing struc-
tures of power. They consecrated the formula according to which each person is 
not the author of his or her acts, which constitutes a denial of the principle of 
causality. Otherwise limits were placed on divine omnipotence and the miracles 
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of the prophets were denied. The doctrine of the Jabarites recalled the words 
of Mu’awiya when he took power, one of many justifications for tyranny and 
exploitation: “Had God not judged me fit to exercise this charge, He would not 
have given it to me. If God had found our situation undesirable, he would have 
changed it.”67 Generations of Muslims were educated in a way which led them 
to refuse any discernment in the different areas of life. Human acts were not 
attributed to natural, social or logical causes and the First (divine) Cause was 
immediately identified in questions both anodyne and momentous. Ignorance 
was thought to be a sign and condition of piety, an attitude which favoured the 
spread of fatalism, charlatanry, oppression and fanaticism in many and varied 
forms. 
Sufism
Theology was founded on reason, whereas Sufism is founded on sentiment. The 
position occupied by Sufism is similar to that of mysticism in other Eastern and 
Western religious traditions, both ancient and contemporary. From the third/
ninth century onwards, conflict between religious law and wisdom, as well 
as between inner truth and law, preoccupied Muslim scholars. The history of 
Islamic thought saw many attempts to harmonise the claims of these rival disci-
plines. In the end philosophy was made into an independent discipline with only 
logic and physics being retained by theology. Some of the excesses of Sufism 
were corrected, leaving it free to cultivate interior spiritual life and examine the 
depths of the soul, on condition that it recognised, at least formally, the utility 
of external forms of religion and the need to respect them.
There is general agreement among Sufis that their experience cannot be 
expressed through language and for this reason they often use poetry, aphorisms 
and proverbs. Sufi literature is marked by symbols, allusions and evocations. 
Familiar expressions take on esoteric meanings and veiled significations. It is, 
therefore, difficult to evaluate this domain with its distinctive rationale and 
rich imaginative resources on the same basis as the institutional aspects of Islam 
where the message took form, albeit with the same rational basis, despite its 
different preoccupations and agenda. The most one can do is to study Sufism 
as an historical and social phenomenon of past, present and possibly future 
significance, influencing the course of political, economic and social affairs, as 
well as shaping intellectual life. This approach doubtless neglects the basic spiri-
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tual dimension of Sufism, which strives to explore the depths of the prophetic 
message or rather messages, transcending the limits of time and space, relying on 
“taste” rather than reason, freed from the pressure and heavy constraints of those 
who proclaim themselves “guardians of the sanctuary”.
The origins of Sufism can be located within an ascetic aspiration, common 
to a minority in all religions, for freedom, partial or complete, from the burdens 
of this world, the constraints of money and labour, in order to prepare for 
death and the annihilation of the body.68 After the departure of the Prophet 
this small group within the Muslim community drew spiritual sustenance from 
 meditation on the verses of the Qur’an which emphasise the transient nature 
of the world and the proximity of the world to come. They cite as a warning 
the fate of those who store up treasures of gold and silver and do not spend it 
according to God’s designs, while describing the pleasures awaiting the righteous 
and the punishment in store for the unbelievers. This tendency, in fact, existed 
among the generation of the Companions and the names of the most illustrious 
are immortalised in the numerous hagiographical works that are dedicated to 
them. Asceticism, albeit as a marginal phenomenon, also existed in subsequent 
generations, influencing small groups known for their piety and moral refine-
ment. They often tended to congregate in frontier posts and fortified monas-
teries where they combined prayer with participation in holy war.
It is certain that this variety of asceticism has been a permanent feature of 
Islam, nourishing the Muslim conscience and its reflection on the teachings of 
the Qur’an and the imitation of the Prophet. It was not calculated to satisfy 
those who imagined that by reining in the powers of thought and the imagin-
ation they could fit different temperaments and dispositions into the same 
pre-prepared mould and weave all the variegated threads of reality into a single 
seamless garment. Asceticism would not have evolved into mysticism, that is 
to say, a lifestyle with common bases and characteristics, were it not for two 
principal factors which converged to produce renewed dynamism.
First, the refined civilisation of the Abbasid period, marked by elegance and 
delicacy in numerous aspects of life alongside immorality and debauchery in 
certain circles constituted a strange and unfamiliar way of life for those used to 
a frugal existence.69 Some individuals were offended by these developments and 
the values that accompanied them. For a variety of reasons they were unable to 
adapt to these changes. Seen in this light Sufism is a reaction against a particular 
turn of events rather than a development of a previously existing tendency. Like 
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any reaction, it is prone to move too far in the contrary direction, denouncing 
the broad sweep of life in this world as error, things forbidden and permitted 
alike, with the exception of marriage. This is noteworthy, as celibacy was not 
part of the traditions inherited from the Prophet and, while this practice was 
characteristic of Christian monasticism, Sufism did not want to be assimilated 
to Christian monks. There was, it seems, no greater a tendency among Sufis to 
refrain from marriage than there was the case in other social categories.
The dominant role of ‘ulamā’ in defining the external practice of faith was 
another element which contributed ultimately to the development of Sufism. 
Such external practices are the guarantee of group cohesion, and may be suffi-
cient for the general run of believers with their quotidian preoccupations. It 
is natural that they may not provide adequate spiritual sustenance for smaller 
groups of believers who desire to go beyond compliance with external liturgical 
observances and social duties. Such groups give importance to the demands of 
the conscience in its quest for inner serenity and harmony between what is and 
that to which the soul aspires. The Sufis were restless and turbulent in character, 
avid to discover the secrets of existence and explore its mysteries. Many of them 
preferred to isolate themselves and retreat from the cares of life. They practised 
meditative introspection and spiritual exercises which they thought would 
lead them to free themselves from the bonds of the flesh and reach the highest 
degrees of intimacy with God.
This existential quest proceeded, unbridled, in all directions. It is unsurprising 
that it led to theories and positions which were to a greater or lesser extent distant 
from the forms and content of belief fixed by the ‘ulamā’ and approved by the 
community, for example, a certain detachment from rites and observations, the 
affirmation that the divine principle resided in the innermost part of the believ-
er’s soul, which was capable of union with God. This led to violent opposition 
from the fuqahā’, who solicited assistance from the holders of political power 
in order to counter Sufi tendencies. The trial and crucifixion of al-Hallāj in the 
year 309/922 marked the end of an era in the history of Sufism during which 
it had been independent from the ascetic movements and existed as an intel-
lectual current on the fringes of the fiqh schools and political factions. After the 
death of al-Hallāj the number of those rallying to the Sufi cause increased and 
its leaders sought to obtain the neutrality of the fuqahā’ and the religious estab-
lishment in general, recognising the latter’s right to look after what the Sufis 
considered the external husk of religion as distinct from the kernel of veneration 
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and prayer. This tactical concession did not prevent the infiltration of gnostic 
ideas and the influence of illuminist philosophy. This incited the Ahl al-Sunna 
to maintain their attitude of circumspection and defend the purity of the faith in 
conformity with the ideals of the first generations of believers. This could entail 
violent confrontations with the Sufis, as happened in the case of Shihāb al-Din 
al-Suhrawardi, assassinated in the year 587/1191 of the Hijra.
Sufism nevertheless continued, despite this opposition, to occupy an impor-
tant place in the life of Muslims. It gained many new adepts from different 
social classes, who followed the Sufi way and rose up the degrees of the spiritual 
hierarchy. The roles played by al-Ghazāli, who introduced Sufism into the Sunni 
world despite fierce debate, and eminent figures such as the sheikh al-akbar, Ibn 
al ‘Arabi (who died in the year 632/1234), were especially important. Sufism 
would not have expanded as it did across the Muslim world were it not for its 
pyramidal structure which placed aspirants and those following the spiritual 
path under the authority of their masters, in a spirit of self-renunciation and 
obedience to their masters’ orders. The gathering of Sufi adepts in zāwiyas and 
khānaqāh (convent-style structures) in order to carry out regular rituals and 
collective spiritual exercises also contributed to its spread. This was also one of 
the reasons for the cohesion of the broad Sufi community and the solidarity 
characterising their way of life.
Sufism ceased to evolve from the sixth/thirteenth century onwards, in the 
same way as any organisation lacking democratic rules for its functioning. It 
became a confraternity, with its positive and negative aspects. Among the former 
one may mention the spiritual framework it provided for ordinary people in a 
period of political fragmentation and the concomitant limiting of the ‘ulamā’ 
activity to urban centres. Many Sufi leaders played an effective role in defending 
the weak and oppressed and in resisting foreign invasion right up until modern 
times; the cases of this include the Emir ‘Abd el-Qādir’s resistance to French 
colonisation in Algeria and Sanusi resistance to the Italians in Libya.70 The 
negative aspects of the confraternities were also numerous, transmitting to 
Sufism a predisposition to offer stubborn resistance to the nineteenth-century 
reformist movements. Sufism was considered responsible for the spirit of 
fatalism, and belief in spectacular wonders and miracles were attributed to Sufi 
“saints”. This was due to the contagion of popular piety and the observance of 
pagan rituals unconnected with Islam. Exploitation and corruption also flour-
ished among Sufi sheikhs. Summing up the main characteristics of Sufism, one 
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may conclude that it was a phenomenon with two main facets. It sustained its 
adepts in many cases by a rich spiritual life, leading them to high degrees of 
rapture to which Sufi literature bears witness in works still admired today. These 
inspire Muslims and non-Muslims alike. At the same time Sufism tended toward 
self-absorption and a flight from reality, abandoning any attempt to improve it 
by appropriate means. 
In conclusion, Sufism was an ambiguous phenomenon, a fruit of its own 
particular reading of the message of Islam and of human history. In its later 
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Talbi, in a UNESCO Chair of Comparative Religions lecture given on 15 May 2000 at 
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Scripture penned on unrolled parchment!” (Sūra 52:1–3). This sūra (al Tūr) is Meccan: it 
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al-Athīr, ةباغلا دسأ (Asad al-Ghāba) (Cairo, 1390/1970), III/259, and al-Balādhuri, Futūh 
al-buldān (Cairo, 1350/1932), p. 459. Al-Suyūti, in ch. 16 of al-Itqān, recounts how 
‘Abdallah ibn Mas’ūd recited before someone “The tree of Zaqqūm is the food of the 
criminal.” The man said: “the food of the orphan”. But ‘Abdallah stood by his story. His 
interlocutor said: “could you say: ‘the food of the wastrel?’” ‘Abdallah replied “yes”. “Then 
do so’,’ came the reply. On the flexibility that characterises oral religious discourse over 
written forms, see Jack Goody, La logique de l’Ecriture (Paris, 1986), p. 21. 
 6. See J. Van Ess, “Une lecture à rebours de l’histoire du mu‘tazilisme”, Revue d’études 
islamiques, vol. LXVI, fasc. 2, 1978, pp. 185–94.
 7. See Ze’ev Herzog, “Deconstructing the walls of Jericho”, Haaretz, 19 October 1999, pp. 
1–8. Françoise Smyth-Florentin has illustrated this point in several articles.
 8. They naturally refuse, along with inadequately-informed Muslims, the principle of 
evolution. As François Jacob, a leading contemporary French scientist, puts it:“we are to 
imagine, therefore, that all the animals on the earth today descend from a single organism 
which lived 600 hundred million years ago and already possessed this variety of genes.” 
Le Monde, 4 January 2000, p. 14. 
 9. “The unbelievers of the People of the Book and the pagans did not desist from unbelief 
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until the Clear Sign came to them: an apostle from God reading pages purified, therein 
true books” Sūra 98:2–3). See too Sūra 80:11–16: “No indeed; it is a Reminder (and who 
so wills, shall remember it) upon pages high-honoured, uplifted, purified, by the hands of 
scribes noble, pious.” 
10. See Wilferd F. Madelung, “The origins of the controversy concerning the creation of the 
Qur’an”, in Orientalia Hispanica, vol. I, 1974, pp. 504–25 and Fahmi Jad‘ān يف ثحب ةنهملا 
ملاسلإا يف يسايسلا و ينيدلا ةيلدج (The Mihna: Study of the Controversy between Religion and 
Politics in Islam) (Amman, 1989). 
11. Sūra 18:109. See, too, Emmanuel Levinas’ quotation of the words of Rabbi Eliezer in 
Difficult Freedom: essays on Judaism (London, 1990), p. 29: “If all the seas were ink, reeds 
pens, the heavens parchment and all men writers, they would not suffice to write down 
the Torah I have learned, and the Torah itself would be diminished only by the amount 
drawn out of it by the tip of a paintbrush dipped in the sea.”
12. Sūra 56:77–80.
13. Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, Sudanese scholar hanged in January 1985 after being found 
guilty of anti-Islamic activities. ملاسلإا نم ةيناثلا ةلاسرلا (The Second Message of Islam) was 
first published in the Sudan in 1967 and reprinted several times. 
14. See the present author’s ةثادحلا و ملاسلإا (Islam and Modernity) (Tunis, 1990) for a detailed 
commentary on each of these positions.
Legislation
 1. Sūra 45:12 “And now we have set you on the right path. Follow it …”
 2. This is the point that Muhammad Talbi made, using the image of the “pointed arrow” 
(هجوملا مهسلا). See his book, ‘ﷲلايع“ (The families of God) (Tunis, 1992).
 3. The only occasion when details are given is in Sūra 4:101–2. Abū Hanifa nevertheless 
maintained that Muslims were dispensed from prayer if, in the thick of battle, fear was 
running high. Prayer could be postponed in this case. 
 4. Rāzī (c. 239/854–c. 312/925) nevertheless noted that the Companions disagreed about 
features of the Prophet’s behaviour which one might suppose they had seen on numerous 
occasions: “Despite their constant preoccupation with religious matters and their zeal in 
observing its rites, the Companions were unable to carry out exactly gestures which they 
had seen five times a day: stand up once or twice, reciting aloud, raising the hands.” See 
Rāzi’s, لوصحملا (al-Mahsūl) (Beirut, 1412/1992), vol. 1, p. 214. He goes on to say that: 
“Standing up once or twice is one of the most common actions, although this prescrip-
tion has not been uninterruptedly handed down from one generation to the next. Actions 
such as raising the hands or saying bismillah in a loud voice are also matters which are 
clear and evident although they have not been handed down uninterruptedly across the 
generations.” Ibid., vol. IV, p. 293.
 5. A rapid survey of the myriad details contained in the books of fiqh across the range of 
juridical schools reveals the gulf between them and the Qur’an, which insists simply on 
the need to pray. These details are relevant to a type of society which has disappeared or 




 6. The classic work on this subject, although written from a Christian viewpoint, is that of 
Friedrich Heiler, translated into English under the title of Prayer, a Study in the History 
and Psychology of Religion (Oxford University Press, 1932). 
 7. Dr. Mahmoud Sidqi first raised this question in modern times concerning prayer and 
alms-giving in his article, “هدحو نآرقلا وه ملاسلإا” (“Islam: the Qur’an alone”), in the review, 
رآنملا (al-Manār), No. 9, 1324/1906, pp. 515–25. 
 8. Charfi, تانبل (Building Bricks), pp. 165–83. 
 9. Muhammad Hamidullah, “Le musulman dans le milieu occidental”, in Normes et valeurs 
dans l’islam contemporain (Paris, 1966), pp. 200–5. Muslims living in these regions, 
northern Europe and America, are not a scattered handful of individuals but number in 
their millions. They are mainly immigrants or their descendants, although they include 
local converts to Islam. They far outnumber the Muslim communities existing at the time 
of the Prophet.
10. Consultation of the commentaries concerned with the prescriptive verses demonstrates 
this. See, for example, نآرقلا  ماكحأ (Prescriptive Verses of the Qur’an) by al-Jassās, al-Kiyā’ 
al-Harāsi, and Ibn al-Arabi, and even نآرقلا ماكحلأ عماجلا (Collection of Prescriptive Verses in 
the Qur’an) by al-Qurtubi. 
11. See in particular Amel Grami, لاسلإا  ركفلا  يف  ةّدرلا  ةيضق  م (Apostasy in Islamic Thought) 
(Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Manouba, 1993). The central thesis of Muhammad 
Charfi’s book, Islam et liberté (Paris, 1998) is the incompatibility of freedom and fiqh with 
regard to this question and many others.
12. One such example of this deviation from the essential truth of Islam, representative of a 
widespread and multiform tendency, was to be found in the Tunisian daily newspaper, 
حابصلا (al-Sabāh), on Sunday, 20 February 1994, p. 6: “One of the most important rules 
for inculcating good manners is to obey the Word of God ‘If you have disobeyed, conceal 
yourself from view’.” This false idea, which encourages hypocrisy, went unchallenged by 
the editor of the paper and its readers. 
13. “And the thief, male and female, cut off the hands of both as a recompense for what they 
have earned, and a punishment exemplary from God; God is all-mighty, all-wise.” (Sūra 
5:38). 
14. Abdelmadjid Charfi يملاسلإاركفلا  ثيدحت, (Modernising Islamic Thought) (Casablanca, 
1998), pp. 49–51. See also Nā’ila Sallīnī, ةةيعامتجلاا  تاقلاعلا  و  ينآرقلا  ريسفتلا  ةيخيرات (“The 
Historicity of Quranic Commentary and Social Relations”) (doctoral thesis, Faculty of 
Arts and Humanities, Manouba, 1998), pp. 166–93. 
15. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Oxford University 
Press, 1950), p. 157 and 163.
16. On interest and usury see Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest. A Study of the 
Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary Interpretation (Leiden, 1996). This excellent and 
well-documented account confirms the documentation assembled by the present author 
in ةثادحلا و ملاسلإا (Islam and Modernity) concerning the fraudulent methods employed by 
banks who boast they are applying the Sharī‘a while merely changing the names of the 
operations they carry out. It was also noted in the above work that the Sheikh of al-Azhar 
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went so far as to denounce the so-called Islamic banks in 1998, giving preference to 
conventional institutions. 
17. This separation does not apply in all circumstances, even if democratic systems generally 
prevent the state from manipulating religion. Thus, former US President, George Bush 
Sr., declared in a widely-diffused speech to troops departing for the Gulf in August 1990 
that “the world’s eyes are fixed upon you and the hopes and prayers of all those who love 
freedom go with you”. The American branch of the Catholic Pax Christi (Peace of Christ) 
movement replied that for a war to be just it needs to be the last resort. In Pax Christi’s 
view, this was not the case in the Gulf War. War should not be waged on innocents in 
order to preserve energy interests and Western lifestyles. 
18. Tabari’s commentary on the Sūra al-Tawba sheds ample light on the real stakes of this 
expedition, although his text also contains elements related to events which happened 
after the time of Muhammad. 
19. See the chapter “Islam and Violence” in Charfi, تانبل (Building Bricks), pp. 183–201. We 
have not seen fit to modify the point of view expressed in that chapter, although it did not 
take into account the prevailing justification for the conquests under the caliphs ‘Umar 
and Othmān, namely that they were a continuation of the jihād initiated by the Prophet.
20. In this context the Qur’an (Sūra 38:35) mentions that Solomon was the only prophet to 
rule a kingdom “such as may not befall any after me”. 
21. This expression is also applied to Abraham, with regard to monotheism: “you have had a 
good example in Abraham and in those with him, when they said to their people, ‘We are 
quit of you and that you serve, apart from God’” (Sūra 60:4). See also verse 6 of the same 
Sūra.
22. Such expressions appear throughout the Qur’an in the Meccan and Medinan Sūras. They 
express a basic principle of the Prophet’s message. In the light of this an appreciation is 
made of the correct conduct to follow in particular circumstances.
23. “But no, by thy Lord! They will not believe till they make thee the judge regarding the 
disagreement between them, then they shall find in themselves no impediment touching 
thy verdict, but shall surrender in full submission.” (Sūra 4:65). The Prophet was never-
theless conscious of the limits of his human power and never made any claims to perfec-
tion, neither when he took the initiative in giving an opinion as in the celebrated incident 
of the pollination of palm trees, nor when he intervened in disputes. See al-Bukhāri, 
(al-Sahīh), اهذخأي لاف هيخأ ّقحب هل يضق نم باب مكاحلأا باتك (“The book of prescriptions: the 
chapter relating to the person in whose favour a judgment is made at the expense of his 
brother: let him not take what is due to his brother”).
24. The opinion of Ali is based on an analogy which does not hold good in all cases: “The 
drinker gets drunk, when drunk he becomes irrational, then he pronounces words of 
slander, and the punishment for the slanderer is eighty lashes.” On another occasion he 
said “I would not inflict a mortal punishment on anyone. I can see only the case of the 
drinker. If he died I would pay the blood price. The Prophet had not decreed that.” Rāzi, 
لوصحملا (al-Mahsūl), IV, p. 190.
25. Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādi (393/1002–464/1071), commenting on this episode, notes that 
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“this tradition contains two teachings, one which is general, namely that the person who 
has had sexual relations with his wife during the Ramadan fast must make reparation. The 
second is specific to this instance, namely the authorization given by the Prophet for the 
man to appropriate the donation. Only the Prophet can give this kind of authorization.” 
See ّهقفتملا  و  هيقفلا (al-faqīh wa-l-mutafaqqih) (“The Legal Specialist and the Scholar 
Devoted to fiqh”), (2nd edn, Beirut, 1400/1980), vol. I, pp. 110–11. 
26. Tunisia is considered to have gone further than other Arab countries in promoting 
women’s rights. The Code de statut personnel promulgated in 1957, prohibited polygamy, 
gave courts sole authority to pronounce divorce and enabled unmarried women to choose 
their husbands and inherit property in the absence of male relations. This audacious and 
progressive legislation opened the way to future developments. It challenged customs 
which deprive women of their most elementary rights, such as that of education, insist-
ence on the segregation of the sexes and forbiding women from driving. 
27. “The fornicatress and the fornicator – scourge each of them a hundred stripes, and in the 
matter of God’s religion let no tenderness for them seize you” (Sūra 24:2). 
28. “And those who cast it up on women in wedlock, and then bring not four witnesses, 
scourge them with eighty stripes, and do not accept any testimony of theirs ever; those – 
they are the ungodly” (Sūra 24:4).
29. “But when they (female slaves) are in wedlock, if they commit indecency, they shall be 
liable to half the punishment of freedwomen” (Sūra 4:25). 
30. See Shahlān Hā’īri, ةعيشلا دنع ّتقؤملا جاوزلا ةعتملا (Al-Mut‘a: Temporary Marriage among the 
Shia), (7th edn, Beirut, 1996). This was originally a doctoral thesis presented in the United 
States under the title of “Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran”. Also ‘Abdallah 
Kamāl, للاحلا ةراعدلا (Legal Prostitution) (Beirut, 1997). The author studies the ةعتملا جاوز, 
“temporary marriage” (literal translation: “marriage of pleasure”) in Iran, traditional 
marriage in Egypt, and the رايسملا جاوز “marriage of facility” in the Arabian peninsula. 
31. An example of this was the refusal of the Jordanian parliament in late 1999 to modify 
the law authorising the killing of an adulteress (and not the adulterer) by a member of 
her family. Many women, married and single are victims of this practice, often because 
of suspicion, rumours, or calumny. There is nothing Islamic or Qur’anic about such 
 behaviour.
32. “Sexual relations, except where children are concerned, are a strictly private matter 
concerning neither the state nor one’s neighbour. Certain sexual practices which do not 
lead to procreation are punishable by the law: this is mere superstition. The importance 
attached to adultery is totally irrational. Many other kinds of reprehensible behaviour do 
more damage to the happiness of a couple than a passing infidelity.” B. Bussel, Pourquoi je 
ne suis pas chrétien (Paris, 1972), p. 77.
The Seal of Prophecy
 1. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London, 1934), p. 120. 
 2. One may note that the Qur’an makes no mention of “rites of passage” such as circum-
cision and excision which are mentioned in the hadīth collection. Historical research 
could show whether such customs existed at the period during which the hadīth were 
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collected or at the time of revelation. 
 3. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 120. 
 4. “Muhammad is not the father of any one of your men, but the Messenger of God and the 
Seal of the prophets. God has knowledge of everything” (Sūra 33:40). We will not discuss 
here the popular understanding of the term “seal”. The need to give a material translation 
for abstract terms such as “seal” is the reason for the way in which the Sīra texts (biograph-
ical and hagiographic texts) speak of a visible seal between the shoulders of the Prophet, 
one of the signs of prophecy. See, for example, Ibn ‘Ishāq, Sīra (Ribat, 1976), p. 69. 
 5. The Sīra texts, particularly the later ones, abound with examples of these miracles 
 considered by popular imagination as indispensable attributes of prophetic perfection. 
See, for example, al-Qādi Iyādh’s فطصملا قوقحب فيرعتلا يفءافشلا (Healing in the Recogni-
tion of the Chosen One). This is unsurprising given that similar miracles, called karamāt, 
were attributed to saints and holy men, although they were very similar to those attrib-
uted to the Prophet.
 6. The Baha’is hold the same belief, maintaining that although the prophetic line has been 
concluded, prophets may still appear after Muhammad: they hold that the founder of 
their religion, Bahá’u’lláh, lived in the nineteenth century. See Moncef b. Abdeljelil, ةقرفلا 
ملاسلإا يف ةيشماهلا (Marginal Sects in Islam) (Tunis, 1999). 
 7. This explains why the conduct of the Ghuzz tribesmen amazed the tenth-century geogra-
pher and traveller, Ibn Fadhlān: “When they agree about something and decide to act, 
the lowest and most miserable of them come and break the agreement that has been 
reached. Each of them, not only those with the power to loose and bind as in the Muslim 
countries, can oppose decisions.” Ibn Fadhlān, Voyage chez les Bulgares de la Volga, trans. 
M. Canard (Paris, 1988), p. 38. 
 8. “And those who answer their Lord and perform the prayer, their affair being counsel 
between them, and they expend of that which we have provided them” (Sūra 42:38). “So 
pardon them, and pray forgiveness for them, and take counsel with them in the affair, and 
when thou art resolved put thy trust in God” (Sūra 3:159). 
 9. Sūra 33:45; Sūra 33:21. 
10. The way in which the freedom at the heart of the message of Islam is obscured by the 
confusion between politics and religion did not escape the attention of the German 
theologian, Eugen Drewermann: “Although Islam can rightly be termed a religion of 
liberty, the way in which politics and religion are closely associated in a way that recalls 
the Middle Ages appears today as something anti-libertarian.” Eugen Drewermann, 
Fonctionnaires de Dieu (Paris, 1993), p. 732. 
11. The case of the Italian astronomer, Galileo (1564–1642) is one example of this, as well as 
the Church’s recognition of the principle of freedom of conscience which it had vigor-
ously resisted. The Church is now cautiously expressing its regret about its silence during 
the Nazi persecution of the Jews. The Church has not yet addressed the question of its 
support for slavery and colonialism in the past, whether in Latin America or Africa. 
12. Concerning the ‘ulamā’ and the religious establishment in the Sunni system, see: ةسسؤملا 




13. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Oxford, 1999). 
The public sphere is a social site where collective rationality, as distinct from individual 
and group interests, can express itself.
Part Two Introduction
 1. These Caliphs (the Rāshidūn) were Abū Bakr (10/632–12/634), ‘Umar (12/634–24/644) 
and ‘Uthmān (24/644–35/656). 
 2. This is to be differentiated from research based on preconceived ideas which strip Islam 
of its specificity and apply categories derived from Judaism and Christianity. This leads to 
claims that the Qur’an took on its final form only in the third/ninth century. See Patricia 
Crone and Michael Cook’s Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), and John Wansbrough’s Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of 
Scriptural Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1977).
 3. The Sahāba (Companions) are those who personally knew the Prophet. The Tābiūn are 
those who were not contemporaries of the Prophet but knew one of the Sahāba.
 4. See Max Weber, L’éthique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme (Paris, 1985), p. 102 (The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London, 2001)) and Ernst Troeltsch, 
 Protestantisme et modernité (1991). 
 5. See Khalīl Abd el Karām, ةباحصلا عمتجم لاوحاب ةبابرلا ودش (The Music of the Companions), 3 
vols (Cairo, 1997). The author has collected numerous traditions from biographies of the 
Prophet, the Tabaqāt and historical works, differentiating between historical reality and 
the idealised version of events concerning the Companions in the collective imagination 
of Muslim communities.
The Prophet’s Successors
 1. See Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, vol. II, p. 167–72. This document, also known as the “Constitu-
tion”, has been the object of much research in order to demonstrate its authenticity or lack 
thereof.
 2. A saqīfa is a covered communal area suitable for meetings. The term is used by historians 
to refer to the negotiations that took place in 11/632 before the nomination of Abū Bakr 
as head of the incipient community.
 3. Ansār: inhabitants of Medina who gave their support to Muhammad. Muhājirūn: 
Meccan Muslims who emigrated to Medina with Muhammad or before the conquest of 
Mecca in 8/630.
 4. See A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad: a Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sīrat Rasul Allāh 
(Karachi, 1978), p. 685.
 5. See the Sahih of al-Bukhāri, book of hudūd (“legal punishments”), “Stoning of a married 
women pregnant as a result of adultery”. 
 6. This is the same point made by the theoreticians of the Caliphate when they quote the 
pre-Islamic poet from the sixth-century ce al-Afwah al Awdī: “Chaos harms the people 
that has no leader.” 
 7. In the words of Jāhiz: “The common people do not know the meaning of the term 
imamate and how to understand the term of caliphate. They cannot distinguish between 
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the benefits that the caliphate brings and the resulting harm if the caliphate is vacant. 
They are unaware of its origins and of how one attains the caliphate. The common mass 
are carried away by the wind of rumour and novelty and take more pleasure in listening to 
prattlers and windbags than to those who speak the truth.” Jāhiz, ظهاجلا لئاسر (Letters of 
Jāhiz) (Cairo, 1399/1979), vol. IV, p. 37. Muhammad Abduh echoes this point of view 
when he says: “The people on whom one can rely to develop the nation, to reflect and 
bring enlightenment, are those who make up the majority of the middle and upper-
ranking members of society, not the rabble and the common herd. If the middle and 
upper classes reflect wisely, their thoughts are moving towards perfection. If the common 
people are ignorant and superstitious, they do not prevent progress or stand in the way of 
civilisation so long as the upper classes remain lucid and thoughtful.” Muhammad Abduh, 
ةلماكلا لامعلأا (Complete Works), vol. II, part 2, p. 160.
 8. See, in the Old Testament, the Book of Leviticus 15:19–33. Gilbert Durand demonstrated 
that the Sabbath was sacred for the duration of what was held to be the menstrual period 
of the lunar goddess Ishtār, once a month, before it was fixed at once a week. According 
to Durand, the word “sabbath” comes from a root meaning “the dread day of Ishtār”. See 
Durand, Les structures anthropologiques, p. 119.
 9.  Iblīs: the Devil, possibly a contraction of the Greek δίάβολος. According to the Qur’an: 
(Sūra 15:30–3) Iblīs refused to prostrate himself before Adam: “Then the angels bowed 
themselves all together save Iblīs: he refused to be among those bowing.” He tempted 
Adam and Eve: “And We said, ‘Adam, dwell thou, and thy wife, in the Garden and eat 
thereof easefully where you desire; but draw not nigh this tree, lest you be evildoers.’ 
The Satan caused them to slip therefrom and brought them out of that they were in” 
(Sūra 2:34–6). At the end of time Iblīs shall be punished: “And Paradise shall be brought 
forward for the godfearing and Hell advanced for the perverse … Then they shall be 
pitched into it, they and the perverse, and the hosts of Iblīs all together” (Sūra 26:90, 94).
10. تايلئارسا (Isra’iliyyāt): a corpus composed of stories concerning the prophets (صصصق 
ءايبنلأا (qisas al anbiyā’)), stories of the ancient Israelites and folklore of Jewish origin.
11. Ahl al-Kitāb: Qur’anic term (also employed by Muslim scholars) to designate the Jews 
and Christians, to whom scriptures had been revealed: Torah (tawrāh), Psalter, (zabūr), 
and Gospels (injīl).
12. The two verses on which this arbitrary interpretation is based are: “O Prophet, say to thy 
wives and daughters and the believing women, that they draw their veils close to them; 
so it is likelier that they will be known, and not hurt. God is All-forgiving, All-compas-
sionate” (Sūra 33:59) and “Let them cast their veils over their bosoms …” (Sūra 24:31). 
The first verse merely requests that women should draw their robes close to them so that 
they may be recognised and avoid being harmed when they go out after dark to answer 
the call of nature, there being no toilets in the houses of Medina. The second verse forbids 
a woman to show off her charms by covering her chest so that her breasts will be hidden 
and not visible over the top of her dress. This is far removed from the prescriptions of the 
fuqahā’ who consider the female body as something shameful which should be hidden.
13. Abū Bakr (10/632–12/634), ‘Umar (12/634–24/644), and ‘Uthmān (24/644–35/656).
14.  Plural of maulan: client, vassal or dependant.
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15. A movement which in the later ‘Ummayad period refused to recognise the privileged 
position of the Arabs.
16. Empire was the traditional form of the state in the majority of civilisations. Its most 
significant characteristics are its shifting frontiers, expanding at periods of strength and 
declining at times of weakness. Different languages, cultures and even religions coexisted, 
and its subjects were not subject to one single legal system applied to all those living 
within stable geographical frontiers, as is the case since the foundation of nation states in 
the modern era. One of the most important factors in the present-day crisis in Muslim 
thought is that it has not assimilated or interiorised this profound change affecting the 
shape of states, kingdoms and emirates. It functions with pre-imperial schemas now 
devoid of their foundations, continuing to adhere to fiqh, for example, although this by 
its nature is law concerning a particular community which may not live in a state which 
applies its laws to all its citizens whatever their religion, even if these laws may be influ-
enced by a particular religious heritage. The structures of the modern state, its capacity 
to enforce compliance and intervene in a wide range of areas go far beyond that of tradi-
tional state structures.
17.  See Balādhūri, نآدلبلا حوتف (Book of the Conquests of Lands), pp. 439–40, for the following 
tradition: “Abū Hurayra recounts that on his return from Bahrain he went to see ‘Umar. 
He said: ‘I met him at the moment of the night prayer, I greeted him, and he asked me for 
news of our people.’ Then he asked me: ‘What did you bring?’ I said: ‘I brought five 
hundred thousand.’ He said ‘Do you know what you are saying?’ I said: ‘One hundred 
thousand and one hundred thousand and I counted until five hundred thousand.’ He 
said: ‘You are sleepy, go back home and rest, come back and see me tomorrow morning.’ 
‘Abū Hurayra added: ‘I went back to see him.’ He said: ‘What have you brought?’ He 
said: ‘Is that good?’ I said: ‘Yes, I am sure.’ He said to the people: ‘He brought us much 
wealth. If you want we shall count it or if you want we shall weigh it.’” 
18. “Those who treasure up gold and silver and do not expend them in the way of God – give 
them the good news of a painful chastisement, the day they shall be heated in the fire of 
Gehenna and therewith their foreheads and sides and their backs shall be branded: ‘This 
is the thing you treasured up for yourselves:, therefore, taste you now what you were treas-
uring’” (Sūra 9:35). 
19.  The traditions relating to them are well-known and there is no need to describe them in 
detail. See the volumes containing biographies of the Companion such as Ibn Abd al- 
Barr, باعيتسلاا (Comprehension), Ibn al-Athīr, ةباغلا دسأ (Usd al-Ghāba) (Lion of the Forest) 
and Ibn Hajar, ةباصلإا (al-Isāba) (The Correct Answer) as well as the historical works 
among others. It is not only a question of the accumulation of wealth but goes beyond 
that to include failure to observe Islamic values in the field of ethics: an incident of this 
kind is the murder of Malik ibn Nuwayra al-Tamīmi by Khālid ibn Walīd, using a false 
pretext of apostasy. He then imposed himself on al-Tamīmi’s attractive widow, whom he 
was courting, without waiting for the legal delay or istibra’.
20. The book of al-Mawardi, نيدلا و ايندلا بدأ (adab al-dunya wa-l-dīn) (Literature of the World 
and of Religion) is a good example of this tendency. 
21. This is affirmed by the distinguished Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget. Hishām Charabi 
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makes the same point in his work (published in Arabic), The Patriarchal System and 
Backwardness in Arab Societies (Beirut, 1993), pp. 62–3. 
22. Al-Sarakhshi, ريبكلا ريسلا حرش (The Great Commentary on the Biographies and of Religion) 
(Hyderabad, 1355/1936), vol. I, pp. 125–6. Sufyān al-Thawri relies on the following verses: 
“Who so commits aggression against you, do you commit aggression against him” (Sūra 
2:191) and “Fight the unbelievers totally even as they fight you totally” (Sūra 9:36). 
Al-Sarakhshi corrects this viewpoint, saying that the order to engage in jihād and fighting 
was revealed progressively. The Prophet initially received the order to transmit the 
message and avoid the polytheists. Then he received the order to dialogue with them in 
the best possible way. Subsequently, he was authorised to fight them if they initiated 
hostilities. Then followed the command to fight outside of the sacred months, before 
being instructed simply to fight against them. Al-Sarakhshi expresses here the dominant 
interpretation justifying offensive war.
23. Al-Sarakhshi mentions the opinion of al-Awzā’i according to which “the Muslims are not 
permitted to carry out destructive acts in enemy territory because that constitutes 
disorder ( fasād) and God does not like disorder”. Al-Sarakhshi corrects this opinion 
saying: “If it is praiseworthy to construct, destruction is a motive for blame. But we say: 
since it is permitted to kill in order to reduce the power of the enemy – and this is the 
gravest of actions – it is all the more authorized to destroy buildings and cut down trees.” 
ريبكلا ريسلا حرش (The Great Commentary on the Biographies), vol. I, p. 35. 
Institutionalised Islam
 1. The allusion is to ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb. 
 2. See the present author’s thesis, “Arab thought’s reply to Christians”, ّ درلا يف يملاسلإا ركفلا 
ۍرآصنلا ىلع’, pp. 183–5.
 3. Al-Tijāni, writing at the beginning of the second/eighth century in his ‘ةلحر ( Journey) 
(Tunis, 1378/1958), p. 187, notes that “The inhabitants of Ghomrassen [in southern 
Tunisia] and the majority of those living in this mountainous region are Muslim only in 
name. None of them knows the name of the prayers, let alone how to pray in the approved 
manner. The same can be said of all the precepts of Islam. During the period we were 
there, we never heard a call to prayer and the voice of the muezzin was inaudible to us. I 
saw a place high up on their fortress that they term an oratory although the only person 
who prays is a stranger from Zaouara living among them … they do not wash their dead 
nor do they pray over them. The daughter inherits nothing from her father.”
 4. Concerning these disorders of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries see Ibn 
al-Jawzi, مظنملا (A Categorical Collection of the History of the Nations) (Beirut, 1992), vols 
13–15.
 5. See, for example, Ira M. Lapidus, “The Institutionalization of Early Islamic Societies” in 
Toby E. Huff and Wolfgang Schluchter (eds), Max Weber and Islam (New Brunswick 
and London, 1999), pp. 148–50. 
 6. The two angels who examine the dead in their graves as to the quality of their faith, 
questioning them about Muhammad. Both believers and non-believers are questioned. 
Their names do not appear in the Qur’an. Jewish traditions of a similar nature exist.
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 7. Caliph from 232/847 to 247/861. 
 8. Application of what is legally prescribed. 
 9. Sheikh Mahmūd Abū Rayya’s book, ةريضملا خيش (Shaikh al-Madhīra) contains numerous 
accounts of this.
10.  See Cl. Gilliot , “Portrait mythique d’Ibn ‘Abbās”, Arabica, XXXII, 1985, pp. 127–84.
11. In the well known tradition in which ‘Umar ibn al Khattāb and al-Hurmuzān appear after 
the conquest of Persia, the vanquished al-Hurmuzān addresses the victorious ‘Umar as 
follows: “We considered you, the Arabs, as no more than dogs.” See, for example, 
al-Sarakhshi, ريبكلا  رايسلا  حرش (The Great Commentary on the Biographies) (Hyderabad, 
1355/1937 ), vol. 1, p. 176.
12. Ibn Khaldoun, al-Muqadimmah: An Introduction to History (trans. Franz Rosenthal 
(Beirut, 1967–8), vol. I, p. 83. 
13. See, for example, the use of the theme of the spider’s web or that of the hatching of a 
dove’s eggs in a cave where a fugitive has taken refuge while his enemies are pursuing him. 
These famous anecdotes which concern the Hegira and the expedition of ‘Abdallah ibn 
Anīs appear in Al-Sarakhshi’s ريبكلا رايسلا حرش (The Great Commentary on the Biographies) 
vol. I, p. 179. It would be worth making a detailed comparison with themes present in the 
cultures of the Near East. 
14. Abū al Hasan al-‘Amīrī, ملاسلإا بقانمب ملاعلأا, (Guide to the Glories of Islam) (Cairo, 1967), 
pp. 118–19.
15. Mohammed Abd al-Jabri, in his book, يبرعلا  لقعلا  دقن (A Critical Study of Arab Ration-
ality) maintains that the Islamic sciences acquired their definitive form at an early stage. 
However, there are substantial differences between the scholarly production of the 
second/eighth and third/ninth centuries of the Hegira and that of the three following 
centuries. Nor can one downplay the efforts of Muslim scholars in the first/seventh 
century and the second half of the second/eighth century on the grounds that this 
thought was nonexistent, given the lack of texts whose authors can be identified prior to 
the period of codification. Arab or Islamic thought (if it can be referred to in the singular 
form), developed and took form gradually. The first, obscure period determined its essen-
tial characteristics.
The Elaboration of Institutional Theory 
 1. It is regrettable that serious research on this subject is still non-existent. Abū Sarī’ 
Muhammad’s يملاسلإا هقفلا يف هرآثا و هبابسأ ةباحصلا فلاتخا (The Disagreements Among the 
Companions: Causes and Consequences in Muslim Fiqh (Cairo, 1991), and other works of 
this kind are of very little use to the scholar.
 2. Ibn Khaldoun, The Muqadimmah: An Introduction to History, trans. from the Arabic by 
Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 1958), pp. 15–16.
 3. Ibn Khaldoun, The Muqadimmah, vol. 1, pp. 55–7.
 4. Ibn Khaldoun, The Muqadimmah, pp. 72–3. 
 5. Ibn Khaldoun, The Muqadimmah, p. 76.
 6. Ibn Khaldoun, The Muqadimmah, vol. II, p. 462.
 7. See Hunayda Hafsa, ىربكلا  ةنّ  ودملا  يف  ينآرقلا  ّ  صنلا  روضح (The Qur’anic Text in the 
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 Mudawwana l-Kubrā), diplôme d’études approfondies (DEA), Faculty of Arts and 
Humanities, University of Manouba, 1999).
 8. See M. Billig and D. Edwards, “La construction sociale de la mémoire”, La Recherche, vol. 
25, No. 267, juillet–aout 1994, p. 742. Frederick Bartlett, an English psychologist, has 
demonstrated that we process or modify the data that we receive before stocking it in our 
memory. Our memories are not mere copies of our perceptions. He found that people 
did not recall the exact words of a story, retaining them in a form of their own devising to 
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(Tunis, 1990).
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down upon thee the Book wherein are verses clear that are the Essence of the Book, and 
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body. He says: “We have interpretations that must only be expounded to scholars of inter-
pretation, those who are grounded in knowledge, because it is best, in our view, to stand 
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of abrogation was then brought into play. Traditions surrounding abrogation are not 
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traditions. Rāzi, al-Mahsūl, vol. IV, pp. 348–50.
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transmitted by multiple chains of transmission”. See Ibn Fūrak, نسحلا يبأ خيشلا تلااقم درجم 
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practical matters.” See ةلزتعملا ةحيضف  (The Scandal of the Mu‘tazila), p. 120. 
40 On the question of women in the medieval Muslim world see Gavin R. G. Hambly (ed.), 
Women in the Medieval Islamic World. Power, Patronage, and Piety (1998). 
41. Shāfi‘ī, ةلاسرلا (al-Risāla), 2nd edn (Cairo, 1979), p. 478.
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hadīth) (1992) (reproduction of the 1936 edition), vol. I, p. 468, article “hasan”. Al‘Izz ibn 
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these five statutes naturally entails a reward or a punishment, not only in the world to 
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46. See Jacques Derrida, “Force de loi: le fondement mystique de l’autorité”, Cardozo Law 
Review, vol. XI, July–August 1990, p. 960 : “Pour être juste ou injuste et pour exercer 
la justice, je dois être libre et responsable de mon action, de mon comportement, de ma 
pensée, de ma décision.” (“Being just or unjust, or exercising justice presupposes that I am 
free and responsible for my behaviour, thought, and decisions.”).
47. This is emphasised by Sheikh Fādhil ben Achour: “The science of usūl al fiqh has become 
a barrier for the schools of jurisprudence and an obstacle for the fuqahā’, limiting the 
dynamic of free interpretation initially untrammelled.” See تارضاحم (Lectures) (Tunis, 
1999), p. 346.
48. Muhammad al-Tāhir Ben Achour, ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا دصاقم (The Objectives of Islamic Sharia), 
Allāl al-Fāsi, اهمراكم و ةيملاسغلا ةعيرشلا دصاقم (The Objectives and Merits of Islamic Sharia), 
numerous editions in Morocco, including that of 1963. Nūr al-Dīn Būthūri’s The Objectives 
of Sharia: Contemporary Islamic Legislation: Aspiration of the Legist and Narrowness of 
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49. A good critical overview is provided by Muhammad Ta“allah in نيثدحملا  دنع  هقفلا  لوصأ 
(The Origins of Jurisprudence in the Modernist School (University of Kairouan, Faculty of 
Arts and Humanities, 2000).
50. This is the view of tafsīr that one finds in Ibn Khaldoun’s Muqaddimah as well as in the 
work of other contemporary authors. See on this subject, for example, Muhammad 
Husain al-Dhahabī, نورسفملا و ريسفتلا (Textual Commentary and Commentators) (Cairo, 
1967).
51. See Charfi, مويلا  و  سملأا  نيب  ةيفلسلا (The Salafist Tendency Yesterday and Today), تانبل 
(Building Bricks), pp. 35–53.
52. An example can be found in the tafsīr of al-Baydāwī for verse 7 of Sūra 93: “Did he not 
find thee erring and guide thee?” The commentator goes along with the popular belief in 
refusing to recognise that the Qur’an refers here to the Prophet’s being lost in the desert 
of idolatry and seeing an allusion to an incident in which the Prophet lost his way while 
searching for a lost camel.
53. The type of questions arising varies from one period of history to another. See, for 
example, verses 36–7 of Sūra 9 concerning the number of months in the calendar: “The 
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number of the months, with God, is twelve in the Book of God, the day that He created 
the heaven and the earth; four of them are sacred. That is the right religion … the month 
postponed is an increase of unbelief whereby the believers go astray; one year they make 
it profane, and allow it another, to make it agree with the number that God has allowed, 
and so profane what God has allowed.” While presenting no difficulty for traditional 
commentators, these verses may cause today’s readers to reflect on the circumstances and 
meaning of these verses, especially as they concern the period of the year in which fasting 
and pilgrimages took place. In the pre-Islamic period the Arabs added the supplementary 
month so that the pilgrimage period coincided with the spring. 
54. See Muhammad Hamza, ثيدحلا يملاسلإا ركفلا يف هتلزنم و يوبنلا ثيدحلا (Prophetic Tradition 
and its Place in Contemporary Islamic Thought), diplôme d’études approfondies (Faculty 
of Arts and Humanities, University of Manouba, 1992) and Hamādi Dhuwayb, لاصا ةنسلا 
يرجه سماخلا نرقلا ةياهن ىلإ هقفلا لوصا نم (Sunna as a Source of Jurisprudence up until the 
Fifth Century of the Hegira), diplôme d’études approfondies, (Faculty of Arts and Human-
ities, University of Manouba, 1993).
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the Islamic scale of values. It reflects social values prevailing in the Arabian peninsula. 
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question from being part of a chain of transmission. 
56. The classic source is the Muqadimma of Ibn al-Salāh, often reprinted in Cairo and Beirut. 
See the Cairo edition, 1990.
57. Ibn al-Salāh, Muqadimma, 1990.
58. Subhī Sālih, in ثيدحلا مولع (Hadīth Sciences) (Beirut, 1956), suggests that hadīth criticism 
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59. Ibn Khaldoun, The Muqadimmah, vol. III, p. 34.
60. See the useful observations of Gustave Le Bras in “Réflexions sur les différences entre 
sociologie scientifique et sociologie pastorale”, in Archives de sociologie des religions, t. 
VIII, 1959, pp. 5–14. See also Mūna Abū Zayd about the role of theology in يملاكلا ركفلا 
نودلخ نبا دنع (Theology in the Works of Ibn Khaldoun) (Beirut, 1977), pp. 32–6. 
61. Jāhiz, ناويحلا (al-Hayawān) (Beirut, 1969), vol. II, pp. 134–5. 
62. ‘Abd al Jabbār ibn Ahmad, لضف  لازتعلاا (The Merit of the Mu‘tazalite School ) (Tunis, 
1974), p. 185.
63. Ibn al-Bazzāz al-Kurdī, مظعلأا ماملإا بقانم. ةفينح يبأ . (The Virtues of the Great Imam Abū 
Hanīfa) (Hyderabad, 1912), vol. I, p. 122.
64. Ibn Abī Ya’lā, ةلبانحلا  .  مظعلأا ماملإا  بقانم.تاقبط (Tabaqāt al-Hanābila) (Categories of the 
Hanbalites) (Cairo, 1998), vol. I, p. 2. 
65. On this central question in sociology, see the important article published by Milton 
Rokeach in Psychological Review, vol. 61, 1954, No. 8, pp. 194–204. 
66. Ghaylān al-Dimashqi was executed under the Caliph Hishām ibn Abd al-Mālik 
(105/723–125/742) with the support of al-Awzā’i. Ja’d ibn Dirham was slain by Khālid ibn 
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